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Abstract
Foreign policy decision-making is often an obscured process, particularly
when it involves threats to national security or national interests. Despite the lack of
transparency, though sometimes necessary, foreign policy decisions can have farreaching consequences. Policymakers establish and affect relationships with other
governments, and can commit state resources for cooperation or for conflict.
The purpose of this study is to determine what types of decision units make
foreign policy decisions and what factors influence the dynamics of the unit.
I employ the decision units (DU) framework developed by Margaret Hermann to
decisions made by the United States and Israel during the 1973Yom Kippur War
until the signing of the Sinai II Agreement. I identify and classify the units, which
constitute both a crisis and crisis transition period. In addition, this study tests the
effects of shocks or feedback on decision unit dynamics.
The results of the study reveal that more decisions were made more often by
one individual during the crisis than during the crisis transition period. External
shocks did not appear to have a significant effect on the type of decision unit, except
for the initial shock of the war. Internal political shocks occurred in both the United
States and Israel during the transition period, affecting regime change and thus a
change in key actors involved in the decision-making process.

v

Pertaining to the effects of feedback, negative feedback influenced decision
unit dynamics in the U.S. during the crisis. For Israel, negative feedback as a result of
a crisis decision affected the nature of the decision unit, but in the transition period.
In other words, there was no change in decision unit dynamics until after the
conclusion of hostilities. Positive feedback did not appear to influence the nature of
the decision unit.
Overall, the study demonstrates that as the crisis subsided and transitioned
to a less stressful, non-crisis situation, single group decision-making became more
prevalent. The study also shows that decision unit dynamics helped determine
policy outcomes.
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Who Decides?

Chapter One
Introduction
“The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the
observer – often, indeed, to the decider himself…There will always
be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-making process –
mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved.”
John F. Kennedy

The Research Puzzle
Foreign policy decisions: Who decides?
Nations engage in foreign policy making in different ways, dependent upon a
number of factors, including government structure (e.g., democratic or autocratic,
parliamentary or presidential), a state’s position in the international system, and
societal or cultural features. Foreign policy and foreign affairs are often economic or
military in nature. Policies and agendas tend to be common knowledge, with
information reaching the public via speeches or the media. Specific decisions
become public knowledge when governments announce they are pursuing a
particular course of action. However, the process by which policymakers recognize
an issue or problem and then reach a conclusion or solution to the problem is far
from public and sometimes entirely secretive. Because of the often elusive nature of

Chapter One

1

Introduction
the foreign policy process, it is sometimes difficult to understand why a government
pursues a certain policy or action. In other words, how do policymakers come to this
particular decision or reach that specific solution? Specifically pertaining to my
study is how specific individual actors involved in decision-making affect the
process and eventual outcome.
In trying to understand the “why” of foreign policy decisions, an important
first step is identifying “who” exactly makes the decision. Which actor or actors form
the decisional unit, and what is their role within that unit? The purpose of this study
is to help explain the decision process and eventual outcomes through an
examination of the decision unit or units involved. The study seeks to uncover how
certain endogenous and exogenous factors might affect the configuration of the
decision unit and if this in turn affects the outcome. Simply put, I attempt to
determine why, or if, decision unit dynamics might vary throughout the course of a
crisis and subsequent crisis transition period. The key independent variables in the
study are feedback (positive and negative) and shocks (domestic and international).
A multitude of scholars has endeavored to get inside the “black box” of
government in order to better understand the role of individual actors in the foreign
policy decision-making process. Some of the discourse has focused on whether
states should be considered unitary actors, or whether we must examine individuals
and their preferences when studying foreign policy decisions. Kenneth Waltz (1979,
100) asserts that foreign policy behavior need not be examined at the individual
level at all but rather behavior and outcomes can be explained by looking at the
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international-political system. The structure of the system “affects both the
interactions of states and their attributes.” The organization of units and the
distribution of capabilities define the system.
J. David Singer (1961, 80) argues that system level analysis may “exaggerate
the impact of the system upon the national actors…and discount the impact of the
actors on the system.” As the primary actor in international relations, examination
at the nation-state level allows for differentiation of states and, thus, a comparative
approach toward state behavior. However, as Singer points out, comparison at the
state level has several disadvantages as well. For instance, researchers may have a
tendency to overemphasize differences between states, which could potentially
involve value bias on the part of the researcher – i.e., ethnocentrism (Singer 1967;
Waltz 1959). Also at issue is whether the behavior of a particular state is purposive
and goal seeking, and, if so, how and why they pursue such goals. Although Singer
does not elaborate on alternative models or units of analysis, he implies that the
study of decision-making at the national level could be enriched by examining the
individuals “operating within the institutional framework” of the state (Singer 1961,
88).
Each of these levels of analysis has its merits. Indeed, each has demonstrated
validity in explaining international relations and foreign policy behavior – although
Waltz would argue that it is not his intent nor inclination to explain specific foreign
policy decisions. However, since specific decisions are made at the individual level,
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whether by one actor or a group of actors, decision processes (structured or ad hoc),
rules and norms, and decision unit structure matter in foreign policy outcomes.
At the individual level, many studies seek to explain one specific decision.
These case studies tend to focus on a significant or historic decision. While these
cases may explain how a decisional unit arrived at a particular decision, they often
provide just a snapshot or a single frame in an episode or series of decisions
(Hermann 2001). An examination of a sequence of decisions may better explain a
government’s strategy or its means of coping with a particular issue.
Of particular interest to scholars has been foreign policy decisions made in
crisis situations. The time constraints and high stress levels which crises evoke tend
to be publicly dramatic, newsworthy, and atypical. Because crisis situations are
atypical, one aspect of my research will be to examine possible changes in the
decision unit dynamics during the transitional period from crisis to non-crisis. While
much has been written on crisis as well as routine decision-making, few scholars
have examined the post-crisis or the transitional period immediately following a
crisis (Brecher 1980). In addition, few researchers have specifically addressed or
identified possible influences that may affect the subsequent structure or dynamics
of a particular decisional unit. (I have found no studies that apply the DU framework
to sequential decision-making.)
For this study, I apply the decision unit (DU) framework developed by
Margaret Hermann (2001) to explore how or why the dynamics of decisional units
might change through a series of decisions involving one foreign policy issue or
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problem. The DU framework specifies three types of authoritative decision units –
predominant leader, single group, and coalition – that are designed to subsume the
various decision-making entities that can be found within different types of
governments. My study will attempt to elaborate on the relationship between the
occasion for decision (the point at which policymakers recognize that a problem
exists) and the authoritative decision unit. In order to explore this relationship, I
identify and classify different types of occasions of decision, such as related
feedback from a previous decision or new information relating to the problem at
hand that might affect the structure of the decision unit.
The study examines how policy feedback, as a result of one or more decisions
made during the crisis, influences and/or mingles with information from the
environment to shape the nature of subsequent decisions and, hence, the nature or
type of subsequent decisional unit (Beasley et al. 2001). Examining the American
and Israeli actors involved in decision-making during the Yom Kippur War, I also
consider internal and external shocks in order to determine if the decision unit is
influenced by other significant events. In other words, I evaluate whether or not
other crises occurred during the time period of the study, and if those events had an
impact on the nature of the decision unit.
This study will also test the overall applicability of the DU framework to
sequential decisions. Most studies that have applied the DU framework focus on one
particular decision rather than on a series of related decisions. Scholars recognize
that policymaking is an ongoing process consisting of a series of decisions. Each of
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these builds upon previous decisions, reacts to previous decisions, and/or creates
new opportunities for choice (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1954; Lindblom 1959;
Brecher 1979; Steinbruner 2002; Hermann 2001). Occasionally, policymakers will
recognize that a problem exists, but the actors involved in the decision process will
choose to forego a decision or to search for more information. Although Hermann
refers to this occurrence as a “non-decision,” I view this choice as a decision to do
nothing. In the scope of foreign policy decision-making, doing nothing has been
shown to have significant consequences.
Applying the DU framework developed by Hermann (2001), this study
compares the decision units of the Israeli and American governments as they
pertain to key decisions made during the period extending from the onset of the
1973 Yom Kippur War to the signing of the Sinai II Agreement in 1975. I examine
the sequential decision-making processes of these two governments in order to test
the effects of certain factors on decision unit dynamics. The selection of the time
frame allows me to examine changes in the type of decision unit or changes
occurring within the decision unit as the international environment transitions from
a crisis situation to non-crisis conditions. I argue that upon the conclusion of
hostilities, the decision unit dynamic likely became less cohesive, allowing
dissenting viewpoints to surface, despite the potential for a return to military
engagement. Specifically, pertaining to the DU framework, the structure of the
decision unit likely grew to include additional members or was replaced with a new
type of unit upon the conclusion of hostilities. As the environment became less
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contentious and more stable, additional policymakers perhaps were included in the
decision-making process.
I also compare the decision-making processes taking place within each
country to identify any changes in process outcomes associated with changes in the
decision unit or changes in leadership. For example, did Henry Kissinger’s role in the
decision-making process change following the resignation of Richard Nixon and the
ascension of Gerald Ford to the presidency? If so, did this result in any changes to
process outcomes?
Examining the possible impact of feedback and new information on foreign
policy decision-making, this study will incorporate elements of the cybernetics
approach (Steinbruner 2002) into the DU framework. The cybernetics approach
focuses on the potential influence that policy feedback and prior decisions have on
future decisions (Billings and Hermann 1998; Mintz and DeRouen 2010; OzkececiTaner 2006; Steinbruner 2002). Cybernetics involves information processing,
specifically, policymakers’ recognition of negative feedback and select information
from the environment that may indicate that the policy needs to be readdressed.
John Steinbruner (2002) refers to this process as control through feedback.
Because many decision-making processes tend to be complex, governments
establish structured channels in order to facilitate the flow of potential feedback or
new information. As such, policymakers become sensitive to particular information
only if it comes in through the established channels. Monitoring policy feedback and
select information from the environment prevents decision-makers from having to
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recalculate the array of possible policy outcomes and allows for incremental
changes to the previous policy decision (Steinbruner 2002; Hermann 1990; Billings
and Hermann; 1998; Ozkececi-Taner 2006). As Charles Hermann (1990, 9)
summarizes, “an essential feature of [the cybernetic approach] is that an agent,
attempting to pursue some standard or goal, continuously monitors a select stream
of information from the environment that indicates where he is in relation to that
goal and how the relation has altered across intervals of time.”
To summarize, I will apply the DU framework to sequential decision-making,
employing specific elements of the cybernetics approach. The research will focus on
changes in the type or nature of the decision unit and whether those changes were
influenced by feedback from previous decisions, new information, or shocks to the
environment. Assessing such changes can help identify who makes foreign policy
decisions and whether the introduction of new actors, the withdrawal (or removal)
of existing actors, or a shift in the specific type of decision unit results in a change in
policy outcomes.

Conceptual Framework
The DU framework is a contingency model that incorporates an assortment
of previously developed foreign policy decision-making models, allowing for the
utilization of case-appropriate theories and models under one framework umbrella.
The framework suggests in what political structures, kinds of problems, and
situations each type is expected to prevail (Hermann 2001, 49). Table 1.1
summarizes the decision unit dynamics and the theories on which the DU
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framework is based. The nature of the decision unit and the key contingencies
suggest particular process outcome characteristics.
The specification of the decisional unit and the proposed key contingencies
that inform the decision process allow for various models and theories to be
considered within the framework. For example, a predominant leader who is
insensitive to the contextual information provided by the environment will tend to
demonstrate a principled approach to the decision process. Personal goals, beliefs,
and principles of the predominant leader likely will drive the decision process.
Theories that exemplify this particular aspect of the DU and decision process
include personality theories such as those based on social learning, biological,
and/or psychoanalytical factors. Although many of these theories are the
underpinnings of the DU framework, my research focuses primarily on the types of
decision units and how they might change over the course of a series of decisions in
a crisis situation.
Because crisis events are often fluid and unpredictable, I argue that there
usually is the possibility that change will occur regarding the problem or issue,
resulting in a potential for change in the nature or structure of the decision unit. Of
course, a change in the problem does not imply or necessitate a change in the
decision unit, only that the opportunity or potential exists for the decision unit to
undergo a change in structure or dynamic. Moreover, a change in the decision unit
does not necessarily result in a change in goals or objectives. Likewise, a new
occasion for decision, i.e. feedback, external or internal shocks, might not result in a
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TABLE 1.1 Decision Unit Dynamics
Decision Unit
Process
Predominant Leader

Single Group

Coalition

Key Contingency

Theories Exemplify

Sensitivity to Contextual Information:
(a) Relatively Insensitive
(Goals and Means Well-Defined)

Decision

Personality Theory

Principled

(b) Moderately Sensitive
(Goals Well-Defined, Means
Flexible; Political Timing Important)

Theories Based on the Person/
Situation Interaction

Strategic

(c) Highly Sensitive

Theories Focused on the
Situation Alone

Pragmatic

Group Dynamics
(“Groupthink”)

Deny Conflict and
Seek Concurrence

(b) Members Acknowledge Conflict
Is Unavoidable; Group Must Deal
With It (Members’ Loyalty Outside
Group; Unanimity Decision Rule)

Bureaucratic Politics

Resolve Conflict
Through Debate
and Compromise

(c) Members Recognize Conflict
May Have No Resolution
(Members’ Loyalty Outside Group)

Minority/Majority Influence
and Jury Decision Making

Accept Conflict
and Allow for
Winning Majority

Nature of Rules/Norms Guiding Interaction
(a) No Established Rules for Decision Making

Theories of Political Instability

Anarchy

(b) Established Norms Favor Majority Rule

Theories of Coalition Formation

Minimum Connected
Winning Coalition

(c) Established Norms Favor Unanimity Rule

Theories Regarding Development Unit Veto
of Under- and Over-Sized Coalitions

Techniques Used to Manage Conflict in Group:
(a) Members Act to Minimize Conflict
(Members Loyal to Group)

Source: Margaret G. Hermann, 2001, “How Decision Unites Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework,” International Studies Review, Vol. 3,
No. 2, pg. 67.
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different type of decision unit, but it may alter the dynamics of the unit. For
example, during the time period in this study, Gerald Ford assumed the presidency
upon the resignation of Richard Nixon; and, when Golda Meir of Israel relinquished
her post as Prime Minister, she was replaced by Yitzhak Rabin. Should this study
classify Richard Nixon or Golda Meir as “predominant leaders” at some point during
the decision-making process, I then evaluate what types of changes, if any, occurred
upon their exit from office. Also, I evaluate what type of unit subsequently emerged
to address the ongoing crisis.
During crisis periods, multiple decisions are made, or considered, in order to
address the immediate threats of the situation. Some of these decisions are technical
and military in nature, while others are decidedly political. Other decisions span
both the military and political spectrums. I intend to examine the decisions that are
primarily political in nature. While military decisions can, and often do, generate
occasions for decisions for policymakers (see Graham Allison’s organizational
process model),1 they are not themselves political decisions. However, decisions
that involve military components must necessarily be included in the study. For
example, I consider Golda Meir’s initial decision not to launch a preemptive military
strike, as well as her request for military aid from the United States. The request
itself was for military purposes, but it was political insofar as it would force the U.S.
into taking a public, political, and pro-Israel stance, setting the United States in
direct opposition to the Soviet Union and her clients, Egypt and Syria. Though
military decisions may affect political considerations, this study will not include the
array of military decisions made on the battlefield.
Chapter One
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The aim in identifying feedback from a particular decision is not to evaluate
the effectiveness of that decision (except to identify the feedback as positive or
negative), but rather to determine whether a specific decision and subsequent
action of a decision unit resulted in a specific response. Although there may be no
observable response or identifiable feedback, the possibility exists that decisionmakers could perceive that feedback has occurred as a result of their decision. No
response, for example, can generate multiple signals, depending upon the policy
action. It can indicate to decision-makers that the policy choice was acceptable,
leading the decision-makers to proceed as planned. Or it can indicate a rejection of
the policy. Much depends on the attitudes, perceptions, and goals of the
policymakers themselves. The evidence of which might be found in the debates that
arise subsequent to the initial onset of the crisis.
Although other state actors were involved in the crisis and non-crisis
periods, I chose these two governments based on several requirements. Israel is an
obvious choice, as she was the recipient or target of hostilities. It could be argued
that Egypt and Syria, the perpetrators of the war, should be included in the study.
Although Syria no doubt played a significant role in the prosecution of the war and
helped Egypt gain an early military advantage, Syria was not involved in the final
disengagement agreement in 1975 (Sinai II). Syrian President Hafez Assad refused
to attend the summit conference in Geneva in December 1973. Syria’s sole
motivation in the conflict was to recover the Golan Heights lost in the 1967 Six Day
War. There were no indications that Assad wished to engage in any sort of
diplomatic relationship with Israel; and, to this day, Syria does not recognize Israel’s
Drake
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right to exist. Moreover, there is no accessibility to any primary source
documentation and secondary sources recounting the decision-making process at
that time is severely limited.
Egypt, on the other hand, was the primary actor and orchestrated the
coordination of the war. As in the case of Syria, acquiring relevant data for Egypt is
also problematic. Most, if not all, of the primary documents pertaining to Egyptian
decisions are not readily available. Although the Egyptian government recently
announced plans to release 600 pages of official documents pertaining to the 1973
war, the government claims that the documents, which cover the period from 5 June
1967 (the beginning of the Six Day War) through the end of the Yom Kippur War,
would not contain any military papers.2 It remains unclear if any of the official
documents to be released would include minutes of high-level meetings. It would be
necessary, therefore, to rely solely upon the personal accounts of the actors involved
in government meetings or upon second-hand reporting. A survey of these accounts
could possibly enable the identification of the decision unit structures. Indeed,
Hermann (2001) maintains that primary sources are not an absolute necessity.
However, the results of the research could be skewed, owing to the overwhelming
discrepancies in the amount of data available for each of the governments in the
case study.
The Soviet Union was also drawn into the crisis, and could be considered for
this study. Soviet involvement affected decisions across all of the governmental
decision units. In addition, both Egypt and Syria were client states of Moscow, which
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presented a counterweight to the U.S. role. Given its adversarial superpower role in
what was then a bipolar international system, a thorough assessment of the
decisional units at the Kremlin would add an additional dimension to the study. I
opted to exclude them based on two factors: 1) military advisers and their families
had been expelled from Egypt prior to the onset of war; thus, Soviet influence in
Egypt had dissipated, and Sadat had little use for Moscow but for equipment and
leverage against the U.S. in negotiations (Sadat 1978); and 2) except for Moscow’s
participation in the Geneva Conference, the Soviets were effectively excluded from
the negotiating process. As in the cases of Syria and Egypt, documentation regarding
the Soviet decision process is not readily available.
The decision to include the U.S. in the study stems from America’s pivotal
role in negotiating a ceasefire accord, a military disengagement agreement, and,
eventually, a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The role of the United States in
this particular series of events was arguably one of mediator and facilitator, which
could point a researcher toward using theories and models that deal with
negotiations, the role of intermediaries, or conflict resolution. While it could be
argued that theories and models that explain state behavior under these conditions
would be better suited for examining U.S. involvement, there are several obstacles
to this approach. First, one could argue that the United States was not simply a
neutral party to the conflict, nor were there benign repercussions for the U.S. in the
resulting negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Although the U.S. was actively
engaged in a diplomatic solution to the crisis, America also provided substantial
military aid to Israel both during and after the war. Politically, the U.S. at the very
Drake
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least considered Israel a client state, as Israel was the only democratic state in the
Middle East.
Second, the United States had a vested interest in returning stability, i.e.,
economic stability, to the Middle East. During the war, the Arab members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced an oil embargo
against the United States and other countries that supported Israel, including the
Netherlands, South Africa, and Portugal. The embargo prohibited the exportation of
oil to targeted countries, as well as calling for cuts in production. By the onset of the
war, America had become increasingly dependent on foreign oil, and the embargo
naturally strained the U.S. economy.
Third, the bipolar structure of the international system at the time of the
conflict and the competitive nature of the foreign policy environment was a
motivating factor for the United States to take a leadership role in the crisis and to
simultaneously marginalize Soviet influence. Becoming involved in negotiating a
ceasefire or peace settlement was an opportunity for America to establish a
relationship with Egypt, which had been one of Moscow’s client states in the Middle
East. Additionally, any scenario that drew the U.S. and Soviet Union into an
international crisis – particularly when their respective clients were facing a
military confrontation – would naturally elevate America’s role, as well as that of the
Soviet’s, from intermediary to potential participant. Once again, this is evidenced by
the fact that both governments put their militaries on full nuclear alert status during
the war.
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Ultimately, the inclusion of the United States in this study presents the
opportunity to more accurately test the validity of the DU framework, due to the
amount, ease, and availability of data. Unlike Egypt, Syria, or the Soviet Union, the
United States has released classified documents, reports, and telephone
conversations that took place during the time frame. Although not all information is
available, enough should be obtainable to make the determinations necessary for
this study.

Definitions of Terms
One of the primary concepts at issue in this investigation is the definition of
an international crisis. Clarifying what constitutes a crisis will help to delineate the
conditions and time frame of the observed episode. According to Charles Hermann
(1972), an event may be deemed an international crisis if: (1) it threatens highpriority goals of decision-makers; (2) both the response time and policy actions or
decisions are restricted; and (3) the event comes as a surprise to members of the
decision-making unit. Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing (1978) suggest that an
international crisis comprises a “sequence of interactions between the governments
of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving
the perception of a dangerously high probability of war” (6). Michael Brecher
(1979, 447) maintains that an international crisis consists of (1) a change in the
internal or external environment that (2) generates a threat to basic values, which
(3) creates a “high probability of involvement in military hostilities,” and (4) the
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“awareness of a finite time for their response to the external value threat.” Each of
these definitions emerges from a decision-making perspective; thus, a situation can
be classified as a crisis if decision-makers perceive that threats to high-priority goals
or national security exist (Hermann 1972; Brecher 1979).
A key feature of international crises is a state’s uncertainty of “each other’s
willingness to impose a settlement” (Powell 1999, 86). Powell’s model pertains to
what Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (1992) refer to as “neorealist
version” of interaction games, in which the “players are states rather than individual
leaders [whose] preferences are entirely determined by the realpolitik national
interests, and domestic politics is considered largely irrelevant” (Ye 2007, 323).
However, Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) are not concerned with national
interests, per se, but rather the interests of the decision-makers.
The systemic perspective views an international crisis as a significant change
in the normal interaction pattern between nation-states (Young 1967; McClelland
1968; McCormick 1978), which are considered to be the primary actors in
international relations. This definition is not particularly concerned with
perceptions but rather with the decisions of states and changes in state behavior. As
James McCormick (1978) maintains, utilizing the definition of an international crisis
solely from a decision-making perspective or a systemic perspective can be
problematic because one group of researchers may not recognize the alternate
definition. Additionally, “both approaches rely on arbitrary specifications of crisis
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thresholds” (356). McCormick suggests applying both criteria when determining
whether a crisis situation exists and, if so, when the crisis begins and when it ends.
When examining individual actors and groups in the decision-making
process, the definition of international crisis must be considered from the
perspective of those actors. Clearly, evidence of an immediate threat or impending
military hostilities constitutes a crisis; however, policymakers react or respond to
perceived threats, whether or not an actual crisis exists. Stemming from
McCormick’s (1978) treatment of international crises, this study utilizes the
definition from a systemic perspective as well as a decision-making perspective. An
international crisis, therefore, consists of (1) a significant change in the normal
interactions between states, which (2) generates a high-level threat to values, and
(3) a high probability of military conflict. The definition also consists of decisionmakers understanding or recognizing a finite amount of time to respond to the
threat. However, unlike the systemic perspective, this study views domestic politics
as highly relevant.
Analysis of governmental decision units requires a working definition of
decision. Essentially, a decision is a choice made by an individual actor or a group of
actors for a course of action in pursuit of a particular goal or purpose (Steinbruner
2002; Hermann and Hermann 1989; Hermann 1990; Hermann 2001; Hudson et. al.
2002; Mintz 2004b). The goal or purpose can be viewed as a value or objective.
Regarding foreign policy decisions, some argue that it matters whether the decision
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unit is one individual or a group of individuals (Steinbruner 2002; Hagan 2001;
Hermann 2001; Ozkececi-Taner 2006; Kuperman and Ozkececi-Taner 2006).
The occasion for decision is a key element in the DU framework and the
primary independent variable in this study. An elaboration on this component,
therefore, seems warranted. Essentially, occasions for decision represent the points
in time when policymakers acknowledge a specific problem and are faced with
making a choice in order to cope with the problem (Hermann 2001). Individuals
involved in the decision-making process must feel the need to take action even if the
action is the decision to do nothing at all or to search for additional information.
Thus, one problem can, and often does, include a number of occasions for decision
that need to be addressed across time. Hermann (2001) maintains that these
occasions for decision might be addressed by the same type of decision unit or by all
three types of decision units. The occasion for decision, triggered by a foreign policy
problem, is the initial step in the decision-making process in the DU framework.
Specific variables in this study include internal shocks, external shocks, and
outcome feedback. When analyzing and comparing governmental entities, regime
type would be a significant variable. However, as the United States and Israel are
both rated as totally free democracies,3 regime type will not be a variable in this
study but rather will be considered an assumption.
Internal shocks are visible and dramatic events that occur within the
domestic context. As noted earlier, one such event in my study entails the
resignation of President Richard Nixon in 1974. Although not directly related to the
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Yom Kippur War, the scandal and subsequent removal and replacement of a sitting
president directly affects the state’s ability to conduct foreign policy. While
Kissinger remained the Secretary of State, it is the President of the U.S. who wields
the ultimate authority to commit the state resources in many foreign policy matters.
Of particular interest is the effect the event may have had on the decision unit
managing the crisis. For example, did the decision unit undergo a categorical
change; or, conversely, did the decision unit remain constant, with only the
participants changing seats?
External shocks, by comparison, are visible and dramatic events that occur
outside of the control of any of the governments in this study. India’s first nuclear
test in 1974 caught the United States by surprise, for instance, about the same time
that Lebanon began to experience a civil war that would last more than 15 years.
Although external shocks are not likely to directly affect a change in the types of
decision units of the governments being studied, I argue that these events might
present a distraction, with the result that the authority to commit resources may
have been transferred to another actor, possibly resulting in a change in the nature
of the decision unit.
Feedback is another variable that could affect a change in the decision unit.
In relation to this study, feedback is essentially responses or reactions to key
decisions that signal policymakers whether the action requires modification.4 I
argue that negative feedback is more likely to become a factor in changing the type
or the dynamics of a decision unit during a crisis event. Positive feedback reinforces
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policy behavior and institutions, while negative feedback calls into question the
effectiveness of the policy. Both positive and negative feedback can be assessed
through the debates and discussions of decision-makers.

Summary of Methodology
My research is a “comparative-historical” case study, employing a temporal
component to across- and within-unit variations (Gerring 2004). That is, the study
will examine the decision units across the selected governments as well as the
decision units within each government over a two-year time frame. I consider the
Yom Kippur War and its immediate aftermath as a single or continuous event. Using
the occasion for decision as the unit of analysis, I will be able to assess and compare
any changes in the decision unit dynamics between and within the governments of
Israel and the United States.
Applying the DU framework involves identifying key decisions for each
government and then isolating the occasions for decision that initiated the decisionmaking process. As Hermann (2001) maintains, the DU framework requires the
researcher to isolate the occasions for decision that “lead to authoritative actions on
the part of the government in dealing with a perceived foreign policy problem” (55;
author’s emphasis), as opposed to those occasions for decision that seek additional
information about a problem, implement a previous decision, or ratify a decision.
Hermann directs the researcher to examine only those occasions that result in an
“authoritative decision on what the government is going to do or not do with regard
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to the problem at hand” (55). Perhaps an examination of one decision warrants
adhering to the criteria mentioned above. Because this study involves sequential
decision-making, the criteria limit the scope of key decision selection. Indeed,
several decisions that impacted the decision process were not actionable decisions.
By including these types of decisions in the study, I demonstrate the relevance of
“non-decisions” in the decision-making process.
I classify each occasion for decision (discussed below) in order to assess,
first, whether there is a relationship between the type of occasion for decision and
the decision unit that emerged, and, secondly, whether the emergence of a certain
type of occasion for decision may affect a change in the type of decision unit
involved in the process. In essence, I will examine foreign policy feedback loops and
inputs from the environment in order to assess structural changes or the nature and
extent of changes in decision unit dynamics.
Once the types of decision units for each occasion for decision have been
identified, I will assess whether changes occurred in each unit and what factors may
have precipitated the change. Some might be more obvious than others (the
resignation of President Nixon, for example), while others might be more
ambiguous. I will focus on three potential factors in affecting change in the decision
unit: feedback regarding a previous decision made during the crisis, internal shocks,
and external shocks. Moreover, these factors will be considered only if the member
or members of the decision unit perceived them to be relevant to the issue or
decision at hand. For example, negative public opinion would not be considered
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negative feedback, if the decision unit did not engage in discussions or debates
regarding public opinion. Such indications of individual or group perceptions might
be gleaned from debates or meeting records. While shocks and feedback certainly
occurred during the time period in the study, one cannot necessarily discern if those
instances resulted in a change in any of the decision unit or policy outcome without
a review of the debates, discussions, or reports related to those events.
Returning to the primary element I will be examining in the DU framework,
the occasion for decision, or the recognition of a policy problem, will be the impetus
for the emergence of a decision unit. While Hermann (2001) establishes the
occasion for decision as the unit of analysis, in order to ascertain whether a new
occasion for decision results in a change in the type or nature of the decision unit, I
will need to treat the “occasion for decision” also as an independent variable. As
such, I will classify the occasions for decision into 6 possible categories:
External shock
Positive feedback
New information

Internal shock
Negative feedback
Other/unknown

Hermann suggests that a change in the preferences of one or more members
in a decision unit can affect the structure or dynamic of that unit. Generally, one
does not arbitrarily change preferences without reason. I maintain that the
categories listed above will encompass some of the reasons for a change in
preferences and, hence, a potential change in the decision unit dynamic. President
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Nixon’s resignation, for example, can be classified as an internal shock. But even if
the event did not trigger an “occasion for decision” for either of the two decisional
units (U.S. and Israel) during the timeframe studied, it may still be considered as an
independent or intervening variable.
The study also requires an examination of whether each government had the
formal structures or established institutional rules and norms that governed foreign
policy decision-making during the period in question. Institutional rules and norms
might include bureaucratic processes such as information gathering and
management; or they could involve managing group conflicts and decision
procedures. For example, the rules governing a particular committee decision might
require a unanimous vote. Established rules or norms affect the decision process
and, thus, the process outcome.
The research requires the use of both primary and secondary sources in
determining the key decisions and the subsequent decision units. Primary sources
of evidence for the Israeli occasions for decision are available through the Israel
State Archives; however, much of the documentation is in Hebrew. While this may
hinder somewhat the process of analyzing the data, translation of Israeli documents
into English is possible through research assistants. Other documents available at
the Israel State Archives are the records from the Bureaus of Prime Ministers Golda
Meir and Yitzhak Rabin (1969-1977) and the personal documents of Golda Meir
(1925-1984), including declassified material. Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda
Reinharz (1984) produced a volume of historically significant Israeli documents in
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English. Chapters in the volume include the Interim Report of the Agranat
Commission,5 which was the result of a formal investigation into the failures of
Israeli military and intelligence analysts at the beginning of the war, as well as
essays that address the onset of the October War and the protest activity following
the publication of the Agranat Commission’s Report.
As not all of the relevant Israeli documents have been declassified, secondary
sources will also be necessary for this study. Other sources of evidence for Israel’s
decision units will include letters, cables, transcripts of conversations, and meetings,
where available. In some cases, no records of meetings were kept. Also, biographies,
speeches, and records of interviews and personal accounts will help reveal the
actors involved in the series of decisions.
Data pertaining to decisions made by the United States can be gleaned from
the National Security Archives, including the Kissinger transcripts of telephone
conversations with various policymakers, including Richard Nixon, Brent Scowcroft,
the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Golda Meir,
and Chief of Staff Alexander Haig. Documents and archival material can be found at
the Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library,
the Department of State, and through Congressional records. Various academic
publications on American foreign policy and biographical studies will also provide
insights into the U.S. decision-making process.
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Limitations and Contributions of the Study
This research examines the decision units employed by two governments
under two specific conditions: an international crisis period and the transition
period immediately following the crisis. Although the timeframe under this study
encompasses both a crisis as well as a transition period, my research essentially
treats the entire timeframe as one case study (single event examined over time),
comprising two units: Israel and the United States. A large-N study that includes a
comprehensive examination or comparative analysis of a number of crises, narrow
enough to consider only military conflicts, would provide some external validity.
Given the specificity of the crisis environment, the results of this study are unlikely
to be applicable to all types of foreign policy decisions. However, this study should
be able to say something about the actors and decision units involved in sequential
decision-making during an international crisis. In addition, the results of the study
may provide insight into the decision-making dynamics of governments in
transition from an international crisis to a non-crisis situation.
It is also probable that crisis decision-making is heavily influenced by the
international system. Policy alternatives can differ significantly in a bipolar system
than from policy choices embedded in a unipolar or multipolar system. Would
Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy, for example, occur under the current international
system? Would Sadat have decided to attack Israel had it not been for superpower
competition and the probability that each superpower would take steps to limit the
scope of the conflict? This is not to suggest that systems theory might better explain
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most foreign policy decisions in a crisis, only that the structure of the international
system is a condition of the international environment that should be considered
when examining decisions made during crises.
Along those same lines, one must consider the limitations of this study in
terms of its applicability to current international crises. While the events leading up
to the 1973 war, as well as the war itself, fit neatly into the frequently cited
definition of international crisis, some argue that “traditional” inter-state wars are
on the decline (Mueller 1989; Kaldor 2007; Richards 2010; Pinker 2011; Gat 2012;
Goldstein 2012) and, according to Mary Kaldor (2007), a new type of warfare is
emerging. Civil wars, ethnic conflict, and transnational terrorism create different
types of crises for national governments. Snyder and Diesing’s (1978) assertion that
an international crisis comprises interactions between sovereign states in severe
conflict does not reflect recent patterns as described above. Some threats to national
security emerge from non-state actors and by unconventional means – e.g., the
attacks that occurred in the U.S. on 9/11. Also, technological advances create
opportunities for a cyber attack, which has economic as well as physical
consequences. Additionally, Brecher’s (1979) definition of crisis contains one
element that involves the high probability of military hostilities. The events of 9/11
and cyber security represent conditions whereby a military response may not be the
most effective means of addressing national security threats.
Comparing and contrasting two democratic states says nothing about the
possible decision unit dynamics in nondemocratic regimes. Although it is assumed
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that authoritarian rulers possess the ultimate power to commit or withhold the
resources of their government, we cannot presume that each decision unit would
necessarily take the form of predominant leader. Advisors, working alone or in
cooperation with others, can influence leaders’ decisions in a variety of ways.
Government elites might control or distort the flow of information. Military
commanders, particularly in times of war, make technical decisions that impact the
strategic goals of the ruling party and, hence, affect foreign policy decisions. Also,
the presumed leader may in fact be simply a figurehead, making decisions on behalf
of some other individual or groups of individuals.
Another limitation of the study is the discrepancy between Israel and the
United States regarding the data available. While the U.S. has declassified most of
the documents, transcripts, and reports pertaining to the conflict, the Israeli
government has yet to release some of the relevant material from their archives.
Some of the minutes of high-level meetings are simply unavailable to the public. In
addition, original documents are more readily available in the United States than in
Israel. On the other hand, there has been considerable research conducted on the
available Israeli data, hence, many documents have been transcribed and/or
published in English. Part of my methodology incorporates surveys of secondary
sources and historical accounts of the decision process.
Despite the limitations mentioned, as well as the dearth of material already
published on the subject, this study provides valuable contributions to the study of
foreign policy decision-making. My research expands on the DU framework
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developed by Hermann through its application to sequential decision-making. The
study attempts to demonstrate how, or if, decision unit dynamics change through a
series of decisions under certain circumstances. I also expand upon the framework
with the classification of the occasions for decision. I attempt to determine if
domestic shocks – a change in leadership, for example – or external shocks to the
international environment affect the decision-making process. I also assess whether
or not feedback plays a role in the type or nature of the decision unit. To summarize,
this study seeks to understand who makes foreign policy decisions, and to assess
the relative stability of established decision units through a series of decisions from
crisis conditions through the transitional period to non-crisis.

Plan of the Study
Chapter Two explores the literature and the various approaches to foreign
policy decision-making. Chapter Three presents the research design, including
explanations of the hypotheses and the variables used in the study. Chapter Four
provides a brief history of Israel, focusing on the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as
Israel’s relationship with the United States. The chapter is not intended to be
comprehensive, but rather is meant to provide the reader with some contextual
information and situational awareness. Chapters Five and Six provide an account of
the sequence of decisions used in the study. Chapter Five focuses on decisions made
during the crisis, while Chapter Six is dedicated to the crisis transition period. I also
provide a brief analysis of the decision units related to the decisions for each
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government at the end of Chapters Five and Six. Chapter Seven presents the results
relating to the hypotheses. This chapter also compares and assesses decision unit
dynamics between and within each government. Chapter Eight explores the overall
utility and applicability of the DU framework and provides suggestions for future
research.
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Notes: Chapter One
Graham Allison and Peter Zelikow, 1999, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis.
New York: Longman.
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Notwithstanding the nature of the investigation, the Interim Report, published in April 1974, cleared
Prime Minister Golda Meir and her cabinet of any incompetent action. This initial report, however,
caused a public outcry and forced the Prime Minister to resign her post.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
Systems, States, and Individuals
Do Individual Actors Matter?
When it comes to explaining foreign policy behavior and decision-making,
there are three primary schools of thought as to what level of analysis is of
consequence or relevance: the systemic level, the state level, and the individual
actor level. Each of these levels of analysis has dominated the international relations
literature at one time or another. Early works focused on systems-level analysis
(Carr 1939; Hobson 1902; Kaplan 1961; Mahan 1912; Marx 1859; Waltz 1959),
where researchers maintain that state behavior can best be explained by looking at
the international system.
A systemic analysis to international politics is considered a “top-down”
approach and focuses on the characteristics or structure of the international system
and the relationships between the various actors in the system (Gilpin 1981; Waltz
1979; Wendt 1987). Characteristics of the international system can be thought of in
political, economic, social, or geographic terms, and these characteristics help
determine relationships and interactions of global actors. Nation-states have been
viewed traditionally as the dominant actors in international relations; however,
other global actors have emerged in the past several decades as significant political
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players, including but not limited to multinational corporations (MNC),
international non-governmental organizations (INGO), non-governmental
organizations (NGO), inter-governmental organizations (IGO), and even
transnational terrorist organizations. At the root of the systemic approach is that
interactions between states or other international actors can be explained by the
political, economic, and/or societal characteristics of the global system and how
those actors fit into that system.
In 1954 Richard Snyder and his colleagues (1954) introduced the notion that
individuals are involved in making decisions on behalf of the state and, thus,
individuals matter in international relations. By the 1970’s an abundance of
theoretical approaches and models focusing on foreign policy decision-making at
the individual (or group) level had been published (Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein
1969; Janis 1972; Jervis 1976; Shapiro and Bonham 1973). Approaches to
individual-level analysis include examining the roles of leaders, their perceptions,
beliefs and experiences, and leadership style (Astorino-Courtois 1998; Avner 2001;
Brecher 1979; Brecher 1980; Chiozza and Choi 2003; Goeman, Gleditsch and
Chiozza 2009; Hermann 1993; Holsti and Rosenau 1990; Keller and Yang 2008;
Mintz 2004; Schein 2010; Shapiro and Bonham 1973; Steinberg 2008; Stoessinger
1979).
System-level analysis saw resurgence in the 1980’s with seminal works by
Waltz (1979), Robert Gilpin (1981), and Robert Keohane (1984), espousing the
virtues of hegemonic stability theory and neorealism. Since the mid-1980’s,
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however, research and theoretical development at the individual level has once
again dominated the literature on foreign policy decision-making (Anderson 1987;
Astorino-Courtois 1995; Beasley et al. 2001; Crichlow 2005; Dacey and Carlson
2004; DeRouen Jr. and Sprecher 2004; George 1980; George and Romme 2004;
Goertz 2004; Hermann 1990; Hermann 1993, 2001; Hermann and Hermann 1987;
Holsti 2006; Hudson, Chollet, and Goldgeier 2002; Kaarbo 1996; Kuperman and
Ozkececi-Taner 2006; Levy 1997; Mintz 2004; Putnam 1988; Vertzberger 1986).
Throughout the micro versus macro debate in international relations, the foreign
policy literature has been rich with studies at the nation-state level (Bueno de
Mesquita; Lebow 2005; Morgenthau 1948; Singer 1979; Wendt 1992). A nationstate level of analysis involves the examination of structures, such as legislatures,
bureaucracies, and interest groups. Regime type, societal dynamics (e.g., ethnic
homogeneity), and economic factors are all relevant variables at the nation-state
level.
In addition to the three primary levels of analysis, Graham Allison (1971
[1999]) introduced two models that allow for the examination of organizational
decision-making in governments: the organizational process model and the
bureaucratic politics model. The concept of examining individuals within an
“organizational context” was first proposed by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin in 1954.
Allison’s (1999) Essence of Decision is one of the most often cited works on foreign
policy decision-making during an international crisis. His review of the decision
process during the Cuban missile crisis involves employing the two organizational
models noted above, as well as the rational actor model. His novel approach to the
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study of foreign policy decisions allowed for the comparison of different models that
could help explain the outcome of the crisis. I will elaborate on these models
subsequently.
Each of these levels of analysis has its merits. Indeed, each has demonstrated
validity in explaining international relations and foreign policy. However, since
specific decisions are made at the individual level, whether by one actor or a group
of actors, decision processes (structured or ad hoc), rules and norms, and decision
unit structure matter in foreign policy outcomes.

Foreign Policy and Decision-making Paradigms
Foreign Policy Analysis
The study of foreign policy decision-making began with the seminal work of
Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (2002). Their 1954 work, DecisionMaking as an Approach to the Study of International Politics, offered a more
comprehensive perspective to the international relations literature and directly
addressed the issue of multi-level analysis. What the authors identified as foreign
policy analysis (FPA), Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin proposed that the “most effective
way” to understand international politics is to “pitch the analysis” at the state level.
Since the study of international relations involves the behavior of international
actors, one of the work’s primary assumptions was that the nation-state would be
the “significant unit of political action for many years to come” (Snyder, Bruck, and
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Sapin 2002, 58). To this notion or assumption, the authors added that the state is an
actor in a situation [author’s emphasis]. That is, a study may treat the state as part of
a collectivity and still acknowledge that there are certain perspectives associated
with the situation in which a state may be bound.
Furthermore, the authors contend that political behavior or action is based
on decisions by actual human beings with varying degrees of perceptions and
perspectives (see also Rosenau 1980). Understanding the political behavior of
states, therefore, requires consideration of the views of the identifiable actors
involved in the decision-making process. As such, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (2002)
suggest analyzing actors in terms of: (1) “their discrimination and relating of
objects, conditions, and other actors”; (2) “the existence, establishment, or definition
of goals”; (3) “attachment of significance to various courses of action suggested by
the situation according to some criteria of estimation”; and (4) “application of
‘standards of acceptability’” which narrow the range of perceptions, the range of
objects wanted, and the number of alternatives (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 2002, 59).
These authors also incorporate multi-level analysis into their decisionmaking framework. Variables they suggest include the internal setting (society,
culture), social structure and behavior (value orientations, role differentiation, and
social processes), and external setting (other cultures, other societies). Also
important to the approach are the perceptions, choices, and expectations of the state
– or rather the individual, group, or coalition making decisions on behalf of the state.
The authors argue that these features are extremely relevant if one is to understand
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the decisions or actions taken by the actors. Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin’s work has
provided the foundation for other scholars to develop and expound upon the study
of foreign policy decision-making. Additionally, although the dynamics of
international relations have changed considerably since 1954, such as the
increasing influence of non-state actors as well as the structure of the international
system, the nation-state is still viewed as a significant unit of political action.

Rational Choice and Prospect Theory
The rational actor model, based on rational choice theory, has been a
dominant theme in the international relations literature. Indeed, rational choice
theory has been applied or assumed at each level of analysis. Basically, the theory
assumes that states make decisions in considerations of costs and benefits, goals
and agendas, and national interests. Valerie Hudson (2002, 1) notes that the study
of international relations is grounded in “human decision-makers, acting singly or in
groups.” However, many theories in IR treat the decision making body as a unitary
rational actor, whether the level of analysis is at the state or individual level. For
example, the rational actor model assumes that foreign policy decision-making
processes are alike in essential ways across states, and that the international system
determines state actions (Allison and Zelikow 1999). According to Min Ye (2007),
the standard solution in the rational choice approach is to collapse all issues “to a
single policy dimension having to do with the overall contribution of the policy” (Ye
2007, 319; see also Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995).
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According to Bueno de Mesquita (2009, 2), the rational actor model “assumes
that actors (such as decision makers) make choices that the actors believe will lead
to the best feasible outcomes for them as defined by their personal values or
preferences” (2). The actors’ preferences may or may not reflect the interest of the
nation-state. Although the rational actor model assumes that policy choices will
reflect the preferences of the decision makers, the decision makers themselves are
often constrained (March 1994; Bueno de Mesquita 2009). Constraints can result
from the structure of the system, the structure of the government, or domestic
pressures. They can also come from the inability of decision makers to obtain
complete information or know all possible outcomes (Simon 1957; March 1994).
These constraints limit the choices available to policy makers, and so, theoretically,
policymakers will select the option that will most likely achieve particular goals.
Bueno de Mesquita (2009) claims that uncertainty, impatience, indivisibility,
and commitment problems are generally the conditions whereby a decision-maker’s
preferences do not align with those of the state or citizenry. He examines the
rational actor model along two dimensions: 1) game theoretic studies that regard
states as the rational actor, and 2) studies that “look within states at rational choices
against the backdrop of domestic politics” from a political economy perspective
(Bueno de Mesquita 2009, 4). He also suggests that scholars should examine
“institutions, endowments, and ease with which citizens opposed to government
policies can coordinate so as to understand how domestic conditions shape the
incentives of political leaders to pursue war and impose misery on their subjects or
to pursue peace and advance prosperity” (Bueno de Mesquita 2009, 22).
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According to Allison and Zelikow (1999, 13), a trademark of the rational
actor model is “the attempt to explain international events by recounting the aims
and calculations of nations or governments.” The rational actor model assumes the
state or national government to be the unitary actor. In addition, the rational choice
model assumes that the action selected is based on a calculated assessment of the
problem and its potential solutions. Essentially, the researcher can identify specific
goals the government is pursuing and how the choice was a reasonable one.
An alternative approach to rational choice in the decision literature is
prospect theory. Prospect theory posits that individuals tend to value what they
already have over what they could have. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
(1979) assert that expected utility theory, dominant in analyses of decision-making
under risk, is not an adequate “descriptive model” and that people weigh gains and
losses from a reference point rather than from levels of wealth and welfare
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Levy 1997).

Poliheuristic Theory and Crisis Decision-Making
The poliheuristic theory (PH) combines the cognitive – mental shortcuts –
and rational approaches to decision-making that consists of a two-stage process
(Mintz and DeRouen 2010; Stern 2004). The first stage is the cognitive phase,
which simplifies and reduces the alternatives based on the decision makers’
experiences and knowledge of the issue. Limited to bounded rationality and
satisficing behavior, policymakers are able to eliminate options that do not meet
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a certain threshold (Mintz 2004; Simon 1957). The second stage uses the rational
approach to select from the remaining alternatives.
The PH model assumes that people “process information differently
depending on time constraints, prior beliefs and experiences, limited searches
for information, and a dominant goal or value heavily influencing the decision
process” (DeRouen and Sprecher 2004, 57). Additionally, the model assumes that
a dominant goal for national leaders is to avoid political loss. DeRouen and
Sprecher find that the avoidance of domestic political loss is a significant
influence in the initial behavior of decision-makers during a crisis.
Proponents of the theory claim that PH is an integrative approach that
bridges the gap between cognitive and rationalist theories (Mintz and DeRouen
2010; Stern 2004). Limitations of PH include its inability to illuminate “how
problems are detected, how decision makers are activated, and how decision
units are formed” (Stern 2004, 110; see also Hermann 2001).

Sequencing, Feedback, and Environmental Shocks
Sequential Decision Making
A common formulation applied to foreign policy analysis involves cases in
which policymakers regard each decision as an ad hoc event despite the reliance on
previous experiences (Brecher 1980; Kuperman 2006; Maoz and Astorino 1992). In
this formulation, decision-makers may even recognize the need for future rounds of
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decisions. My study is conducive to this particular approach due to the nature of
crisis conditions (e.g., high levels of stress, time constraints).
Ranan Kuperman (2006) attempts to differentiate the processes of decisionmaking, categorizing events as ad hoc, sequential, or dynamic. He posits that an
“ideal” ad hoc event should mean that the problem is entirely new and appears
suddenly. In the ad hoc decision-making event, previous experience is irrelevant.
Sequential decision-making, according to Kuperman, involves policymakers
readdressing a particular problem. This can occur due to a change in the significance
of the problem or a reevaluation of previously held assumptions. In dynamic
decision-making, the problem has no solution, continually exists, and prior
experience in constantly being incorporated into the process (Kuperman 2006).
One method of analyzing sequential decision-making is to examine what
Christian List (2004, 499) refers to as the “decision path”; that is, the “order in
which the options are considered in a sequential decision process”. He offers one
model of a decision path in order to determine if such decisions are path-dependent.
List’s model is based on the concept that prior propositions and decisions constrain
future decisions. His priority-to-the-past rule does not allow the acceptance of
propositions that conflict with propositions accepted earlier. The decision path is
stable or consistent in that previous propositions are not overturned.
List (2004, 510) maintains that individual decision-makers may attempt to
avoid path-dependence through a “self-imposed discipline of rationality.” However,
this implies that rational individuals have complete information and are cognitive of
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the various options available. List acknowledges the implication and notes that a
“perfectly rational individual can avoid path-dependence, [whereas] a boundedly
rational [individual] may be susceptible to it” (List 2004, 510). Consequently, pathdependence can be particularly significant at the collective level, where several –
sometimes many – individuals are involved in the decision-making. List maintains
that the aggregate beliefs and attitudes of group members run the risk of violating
rationality and make the collective decision process susceptible to pathdependence. In addition, the group decision process is vulnerable to manipulation
both by agenda setting and from misleading or ambiguous information.
List does not address decisions made under crisis conditions. His priority-tothe-past rule dictates that the order of options and decisions is temporal in nature,
rather than occurring in order of importance or priority. In this regard, his model
may not be conducive to crisis decision-making as multiple propositions and
multiple decisions are made under severe time constraints. List also does not
incorporate feedback into his model, a crucial element of path-dependence (Pierson
2004). Although the findings in List’s study indicate that certain violations of
rationality by relevant agents are “necessary and sufficient” for path-dependence, he
does not investigate why or how sequential decisions can avoid or deviate from
path-dependence.
A particular issue with examining decisions made over time is that most
research does not account for possible changes in individual agency within a
decision-making body. Although not explicit in much of the literature, a key
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assumption of sequential decision-making implies that the decisional unit or
decision body remains relatively static (Beasley et al. 2001). That is, in the course of
addressing a particular problem or issue, Beasley et al. imply that decisions will be
considered by the same type of decision unit, if not by the same actual group of
decision-makers. Research that does address administrative changes tends to focus
on one or two key positions (e.g., a president or prime minister), with primary
importance focused on potential changes in leadership style or agenda and how this
might affect decision processes.
Although a change in individual actors within a decision unit can affect the
decision process and eventual policy outcome, I argue that there does not
necessarily have to be such a change in order for a problem to be reconsidered.
Some scholars maintain that decision-makers may reconsider their position or
strategy in light of new information or unintended consequences (Beasley et al.
2001; C. Hermann 1990; Hermann 2001; Rasler 2000). As discussed in Chapter One,
I argue that there are associated problems embedded in sequential decision-making
that affect the decision process in general and the decision unit specifically.

Feedback, Decision-making, and Crises
One of the premises of this study is that positive feedback reinforces
organizational or institutional structures. Thus, research suggests that positive
feedback encourages path dependence in government institutions (North 1990;
Pierson 2004; Skocpol 1979). As the foreign policy decision process in most
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governments tends to be guided by certain rules and norms, both formal and
informal, I argue that positive feedback can create path dependence for decision
units involved in international affairs. Specifically, when decision-makers are
presented with positive feedback, there will be no reason to deviate from the
current decision-making process. Paul Pierson (2004, 44) asserts that “once the selfreinforcing process has been established, positive feedback will generally lead to a
single equilibrium,” which tends to be resistant to change.
This single equilibrium, however resistant to change, establishes an
environment or condition that will inevitably become unstable; that is, positive
feedback, without an incursion of negative feedback, will lead to the destruction of
the system (Baumgartner and Jones 2002; de Rosnay 1997; Wiener 1948).
Following the cybernetics approach, scholars in fields such as mathematics, biology,
and the social sciences maintain that it is negative feedback that creates stability and
equilibrium in many different types of systems (Ashby 1956; Baumgartner and
Jones 2002; de Rosnay 1997; McCulloch 1969; Wiener 1948). While Pierson (2004)
and North (1990) seek to explain how policies and institutions expand and become
entrenched, they do not suggest that negative feedback is not a factor in political
development; simply, they maintain that consistent positive feedback results in
increasing returns and sunk costs, establishing a basis, or perhaps establishing
legitimacy, for the continuation or expansion of policies, bureaucracies, and
administrators.
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Steinbruner’s (2002) cybernetic theory of decision, first published in 1974,
draws from the field of mathematics and employs a concept first introduced by
Norbert Wiener in 1948. Wiener (1954) developed a theory of control and
communication, what he termed “cybernetics,” where information is processed is
such a way as to control the surrounding environment. Underlying Wiener’s theory
is the idea of feedback. Although his theory refers primarily to machines, he
maintains that machines – or animals or humans – can sense feedback from the
environment and then adapt accordingly so as to function within its system (Wiener
1954, 21). Thus, machines, animals, and humans respond to negative feedback and
make adjustments. In Wiener’s theory, negative feedback leads to stability and
equilibrium in the system, whereas positive feedback leads to destruction (de
Rosnay 1997; Wiener 1948).
“An important next step in making the [DU] framework more comprehensive
in detailing the decision-making process involves constructing a more dynamic
model by examining a sequence of occasions for decision” (Beasley et al. 2001, 234).
“[F]eedback from the environment can lead to reconsideration and possible change
in the prior response to the problem” and “[F]eedback can cause the decision unit to
alter its definition of the problem and, as a result, to make different assumptions
than those they followed in the previous decision(s)” (Beasley et al. 2001, 236).
The vast research on the effect of policy feedback is generally referred to as
an “historical institutionalist” approach to comparative politics (Pierson 1993;
Pierson 2004). “Historical institutionalist analysis is based on a few key claims: that
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political processes can best be understood if they are studied over time; that
structural constraints on individual actions, especially those emanating from
government, are important sources of political behavior; and that the detailed
investigation of carefully chosen, comparatively informed case studies is a powerful
tool for uncovering the sources of political change.” North (1990), Pierson (2004),
and Skocpol’s (1979) works emphasize institutional path dependence, or
persistence and equilibrium in bureaucracies and organizations. Pertaining the
effects of positive feedback, the research in political science generally applies to the
public policies and public good (Pierson 2004; Skocpol 1979). Although limited,
studies that examine the effects of feedback under crisis conditions generally apply
cognitive theories (Astorino-Courtois 1998; Bonham, Shapiro and Trumble 1979;
DeRouen and Sprecher 2004; Geva and Mintz 1997; Mintz 2004a), such as PH
theory, or focus on crisis negotiations (Wagner 2000; Wilkenfeld et al 2003; Ye
2007).
Peter Trumbore and Mark Boyer (2000) examine the impact of domestic
factors on decision-making across regime types and how those factors relate to the
use and extent of violence in international crisis. Their study draws 895 foreign
policy crises from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset. Trumbore and
Boyer employ three categories of regime type: democratic, civil/authoritarian, and
military. Cross-tabulation and regression analysis reveals that democracies and
non-democracies exhibit similar behaviors in crisis situations, particularly in the
initial stages of the crisis. They find differences across regime types begin to emerge
when considering the entire crisis time period. [author’s emphasis] This suggests
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that, in order to better understand the decision-making process under crisis
conditions, it would be beneficial to examine sequential decisions across the crisis
episode.
Trumbore and Boyer’s (2000) findings that relate to the size and structure of
the decisional unit reveal some differences between the regime types. For example,
in civil/authoritarian and military regimes the size of the decisional unit tended to
consist of less than four members (56.9% and 55.8%, respectively). Democratic
regimes, however, displayed a slight, although not dramatic, tendency for wider
participation in the decision-making process. Eighty of the cases (32%) resulted in a
small unit (1-4 members), 94 (37.6%) cases were medium-sized units (5-10), and
76 cases (30.4%) resulted in a decisional unit of 10 or more members.1 While the
results do not say anything about the dynamics of the decision unit, this research
suggests non-democratic states demonstrate a higher restriction of the members of
the authoritative decision unit and perhaps will be more likely to tend toward a
“predominant leader” unit than would democratic regimes. Trumbore and Boyer do
not differentiate between a single “predominant leader” and a small group; whereas,
the DU framework makes that distinction.
Trumbore and Boyer (2000) also examine what they deem to be the
structure of the decisional unit – i.e. institutional, ad hoc, combined, and other.2
Interestingly, they find that an overwhelming number of the decisional units during
international crises are institutional (90.9%) rather than ad hoc (4.5%), regardless
of regime type. That is, Ranan Kuperman and Binnur Ozkececi-Taner (2006; see also
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Anderson 1987) maintain, however, that the onset of a crisis may encourage the
establishment of ad hoc decision units, owing to the high level of stress or unusual
circumstances (see also Maoz 1990). Astorino-Courtois (1995) also finds that states
tend toward ad hoc policy-making during crisis situations. She asserts that the
uncertainty of crisis conditions and the opponent’s previous level of
cooperativeness – i.e. the Prisoner’s Dilemma – influence the decision environment
and affect subsequent behavior.

Environmental Shocks and Decision Making Constraints
Beliefs, values, and ideas are embedded within most institutions. Thus,
institutions are inherently resistant to change. “To the extent that an institution is
successful in institutionalizing one set of ideas and values, it will encounter difficult
in change; and [either] leadership (Brunsson and Olsen 1993) or significant external
shocks (Baumgartner and Jones 2009) will be required to generate change. In reality
both of these factors may be necessary, as an agent is still required to mediate
between the dynamic external environment and the internal inertia of the
institution” (Peters, Pierre, and King 2005, 1288).
Research pertaining to institutional changes resulting from environmental
shocks largely focus on the effects of exogenous shocks (Baumgartner and Jones
2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; Gilpin 1981; Hermann 1990; Ikenberry
1986; Legro 2000; Luong and Weinthal 2004; North 1990; Rasler 2000; Thelen
2004; Wendt 1987) Much of the literature tends to be found in conflict studies
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(Gilpin 1981; Nielsen et al. 2011; Rasler 2000) or in the field of political economy
(Ikenberry 1986; Nielsen et al. 2011; Weatherford and Fukui 1989). There are
numerous studies that examine the effects of endogenous shocks; however, rather
than “shocks,” these studies usually refer to domestic political changes with a
turnover in leadership as the dominant focus (Brunsson and Olsen 1993; Colaresi
2004; McGillivray and Smith 2004; Schein 2010; Skowronek 1997). Rosabeth Moss
Kanter (1983) helps to clarify and define both endogenous and exogenous shocks as
a crises or galvanizing events (domestic or international). In short, shocks are crises.
Some are short in duration, such as the election of a new leader, while others can
span months and years (e.g., financial crises). Of interest in my study is how a shock
affects previously established institutional structures, specifically decisional units.
One theory of how change can develop in organizations includes Kurt
Lewin’s (1947) three-stage model of change. The process consists of (1) unfreezing
the present level, (2) moving to the new level, (3) and freezing group life on the new
level (Donahue and O’Leary 2012). “[A] change toward a higher level of group
performance is frequently short lived: after a ‘shot in the arm,’ group life soon
returns to the previous level” (Lewin 1947, 344). According to Lewin, in order for
organizational change to occur, present group behavior must be “unfrozen” (there
must be a motivation to change). Then a change needs to “occur in the form of
moving to the new level. The group as a whole must acknowledge a new set of ideas
or values. The new behavior then needs to be ‘frozen,’ or reinforced, at the new level
(Donahue and O’Leary 2012, 401).
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Edgar Schein (2010), recognized for his research on organizational culture,
extends Lewin’s model of change by looking deeper into each of the stages and to
include the context of organization change and culture (underlying sets of values,
beliefs, understandings, and norms shared by ‘employees’). Schein asserts that once
an organization is sufficiently motivated to change behavior, reframing or “cognitive
redefinition” is needed. The new information – the source of the motivation – will be
adopted and the result creates “new standards of judgment or evaluation, which
must be congruent with the rest of the organization culture” (Donahue and O’Leary
2012, 402). For the change to be permanent (“refreezing”), the new standards,
including norms and behaviors, must be embedded throughout the organization and
reinforced through positive feedback (Schein 2010).
Kanter’s (1983) work includes the role of crises in organizational change. In
her assessment, five forces must converge:


“grassroots innovations” – new ways of thinking emerge within the
organization;



“crisis or galvanizing event” – the crisis may be exogenous or precipitated
by organization’s own behavior (the first two forces set the stage for
change);



“change strategists and strategic decisions” – a leadership emerges
(whether from within or from outside the group), and a new definition of
the situation (plans, reconceptualization) is expressed;
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“individual prime movers” – these are the people who push the new
organizational reality, support advocates for change, and themselves
actively push for change;



“action vehicles” – “transform abstract notions of change into reality” –
procedures, structures, processes; essentially, working out the details of
how to implement the change (Donahue and O’Leary 2012).

Although the logic and explanation of the five forces are compelling, Kanter’s work
pertains to organizational change in American corporations. That is not to say,
however, that these concepts do not apply to political institutions, or even
decisional units.
Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal (2004) suggest that exogenous
shocks can provide the stimulus for institutional change. These scholars examine
decisions by the Russian government and Russian oil companies to alter economic
policy through the negotiation of a new tax code. The authors argue that the impetus
for the change was the August 1998 economic shock, which revealed to both actors
the financial vulnerabilities of the government as well as the oil companies. Shared
perceptions of vulnerability were key in stimulating the change; however, these
perceptions were “contingent upon both sets of actors feeling equally vulnerable to
the effects of the crisis and recognizing that they depended on one another to
recover from the crisis” (Luong and Weinthal 2004, 145). Although this example of
exogenous shocks and their effects on institutional change focuses solely on an
economic crisis and economic policy, it nevertheless demonstrates how established
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institutions and structures can be altered by changes in the external environment.
Also, shared perceptions alone were insufficient to bring about the change in policy,
strengthening Kanter’s requirement of “action vehicles.”
Donahue and O’Leary (2012) attempt to determine whether the presence of
shocks can affect organizational change. They examine three devastating accidents
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), each of which
resulted in the death of the crewmembers, and review subsequent changes within
the organization. Although many technical and procedural changes occurred
following the tragedies, they discovered that certain obstacles were embedded
within the organization that made change difficult. NASA operates within a complex
environment (external authorities, the media, demands by interest groups) that
affect what the agency can and cannot do. This research may suggest that change in
an organization – even one as small as a decision unit (group) – may not be
sustained. Things may go back to the way they were prior to the introduction of the
impetus for the change. Donahue and O’Leary posit that “change imposed from the
outside after a shock is likely to be opposed on the inside of an organization” – i.e.,
pressure exerted by those outside of the organization to change will likely be
resisted by the organization itself. Moreover, Donahue and O’Leary argue that
internal acceptance is critical in establishing permanent change. “The greater the
acceptance of the need to change by members at all levels of an organization…the
greater the likelihood of sustained change after a shock. Sustainable change cannot
be driven solely from the top (Donahue and O’Leary 2012, 423). The authors
suggest that future research should examine how the environment of an
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organization affects or does not affect change within those organizations after a
shock.
Karen Rasler (2000) examines the effects of internal and external political
shocks in the case of Palestinian-Israeli de-escalation of protracted conflict. She
asserts that while political shocks alone do not always affect change in the
expectations or strategies of Palestinian and Israeli leadership, they can combine
with other key variables to improve the frequency of agreements in the long term.
Moreover, she finds that shocks, combined with entrepreneurship, “reduced major
institutional constraints” and helped lead to the initial settlement in the 1993 Oslo
Accords.
Rasler (2000, 702) maintains that shocks “are transitional situations that can
instigate a major period of change in adversarial relations by altering key
expectancies.” She goes on to say that “[s]ince shocks are not always certain to alter
expectancies, the extent to which they do so ultimately depends on how actors
perceive them” (702). Thus, Rasler views changes in leadership as internal or
endogenous shocks. “Critical events (or potentially significant transforming events)
can be policy windows that allow proponents of change to assert their political
leadership by advancing new alternatives to old problems” (Rasler 2000, 703). It is
perhaps under these types of conditions that individuals within a decision unit
would be most likely to alter their positions and affect group dynamics.
Allison Astorino-Courtois’ (1998, 733) study of the effects of situation versus
personality on foreign policy decision-making reveals that the relevant importance

Chapter Two

53

Literature Review
of each of these factors is a “function of the structural constraints imposed by the
policy decision environment.” Examining the 1970 Jordanian Civil War decision
process, Astorino-Courtois applies an analytic framework first used by Zeev Maoz
(1990) that considers the focal actor (initiator or target of the action), whether the
nature of the decision situation is conflictual or cooperative, the severity of the
consequences of the decision, and the time available for action (Astorino-Courtois
1998). The author holds personalities and perceptions constant under varied
decision types and structures. The study consisted of ten key political decisions
involving four governments or actors: Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organization,
Israel, and Syria. The results of Astorino-Courtois’ research demonstrates that
decision-makers’ preferences seem to be more relevant in a fluid decision
environment, where there are less constraints on the decision structure. In general
terms, the personalities, perceptions, preferences, and leadership styles of decisionmakers become more relevant in explaining decision outcomes in fluid settings. The
study suggests, then, that the decisional unit, including the number of members
involved as well as their personal preferences, matters in the decision-making
process during crisis situations, where the environment is fluid, less constrained,
and uncertain.

Decisional Units and the Decision Units Framework
The basic premise of my study is that foreign policy decisions are
significantly influenced by the dynamics and structure of those involved in the
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decision-making process. Whether the decisional unit includes one individual or
many, how the unit is configured, the positions of the actors within the unit, and the
perceptions of those actors affect foreign policy outcomes. The DU framework
provides a vehicle by which to examine and assess the decision-making process.
Ryan Beasley et al. (2001) assert that DU framework is not intended to be a general
explanation of foreign policy but an explanation of foreign policy decision-making at
the point of choice. Essentially, the framework is “intended to aid in understanding
how foreign policy decisions are made by those with the authority to commit the
government to a particular action or set of actions when faced with an occasion for
decision” (Beasley et al. 2001, 232). To reiterate, the three types of authoritative
decision units in the framework are the predominant leader, single group, and
coalition.
Patrick Haney (1994) notes that research on crisis management “has
demonstrated that as a crisis emerges and builds, the size of the ‘ultimate decision
unit’ tends to shrink in size and grow in importance” (941). This might seem to
imply that many of the decision units involved in my study would take the form of
predominant leader. Since decisions – including the actions and policies that are
derived thereof – often become path dependent and help determine subsequent
decisions, identifying each decision unit can facilitate our understanding of the
foreign policy-making process. Simply stated, each decision made and action taken
along the policy path has consequences and implications for the outcome. The
process outcome will either achieve the desired result or the desired goals, or it will
cause decision-makers to reassess the policy.
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Theoretical approaches to leadership – when it involves a single
predominant actor – tend to lend themselves to dichotomous categorizations. For
instance, are certain leaders “born to lead” or do circumstances offer opportunities
and leaders rise to the challenges? John Stoessinger (1979, xvi-xvii) suggests that
leaders are “movers” rather than mere players and can be categorized according to
their personalities: crusaders and pragmatists. “Crusaders” are the leaders whose
foreign policy decisions are guided by a preconceived worldview. “Pragmatists,” on
the other hand, are leaders who make foreign policy decisions based on evidence
and practicality. Other dichotomous classifications include “ideologue vs.
opportunist, directive vs. consultative, task-oriented vs. relations-oriented, and
transformational vs. transactional” (M. Hermann et al. 2001, 86). M Hermann et al.
further maintain that each of these classifications can be grouped into two general
categories. Crusaders, ideologues, those who are directive, task-oriented, or
transformational are classified as “goal-driven leaders.” That is, the foreign policy of
these leaders is shaped by previously held beliefs, attitudes, motives, and passions.
Goal-driven leaders often surround themselves with like-minded individuals,
attempt to shape institutional norms, and are less open to alternative views (M.
Hermann et al. 2001, 87). M. Hermann et al. classify pragmatists, opportunists, and
those who are consultative, relations-oriented, or transactional as “contextually
responsive” and who seem to be constrained by the domestic environment. These
leaders are more risk averse and interested in “consensus-building and multilateral
approaches to foreign policy” (M. Hermann et al. 2001, 88).
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The literature on group decision-making suggests that there is generally a
formal set of procedures for the processing of information, the management of
options, and resolving disagreements within the group (C. Hermann et al 2001; Janis
1972; Kuperman 2006; Maoz and Astorino 1992; Vertzberger 1990). The DU
framework developed by Hermann (2001) focuses on the management of options
within group decision-making and, in particular, the role that conflict among the
members of the group plays in the process (Hermann 2001; C. Hermann et al 2001).
As noted previously, Allison and Zelikow (1999) develop two organizational
decision-making models. In the organizational process model, they explain the
decision-making process of government leaders by analyzing the behavior and
communications of the actors involved in the Cuban missile crisis. Their analysis
challenges previously held assumptions regarding foreign policy decisions and the
process from which those decisions are derived. Allison and Zelikow employ a
multiperspectivist approach (Stern 2004), which consists of identifying several
alternative decision-making (or policy-making) models from the literature and then
consider how well each “illuminates and accounts for a given empirical case”
(Allison and Zelikow 1999, 106). Government leaders must also be able to assess
other governments’ motives, intentions, and possible responses to any actions
taken. It is not enough simply to detect potential threatening situations;
policymakers must make determinations as to the possible or probable intentions of
adversaries.
The bureaucratic politics model, also referred to as the governmental
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politics model of decision-making, is “concerned with features of internal politics of
a government that might produce decision” (Allison and Zelikow 1999, 183). Simply
stated, multiple agencies or officials inside the government engage in bargaining and
compromise in order to reach a policy decision. Allison and Zelikow maintain, for
example, that executive decision-making is constrained by the amalgamation of
competing organizations that seek to advance interests of their own. The
information each unit provides is presented in such a way as to maximize that
agency’s particular interests. Problem representation – whose voices are heard and
who defines the problem – facilitates the decision process where alternatives are
presented, goals are defined, and solutions are considered (Baumgartner and Jones
2009; Kingdon 2011). During the Cuban missile crisis, for example, Air Force Chief
of Staff Curtis LeMay argued that a military strike was essential for eliminating the
problem. His suggested alternative would have given his organization – the military
– a prominent position in the decision-making process, rendering it a key actor in
the implementation of the policy during the crisis (Allison and Zelikow 1999).
A seminal approach pertaining to single group interaction is Irving Janis’
(1972) work on groupthink. Based on social psychology theories, "[g]roupthink
refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment
that results from in-group pressures"(Janis 1972, 9). In Victims of Groupthink, Janis
explains that cohesive groups engage in concurrence-seeking behavior, which may
result in inappropriate decisions or responses to crisis situations. Concurrenceseeking behavior may also result in "incredibly gross miscalculations about both the
practical and moral consequences of their decisions" (Janis 1972, iv). Janis claims,
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however, that this may not necessarily be the case. Groupthink can produce
successful results (although the case studies Janis uses in his study, as well as the
title of his work, suggests that groupthink in and of itself is negatively connoted).
Cohesive groups – particularly, small groups – may be like-minded or have a
“hidden agenda” that may influence decision-making alternatives. As with his caveat
of the occasional success resulting from groupthink, Janis admits that other causes
are likely to effect “bad” policy decisions. Janis simply seeks to determine the
conditions under which bad policy decisions are likely to be made by small group
decision-making units.
In Groupthink in Government, Paul ‘t Hart (1990, 282) expands on Janis’
concept of groupthink and attempts to "move groupthink from its present
unwarranted popularity resulting in vulgarized applications and quick-and-easy
analyses, to the status it deserves, namely to a conceptually and empirically wellfounded, contextually sound, and cautiously used explanatory framework." ‘t Hart
suggests three paths that lead to excessive concurrence-seeking: cohesiveness, deindividuation, and anticipatory compliance. He further adds to Janis’ concept by
identifying two outcome scenarios of groupthink: collective avoidance and collective
over-optimism. Unlike Janis, ‘t Hart maintains that conflict is a natural condition that
precedes analysis of alternatives by the group. One of his case studies – Reagan and
the arms-for-hostages deal – examines contextual factors and preconditions,
process dynamics, and decision outcomes.
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Grounded in the groupthink literature, Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow
(2002) examine the influence of three types of process factors on outcomes
resulting from group decision-making. They investigate situational factors, such as
time constraint or stress level, factors relating to the structure of the group, and
factors pertaining to information processing. Their findings suggest that situation
variables have little influence in terms of affecting outcomes and quality of
information processing. However, the results of their quantitative analysis indicate
that both group structure and information processing have a significant effect on
outcomes relating to national interest and level of international conflict.
One example of group decision-making is illustrated in Patrick Haney’s
(1994) work on advisory groups. He examines the construct of advisory groups in
three separate crises during the Nixon administration. “Previous research has
shown that Nixon utilized a formalistic approach to structure both domestic and
foreign policymaking (George 1980; Hess 1988; Johnson 1974). Furthermore,
George (1980) notes that the Nixon model included a broad strategy for overcoming
the potentially distorting effects of a hierarchically organized foreign policymaking
bureaucracy: a “formal options” system. The purpose of this system was to center
decision making at the top, and yet to insure that policy options got to the top
(George 1980, 177). A variety of interdepartmental committees was created in the
National Security Council and chaired by Henry Kissinger. One of these groups was
the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), whose responsibilities included
crisis management” (Haney 1994, 942-943). “We know little about how the onset of
a crisis may have conditioned or affected the Nixon advisory structure and strategy”
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(943). Haney employs a case survey methodology. He examines previous case
studies as data and extracts information using a schedule of questions for each case.
Through one set of questions, he examines the nature of the advisory structure
established by the president: formalistic competitive, collegial, or a hybrid of these
types. These advisory structures are distinctly different from the decision unit
structure developed by Hermann (2001). Another set of questions addresses the
nature of the decision-making process: how the advisory group, including the
president, performed the task of decision-making.
Haney maintains that the evidence from the crises indicates that the group
size reduced as the crises unfolded and eventually centered on Nixon and Kissinger.
Haney does not differentiate between Nixon and Kissinger as individuals per se,
except to note that Kissinger was “’filling-in’ where presidential leadership would
normally have been expected” (Haney 1994, 953). As to possible dynamics within
the advisory group that may have affected decisions made during the crisis, Haney
(1994, 953) only mentions conceptual “baggage” with which the group had to
contend that “clouded its ability to assimilate new and discrepant information.”
While Haney makes general assessments on group decision-making, the DU
framework will allow me to compartmentalize the key decisions made during the
1973 crisis and specify the decisional unit. In addition, I will be able to determine
whether there were changes in that unit and perhaps discover why those changes
occurred.
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Foreign policy decision-making by coalition is the third category in the DU
framework. A decision unit is considered a coalition if the setting is fragmented and
centers on the “willingness and ability of multiple, politically autonomous actors to
achieve agreement to enact policy” (Hagan et al. 2001, 169). Coalition decisionmaking is commonly found in parliamentary democracies with multiparty cabinets,
in presidential democracies where the legislative and executive branches are in
opposition, in authoritarian regimes where power is distributed among different
factions or institutions, and where bureaucrats obtain authority by dealing
collectively on major policy issues. In a coalition decision unit, the identities of the
members rest with constituents, not the group. Essentially, while no single actor
may enact a policy directive, any one member of the coalition can block or prohibit
the initiatives of the other members. Such actions include the use of a presidential
veto, threats of termination of the coalition, or “withholding the resources necessary
for action or the approval needed for their use” (Hagan et al. 2001, 170).
Constituents can also influence members of the decision unit. Members of the
coalition must not only negotiate with other members of the decision group but also
are committed to representing the interests or values of those they represent. This
feature of the process is known as the “two-level game” (Putnam 1988). Echoing
Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin’s (2002) findings, the internal environment of the state
necessarily affects the interests of the coalition members and, hence, foreign policy
outcomes.
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Generally missing from the coalition literature is a focus on the decisionmaking process and its influence on policy outcomes (Kaarbo 2008). Juliet Kaarbo
posits that the lack of research on coalitions and foreign policy outcomes may be in
part because coalitions can dissolve due to disagreements. Of the literature on
coalitions and international conflict, the results have been mixed. Brandon Prins and
Christopher Sprecher (1999) find that Western parliamentary democracies are
rarely involved in military disputes and are rarely the aggressor. Additionally, when
parliamentary democracies are the targets of aggression, they are more likely to
reciprocate if a coalition government is in power rather than a single-party
government. Conversely, Dan Reiter and Erik Tillman (2002) find that there is no
difference between coalition cabinets and single-party governments when it comes
to military reciprocation. These studies are quantitative in nature, and neither
investigates beyond conflict initiation and response. However, they do suggest that
further research could tease out other factors that influence coalition government
behavior.
The following chapter presents the research design and hypotheses. Chapter
Three also provides an explanation for the variables used in the study.
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Notes: Chapter Two
The size of the decisional unit is a variable available in the ICB dataset. According the ICB codebook,
the “decisional unit is not necessarily the formal body designated by a crisis actor’s regime to make
choices, but rather that body which actually formulates the major response to the crisis trigger. The
term ‘decision maker’ refers to political leaders, not bureaucrats or military officers, or any other
advisors.” Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2010, “International
Crisis Behavior Project,” University of Maryland.
1

The category “other” is not specified, but is explained as “other variations on the normal policy
process” (Trumbore and Boyer 2000, 686).
2
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Chapter Three
Research Design and Hypotheses
Research Design
My research incorporates two main components of foreign policy behavior:
(1) the decisional units involved in the decision-making process; and (2) specific
conditions under which decisions are made. The first component of the research
design draws from certain concepts regarding foreign policy behavior and decisionmaking. First is the notion that people make decisions and, therefore, individual
leaders matter. Second, that within most governments exist rules and norms that
help determine the decision process, including which actor or group of actors has
the authority to commit the state’s resources. The DU framework provides a set of
guidelines that helps analysts identify the type of unit involved in particular
decisions. In addition to directing the analyst to the type of decision unit, the
framework stipulates that consideration should be given as to the nature of the unit;
that is, whether the decision unit is formally or informally structured. Formal
structures are guided by established rules and are assumed to be more rigid.
Informal structures are guided by culture, norms, and traditions. Drawing on
theories of institutional change, a formal or institutionalized decision unit structure
might be more difficult to change (North 1990; Pierson 2004; Skocpol 1979). Given
the nature of the structure, therefore, the research design takes into consideration
specific variables that might affect changes in such units.
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The second component of the study involves foreign policy decisions that are
made under specific conditions: crisis and crisis transition. The selection of crisis
decision-making is two-fold. First, since the literature suggests that the number of
actors involved in the foreign policy decision process tends to shrink as the level of
threat or as the interest of decision-makers increases (Haney 1994; Hermann and
Hermann 1989; Hermann 2001), the ability to assess decision unit dynamics
becomes more feasible. Given the atypical nature of crises, there is likely to be a
large amount of information available, both primary and secondary material (e.g.,
biographical accounts, minutes of meetings and telephone conversations,
correspondence, press conferences/briefings, and Congressional records). Second,
crisis decision-making is made at the highest levels of government, making it easier
to identify individual unit members and goals. The disadvantage is that the process
tends to take place in secret. As such, much of the necessary documents are
classified and inaccessible. Although some of the primary sources have yet to be
released, particularly in the Israeli case, a considerable amount of historical and
biographical accounts have been published.
The transition from hostilities to non-crisis conditions is the second phase of
the study. As history has shown, cease-fire agreements do not always signify an end
to the conflict, but rather provide an immediate reduction in tensions with a
perhaps cautious transition to a more stable, yet still threatening, environment
(Fortna 2004). This was certainly the case following the Yom Kippur War. Each side
in the conflict accused the other of violating the cease-fire, after an agreement had
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supposedly been reached. Even after the participants stopped firing and tensions
eased, there was still the issue of military disengagement.
Tensions also persisted in other areas of the region. The Nixon
administration continued to negotiate for an end to the oil embargo, which was a
result of U.S. assistance to Israel during the war and critical to the U.S. economy.
Additionally, the administration was concerned about the increasing possibility of
renewed hostilities (Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977). This does not by itself indicate
that the crisis persisted; however, it speaks to the perceptions of the leadership that
a termination of negotiations or some other setback could result in renewed
fighting. The point here is that while the intensity of the crisis may have subsided,
decision-makers recognized the implications of failing to reach some sort of
settlement that would appease those concerned and limit the possibility of another
war. From an analytical perspective, I argue that the crisis (or at least the
“problem”) was not sufficiently resolved to prevent a recurrence and, therefore,
warrants an examination of the decision units involved in the continued
negotiations.
In my study, the time period following the end of the war until the conclusion
of the Sinai II Agreement (military disengagement) is referred to as the transition
phase. In comparing a sequence of decisions, the DU framework provides a fairly
systematic way to identify and categorize decisional units and policy outcomes.
Hermann (2001) asserts that the type of decision unit and its key contingencies
affect the type of decision process in which policymakers engage (see Table 1.1) and
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this, in turn, shapes the outcome. The framework itself was designed to examine one
process outcome based on one occasion for decision, although the structure is such
that presumably one could apply the framework to a series of occasions and
decisions. Beasley et al. (2001) suggest that an elaboration of the DU framework is
possible by examining the circumstances under which prior decisions are
reconsidered or continued.
Reconsideration consists of the reexamination of a prior decision or of the
problem itself, while continuation involves the decision unit’s recognition that the
problem is ongoing and will require a series of decisions. The authors’ definition of a
reconsideration of a problem implies that there is a time lapse between decisions
and, perhaps, the emergence of a different set of actors. Alternatively, the
continuation of a problem implies that once the decision unit has been established,
it will remain constant for the duration of the decision process. Given the fluid
nature of crises and the multiple decisions that must be undertaken, I argue that it is
possible for different types of decision units to emerge from separate occasions for
decision, even if each occasion relates to the same problem. Simply stated, not all
members of the unit or the actors involved in the initial decision process need
participate in subsequent decision-making.
The framework indicates that one occasion for decision initiates a series of
decisions and culminates in a policy outcome. While this is true in a very practical
sense, issues emerge when there is a decided change in the actors involved in the
process before the problem is resolved. In addition, the definition of “problem” itself
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can be problematic. In the case of the 1973 war, the basic problem was the threat of
force mobilization at the Israeli border. After hostilities began, the problem facing
Israel was no longer what Israeli decision-makers should do about the impending
attack. Not surprisingly, additional problems emerged within the overarching crisis.
Should Israel use nuclear weapons? Should Israel go on the counter-offensive?
Should Israel call for a Security Council meeting? Will they give up territory if they
lose the war? Should they give up territory for peace?
Similarly, the United States faced multiple decisions and reformulated shortterm goals as the crisis developed. An immediate goal for the U.S. was to get the
fighting stopped. Although U.S. decision-makers had long-term strategic goals
regarding the Middle East, Kissinger recognized that it was necessary to deal with
one “problem” at a time. Therefore, identifying the “problem” as can be derived from
one occasion for decision does not always reflect the numerous decisions that are
made throughout the crisis.
According to the steps in the framework, a “problem” arises, the decision unit
emerges, and a process outcome (policy or action) results. This works ideally when
applied to one significant or finite decision and the decision process is not
complicated by extraneous issues. One assumption emanating from this ideal would
seem to be that the structure or type of decision unit does not change for the
duration of the immediate problem. The question then becomes, how does a
government address and respond to a series of associated problems inherently
embedded within a bigger problem? Do the same types of decision units (or the
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same decision-makers, for that matter) address all problems during a crisis
situation? In short, problem identification, problem definition and short-term goals
become critical factors in determining how the decision process unfolds.
Problem identification can be viewed as the occasion for decision noted in the
framework. Through government or intelligence reports, meetings, and
correspondence, policymakers recognize that a problem needs to be addressed.
Once policymakers recognize (or perceive) that a problem exists, the type of
decision unit emerges. As the dynamics of the decision unit begin to be revealed, the
analyst learns whose positions are considered and who is framing the issue. Thus,
problem definition is an underlying part of the step in the framework where the
decision unit emerges. Also discernible in this step are the short-term goals of the
individual member(s) of the unit.
From a practical perspective, it is not feasible to identify all problems,
decisions, and decision-makers involved in a crisis (and, in my study, the crisis
transition). However, identifying key decisions made by high-level policymakers is
more than possible and is of particular interest to foreign policy analysis. These
decisions are those that, once implemented, are difficult or unlikely to be reversed.
The implementation process of such decisions is not considered in this study.
In addition to the notion of associated problems, there is the reality that
policymakers must deal with multiple unrelated problems or crises. This was
certainly the case for the United States during the time of the Yom Kippur War.
President Nixon was embroiled in the Watergate scandal, concerned about the
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developing relations with China, and was distracted by ongoing problems in
Southeast Asia and Latin America. These or other unrelated problems are
considered in this study as shocks to the environment.
Identifying Shocks and Feedback
The inclusion of the effects of endogenous or exogenous shocks speaks to the
fact that multiple crises (domestic and international) can and do occur
simultaneously (Kanter 1983). This study does not intend to thoroughly examine
multiple crises or the decision units that emerged from each, but rather the purpose
of their inclusion is to ascertain whether other parallel events (i.e., shocks) might
affect the dynamics of the actor or actors involved in the decisions made pertaining
to my case study: the Yom Kippur War and its aftermath. Although the inclusion of
external and internal shocks in the study might contribute in part to the
understanding of how multiple crises are managed, any effects noted pertain
primarily to the structure of decision units.
Borrowing from Rasler’s design, (2000, 704) one can identify shocks as: (1)
“the emergence of external threats from a new actor(s) that downgrade the threats
posed by old adversaries; (2) changes in domestic political leaderships and/or
institutions that either increase the perception of value and goal compatibility or
alter preference structures that emphasize the management of domestic problems;
(3) significant decreases in the availability of economic resources that are perceived
as current or impending; and (4) catalytic events that cause adversaries to
reconsider their assumptions about their rivals or changes their ability to compete
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with them.” The advantage of using shocks as a variable in this study is that they
tend to be high profile, public events and, thus, fairly easy to recognize. A potential
difficulty in assessing shocks pertains specifically to decision-makers’ perceptions.
Unless the events are included in the debates and discussions of the relevant
decision unit(s), the effects of such events on the unit would have to be assumed
rather than substantiated. In other words, there would be inconclusive evidence to
support or reject my hypotheses regarding shocks and decision unit dynamics.
While shocks might be easier to identify, it can be more difficult to recognize
feedback. As noted in Chapter One, feedback, in verbal or physical (military) form,
can be positive or negative, real or perceived, and is monitored through various
channels. For policymakers, the decision process can be particularly challenging in
an environment where multiple decisions must be made under time constraints and
conditions of uncertainty, and feedback might not always reach policymakers before
the next decision is made. The inclusion of feedback as a variable in this study is
based on the literature that suggests that institutional structures can be reinforced
or altered by particular kinds of feedback (North 1990; Peters, Pierre, and King
2005; Pierson 2004; Thelen 2004).

Hypotheses
The hypotheses in this study pertain to the potential changes in the type or
nature of the decision unit under a specific set of conditions in a sequential decisionmaking process. Specifically, they relate to how new occasions for decisions that
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result from feedback (perceived or actual), internal shocks, or external shocks affect
the decision units in a series or sequence of decisions made during a crisis and its
immediate aftermath: the transition period. As stated previously, the three types of
decision units, derived from the DU framework, are the predominant leader, single
group, and coalition.
Conditions favoring a predominant leader, where the leader is likely to take
charge and exercise authority, include instances of high-level diplomacy, instances
in which the leader has a high personal interest, and crisis situations (Hermann
2001). The international crisis literature indicates that there is a contraction of
authority during situations that are critical to regime stability or survival or during
international crisis events. This suggests that the decision units that emerge during
crises would most likely fall under the ‘predominant leader’ or ‘single group’
category.1 Hermann (2001) asserts that the authoritative decision-maker will
exercise his or her authority and become involved in crisis decision-making, even if
he or she is not generally involved in foreign policy issues.2 I argue that during crisis
events, the decision unit will likely take the form of predominant leader or single
group and will maintain the same structure throughout the crisis period.
Hypotheses #1 and #2 are based on the propositions stated above.

H1: During sequential crisis decision-making, the nature and type of
decision unit will remain constant throughout the duration of the crisis.

Chapter Three

73

Research Design and Hypotheses
H2: During sequential crisis decision-making, the decision unit will likely
take the form of predominant leader or single group.

Hypotheses #3 through #5 pertain to the effects of policy feedback and
shocks to the environment, respectively. The hypotheses illustrate that negative
feedback is more likely to affect change. Hypothesis #3 reflects the notion that
positive feedback tends to generate path dependence. As noted in the literature
review, research on policy feedback suggests that positive feedback reinforces
organizational or institutional structures and policy choices, maintaining previously
established entities and ensuring the persistence of a particular course of action
(North 1990; Pierson 2004). Paul Pierson explains that path dependence can also be
a result of certain actors in positions of authority imposing self-reinforcing rules on
others. Such an actor can effectively “change the rules of the game” (Pierson 2004,
36), for both formal institutions as well as informal public policies, in order to shift
the rules in his or her favor or to increase the capacity for political action while
diminishing that of his or her rivals.
Hypotheses #4 and #5 address the potential effects of negative feedback.
Given the concepts of positive feedback and path dependence, I hypothesize, on the
one hand, that affirmation of a policy action in the form of positive feedback
received during a crisis period, whether actual or perceived, will reinforce the
decision unit dynamic; while negative feedback has the potential to alter decision
unit dynamics. It does not necessarily challenge the existing order or policy. Under
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time constraints and uncertainty, however, negative feedback could have a greater
influence on the decision process. In addition, based on the assertion that crises
tend to minimize disagreements within a unit or group, I argue that changes in the
decision unit will more likely occur due to negative feedback only after the cessation
of hostilities or during the transition period.

H3: Positive feedback regarding a foreign policy decision or policy action
will not likely alter the nature or type of decision unit of a given
government.

H4: Negative feedback regarding a foreign policy decision or policy
action will not likely affect the nature or type of decision unit of a
government under crisis conditions.

H5: Negative feedback from a foreign policy decision or policy action
will likely affect the nature or type of decision unit of a government
during the transition period from a crisis to non-crisis.

Hypotheses #6 and #7 are meant to test the effects of internal and external
shocks to the decision-making environment. Internal shocks can include but are not
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limited to national elections, a change in leadership (whether or not the change was
the result of elections or some other event), a constitutional crisis, economic shocks,
natural disasters, or civil conflict. For my purposes, external shocks may include but
are not limited to, imposing embargoes, the ceasing of diplomatic ties, a sudden
change in the international market (perhaps resulting from droughts, floods, or
pestilence) or a significant natural disaster. These shocks, external and internal, may
be associated with the crisis at hand, such as the Soviet and U.S decisions in October
1973 to place their militaries on heightened alert, or can fall completely outside the
scope of the crisis (i.e., the Watergate scandal and President Nixon’s subsequent
resignation).

H6: Internal (domestic) shocks likely will alter the nature or type of
decision unit under both crisis conditions and during the transition
period from crisis to non-crisis.

H7: External shocks likely will alter the nature or type of decision unit
under crisis conditions and during the transition period from crisis to
non-crisis.

An alternative hypothesis might test whether the initial structure and/or
dynamics of a particular decision unit might affect the structure of subsequent units
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in sequential decision-making. According to the DU framework, different models of
group dynamics result in different policy outcomes. (See Table 3.1) For example, a
single group unit can consist of a concurrence model or a unanimity model. In a
concurrence model the members of the group find their primary identity within that
group and, therefore, will be more likely to choose a dominant solution. In a
unanimity model, members of the group have their primary identity elsewhere and,
thus, deadlocks or integrative solutions tend to be the result. A single group unit
whose members identify strongly with that group may inhibit the decision-making
process insofar as members will tend to avoid disagreement and to encourage
concurrence on decisions: groupthink (Janis 1972). In this scenario, the resulting
decision might be less than optimal, or alternative options may be dismissed or not
considered.
The framework does not concern itself with the relationship between the
unit that emerges from the initial occasion for decision with subsequent decision
units addressing the same problem or issue. Each occasion for decision is treated as
a separate (or new) event, creating a new unit. This might be due to the fact the
framework assumes that some period of time will lapse before the problem recurs
or reemerges. These concerns and the potential for the decision unit to affect
subsequent units, however, can be potentially addressed under Hypothesis #1. If
Hypothesis #1 is true, and the decision unit remains unchanged, then the implied
assumption of the framework – that one decision unit will emerge and remain as
such until the problem is resolved – would appear to be valid. If it proves to be false,
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TABLE 3.1 Characteristics and Implications of Process Outcomes
Range of
Preferences
Represented
in Decision

Distribution of Payoffs
Symmetrical

Asymmetrical

One Party's

Concurrence (All own decision;
see decision as final; move to
other problems)

One Party's Position Prevails
(Only one party owns decision;
others monitor resulting action;
push for reconsideration if
feedback is negative)

Mixed
Parties'

Mutual Compromise/Consensus
(Members know got all possible
at moment; monitor for change in
political context; seek to return to
decision if think can change
outcome in their favor)

Lopsided Compromise (Some
members own position, others do
not; latter monitor resulting
action and political context,
agitating for reconsideration of
decision)

No Party's

Deadlock (Members know no one
did better than others; seek to
redefine the problem so solution
or trade-offs are feasible)

Fragmented Symbolic Action (No
members own decision; seek to
change the political context in
order to reconstitute decision
unit)

Source: Margaret G. Hermann, 2001, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A
Theoretical Framework," International Studies Review, Vol 3, No. 2, p. 72.

then Hypotheses #3 through #7 could indicate why there was a change in the
decision unit.
At issue, however, is whether the variables included in this study act
independent of or in coordination with one another. Do the dynamics of the decision
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unit, which potentially inhibit the decision process, determine the structure of
subsequent decision units? Or does negative feedback influence successive units, to
the extent that it creates friction or fragmentation within the decision unit?
Institutional structure, rules, and norms must also play a role in the construction of
the decision unit. But, given crisis conditions, those rules and norms might be
treated as flexible or fluid in order to deal with an untenable situation (AstorinoCourtois 1998). It is quite possible, and even likely, that two or more of these
variables work together to act upon subsequent unit structures.

Summary
My research design is intended to isolate decisions made under crisis
conditions and during the crisis transitional period, enabling me to identify the actor
or actors that make up the decision units involved in the decision process. The
transitional period is identified as the time between the traditionally recognized end
of the crisis (cease-fire agreement) and the conclusion of a military disengagement
agreement. The disengagement agreement is viewed as an indicator that the
immediate crisis is indeed over and the potential for future hostilities is minimized.
A considerable amount of research has been published on the subject matter
chosen for my study, including military analyses, intelligence studies, and decisionmaking in both the United States and Israel. It is important, therefore, to
differentiate between what those studies provide and what this research attempts
to do. Some of the studies focus on individuals and their leadership style or
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personality (Ambrose 1991; Benedikt 2005; Braun 1992; Dallek 2007; Haney 1994;
Inbar 1999; Isaacson 1992; Kohl 1975; Martin 1988; Steinberg 2008; Thornton
2001), while others assess the war, its aftermath and effects (Allen 1982; Dunston
2007; O’Ballance 1978; Rabinovich 2004; Zeira 1993). Like my study, some of the
research delves into the decision-making process conducted during the war
(Astorino-Courtois 1995; Bar-Joseph and McDermott 2008; Brecher 1980;
Brownstein 1977; Dowty 1984; Haney 1984; Maghroori 1981; Maoz and Astorino
1992; Quandt 1977). Most of the research on decision-making concludes their
analysis with the end of the war. Brecher’s (1980) study extends beyond the war to
the post-crisis period, but ends with the signing of the first disengagement
agreement on January 18, 1974. My study goes beyond the cessation of hostilities,
the presumed end of the crisis, and concludes with the signing of the second
disengagement settlement, the Sinai II Agreement. Furthermore, Brecher’s study
compares the perceptions and attitudes of Israeli decision-makers in the 1967 Six
Day War with those in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. While his study looks at particular
decisions, my research applies a specific framework by which to compare decision
units not only within governments but also between governments.
Of the studies mentioned above regarding decision-making, only one was
published later than 1995. Therefore, in addition to the extended examination of the
crisis and transition period, my study includes recently declassified documents of
meetings, conversations, and correspondence. And, as Graham Allison (1969, 689)
maintains, “[i]mproved understanding of...[crises] depends in part on more
information and more probing analyses of available evidence.” The inclusion of
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additional information on the decision processes, bridging the time period between
crisis and non-crisis, and examining how the authoritative decision unit(s) might
change during that time are what distinguish my study from previous research.
Chapter Four presents a brief background regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict
and the relationship between the United States and Israel. It is not intended to be a
comprehensive historical account, but rather strives to put the Yom Kippur War in
its historical context and provide the reader with some foundational knowledge of
U.S.-Israeli relations.
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Notes: Chapter Three
Although Israel’s parliamentary system encourages cooperation and compromise between political
adversaries and tends to require coalitions to make policy decisions, foreign policy decisions are
generally made within the Office of the Prime Minister and, under crisis conditions, are likely to be
made by a small, elite group of actors. The decision unit may be classified as a coalition, however, if
any one of the members of the decision group may withhold the resources of the state – essentially,
veto any decision made.
2 For example, Franco of Spain was qualified to act as a ‘predominant leader’ yet had little interest in
foreign affairs and left much of Spain’s foreign policymaking to his foreign and economic ministers
(M. Hermann et al 2001).
1
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Chapter Four
Contemporary Israel – A Brief History
A note on historical sourcing: For the general chronology of events, I utilized Keesing’s
Contemporary Archives. The Archives strives to provide accurate and objective articles
on a variety of world events. I consulted other sources as well, which are cited where
appropriate.

The War of Independence and Arab-Israeli Conflict of 1948
The birth of the modern state of Israel in the mid-twentieth century came after
nearly three decades of British occupation in the land of Palestine. In 1922 the League
of Nations agreed to grant Great Britain administrative control over the territory, which
formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire. According to the mandate, the League of
Nations favored the establishment in Palestine of a national homeland for the Jewish
people1 with the stipulation that “nothing should be done which might prejudice the
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities” currently residing in the
territory (League of Nations). During the mandate period, the British forces endured an
Arab revolt by Palestinian Arabs, a Jewish insurgency conducted by Jewish
underground groups, and, in the last two years of its administration, a civil war
between the Arabs and the Jews. The British mandate lasted from 1920 until Jewish
leaders proclaimed Israel’s independence in May 1948 (Keesing’s 1922, 1948).
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Although formally holding an administrative position over Palestine until 1948,
Great Britain transferred its responsibilities for Palestine to the United Nations in
February 1947. In November 1947 the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181(II),
approving the implementation of a partition of Palestine into two separate states, one
Arab and one Jewish. As illustrated in the map in Figure 4.1, the proposed plan would
create two disjointed states whose borders were not contiguous. While Zionist leaders
were resolute in their determination to have an independent state, Arab leaders were
adamantly opposed to a Jewish state in Palestine (Sachar 2009). In response, the Arab
League – members of which included Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi
Arabia, and Yemen – met in Cairo the following month and formally rejected the
partition plan. In addition, the members decided to “enter battle against” the plan and
take “decisive measures” to prevent such a partition (Keesing’s 1948).
By April 1948 the internal situation in Palestine had deteriorated markedly.
Palestinians conducted numerous attacks on Jewish settlements and offices (Sachar
2010). The Jewish paramilitary organization, Haganah,2 led multiple attacks on Arabrun hotels, while other Jewish groups attacked Arab villages, buses, and markets.
Palestine’s Arab neighbors sent a coalition of troops, the Arab Liberation Army, to assist
the Palestinians against the Jewish community. However, disputes surrounding the
Arab leadership fractured the coalition army. In addition, most of the Palestinians
residing in the combat zones had fled or were driven out. The result was a crushing
Palestinian defeat (Morris 2008; Sachar 2010).
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On May 14, 1948, following the successes of the Haganah, Israel proclaimed its
independence in Tel Aviv. The proclamation officially marked the end of the British
Mandate. Later the same day the United States issued a public statement that
recognized the provisional Jewish government as the de facto authority of the state of
Figure 4.1 United Nations Proposed Partition Plan, 1947

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
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Israel. Howard Sachar (2009) and Nadav Safran (1963) maintain Truman was reluctant
to recognize the new state. However, over the objections of some members of his
administration, he originally instructed the Department of State to support the partition
plan (Davidson 2001; Karp 2004; Weir 2014). The following day, May 15, the armed
forces of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded the newly established
state of Israel (Keesing’s 1947, 1948; Sachar 2010; Safran 1978; Smith 2009).3
During what would be known as the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab armies
bombed Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem witnessed heavy fighting. After an Arab assault on
Jerusalem, the Old City was taken on May 28. After two weeks of hostilities, the Arab
League and the Government of Israel accepted a temporary truce, which went into
effect on June 11 (Keesing’s 1948; Sachar 2009). During the month-long truce, the
Israeli military was reinforced with heavy equipment provided by the Europeans and
Americans. With an improved defense system, Israel was able to repel renewed
Egyptian and Syrian assaults. In addition, the Jewish air force went into action for the
first time during the 1948 conflict.
Fighting continued until January 1949, when Israel withdrew its troops from the
border town of Rafa (Sachar 2010). Despite armistice agreements between Israel and
her Arab neighbors, a state of war continued to exist (Smith 2009). From 1948 up until
1956, heightened border tensions resulted in frequent clashes, particularly with Jordan.
The relationship between the governments of the United States and Israel during
the War of Independence and the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict was one of cautious
alliance. Elements within the Truman administration were adamantly against U.S.
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support of the partition plan and establishment of a Zionist state,4 whereas the
president favored a homeland for the Jews (Carp 2004; Christison 1998; Weir 2014).
Numerous members of Truman’s cabinet were outraged when, hours after Israel
proclaimed its independence, the president officially recognized the new state (Sachar
2009; Spiegel 1985; Weir 2014). Premised on the strategy of containment, America’s
policy toward the Middle East following the 1948 war through the remainder of
Truman’s time in office focused on stabilizing the region while aligning Israeli and Arab
interests with those of the U.S. (Hahn 2004).

The 1956 Suez Crisis and Sinai Campaign
Between the summers of 1955 and 1956, the already tenuous relationship
between Israel and Egypt steadily deteriorated. Palestinian fedayeen (militant groups
later reorganized into the Palestine Liberation Organization), supported by the
government of Egypt, were conducting raids on Israel, and Israeli forces retaliated by
launching attacks on Gaza (Keesing’s 1955, 1956).5 Concerned about Egyptian military
weakness, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser entered into an arms deal with the
Soviet Union. Israel likewise sought to increase its military strength with supplies from
France.
In September 1955 Nasser ordered the blockade of the Port of Eilat, effectively
barring Israeli ships from passing (Keesing’s 1955; Sachar 2010; Smith 2009). Then, in
July 1956, after the United States withdrew its financial support on the construction of
the Aswan Dam project, Nasser announced Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal.
Chapter Four

87

Israel: A Brief History
France and Great Britain had owned and operated the canal since 1869, and Nasser
reassured them that they would be compensated. Although Nasser claimed that
commercial traffic would not be affected, both countries were outraged and concerned
over Egypt’s actions (Sachar 2009; Smith 2010). Great Britain filed a formal note of
protest to Egypt and subsequently froze Egyptian Sterling accounts, both private and
government-owned (Keesing’s 1956). The French government, as well as the American
government, likewise took financial measures against Egypt, freezing assets of the
Egyptian government and the Suez Canal Company.
Despite a Six-Point Agreement reached several weeks later by Britain, France,
and Egypt, which stated, “there should be free and open transit through the Canal
without discrimination,” Israeli ships were still not permitted to pass (Keesing’s 1956).6
On October 29 Israel launched an all-out attack on Egypt. At the end of five days of
fighting, Israel advanced to within ten miles of the Canal and controlled virtually the
entire peninsula.
The Israeli government claimed that the objective of the raid, deemed Operation
Kadesh, was political rather than tactical in nature,7 a strategy seemingly devised to
force Great Britain and the United States to take measures. However, the United States
accused Britain and France of colluding with Israel, helping to plan the invasion of the
peninsula. As a result, the U.S. sided with the U.N. rather than with its NATO allies
(Sachar 2010; Smith 2009) and called for an immediate cease-fire.8 The General
Assembly overwhelmingly approved the United States proposed resolution (Resolution
997), which not only called for an immediate cessation of hostilities but also demanded
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the withdrawal of all occupying forces from the Sinai. Additionally, the General
Assembly passed Resolution 1000, establishing a United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) to secure and supervise the cease-fire, as well as to provide a buffer between
the belligerent nations.
On the pretext of securing the canal, British and French paratroopers landed just
outside Port Said on November 5 (Sachar 2010).9 After the introduction of British and
French troops into the Sinai, the U.S. pressured its allies to accept the U.N. cease-fire
resolution. The United Nations sent troops to the region on November 20, and, by the
end of December, the last of the British and French troops left Port Said (Sachar 2010).
The introduction of the UNEF into the Sinai, however, required the consent of
the Egyptian government. Before conveying his consent, Nasser wanted clear and
precise terms as to the function of the UNEF, including where troops would be allowed
to go and how long the force would stay. Nasser was assured that the United Nations
would not infringe upon Egypt’s sovereignty, “detract from Egypt’s power freely to
negotiate a settlement on the Suez Canal or submit Egypt to any control from the
outside.”10 Moreover, the Secretary-General of the U.N. informed Nasser that the UNEF
could not stay in Egypt if consent were withdrawn. A decade later, Egypt would
formally withdraw her consent on the eve of the Six-Day War.
President Dwight Eisenhower’s policy toward Israel differed significantly from
Truman. Unlike Truman’s “special relationship” with the newly established country
(Alteras 1993), Eisenhower exerted heavy pressure on Israel during his administration.
In 1953, for example, he employed economic pressure to compel Israel to stop the
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diversion of water from the Jordan River. In regards to the Suez crisis and the Sinai
campaign, he effectively forced Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula (Alteras
1993; Christison 1998; Hahn 2006; Saunders 2011). In essence, Eisenhower was
determined to practice impartiality in regards to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Eisenhower’s
balanced approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict was intended to diminish America’s role
as Israel’s ally and protector and to mitigate Soviet influence with the Arab states
(Alteras 1993; Hahn 2006). While some Arab states favored the Eisenhower Doctrine,11
Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser demonstrated little gratitude for Eisenhower’s
policies and frequently undermined U.S. interests. The president eventually came to
appreciate Israel’s stability and military strength, and increased economic aid to that
country (Alteras 1993; Hahn 2006; Saunders 2011).

The Six-Day War
In the months leading up the 1967 Six-Day War, Egypt found itself faced with
serious financial problems. America stopped sending wheat shipments, and loans from
Western commercial banks and the International Monetary Fund dried up in response
to Nasser’s refusal to abandon his quest for long-range missiles and reduce Egypt’s
armed forces (Keesing’s 1967; Sachar 2009). Food shortages and rising unemployment
threatened to weaken the Nasser regime. When the Soviet ambassador to Egypt
erroneously informed Cairo on May 12 that the Israelis were amassing troops on the
northern border for a surprise attack on Syria, Nasser was presented with an
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opportunity. On May 15 the Egyptian president announced a state of military
emergency, sending two armored divisions to the Sinai (Sachar 2009).
By May 17 Egypt and Syria were in a state of “combat readiness” with a strong
military build-up along the Israeli borders with both countries. Jordan announced that
its forces were mobilized and ready if the situation warranted. On May 19 the United
Nations withdrew its UNEF from the Sinai and Gaza at the behest of Egypt’s President
Nasser. Meanwhile, Israel began taking what it considered to “appropriate measures” in
response to the Arab build-up (Keesing’s 1967, 22063).
May 22 saw the closure of the Straits of Tiran, sealing off the entrance to the Gulf
of Aqaba. The closure effectively blocked the Israeli port of Eilat, Israel’s only outlet to
the Red Sea and gateway to Africa and Asia (Keesing’s 1967; Sachar 2009). Eilat was
also Israel’s primary oil port. The government of Israel stated that it would not wait
indefinitely for an end to the blockade and responded with a complete mobilization of
its forces (Sachar 2009). Washington’s reaction was a firm message that the U.S. would
“regard any impingement of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran, whether under
the Israeli flag or another, as an act of aggression, against which Israel, in the opinion of
the United States, is justified in taking defensive measures” (Sachar 2009, 626).
In a speech given on May 26, Nasser claimed that if war came, “it will be total and
the objective will be to destroy Israel.” Nasser went on to say that the Egyptian military
was ready for war and that he was confident Egypt could win such a war against Israel.
Israel responded with an official protest and appeals to France, the U.S., and the U.K.
Nasser warned that if the West took any measures against Egypt, he would close the

Chapter Four

91

Israel: A Brief History
Suez Canal. Because of the increasing probability that Egypt would be going to war, on
May 29 the National Assembly conferred full powers on Nasser, enabling him to make
decisions without their consultation (Keesing’s 1967).
Another significant regional development occurred prior to the onset of the
1967 war. On May 30 Jordan and Egypt signed a defense treaty whereby an attack on
either nation would be an attack on both. On June 4 Iraq joined the Egypt-Jordan
defense pact. The following day, June 5, Israel conducted a pre-emptive assault on
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, crippling the Egyptian air force in fewer than three hours.
The air forces of Syria and Jordan fared no better against Israeli pilots. By the second
day of the war, the entire Jordan air force was destroyed, Syria lost two-thirds of its
combat air force, and Iraq lost nine fighter aircraft. Moreover, every Arab fighter that
entered Israeli air space was shot down (Sachar 2009). In addition, the Israeli air force
was able to eliminate enemy ground forces in the Sinai and played a major role in the
defeat of Syrian and Jordanian armored divisions. It was one of the most rapid and
dramatic military campaigns in modern history (Keesing’s 1967). After repeated calls
by the U.N. for a cease-fire, hostilities came to an end on June 10. By the end of war,
Israel had gained significant territorial ground.
The maps depicted in Figure 4.2 illustrate the extent of Israeli acquisition of
enemy land. As a result of the superiority of the Israeli air force, Israel was able to
capture all of the Sinai and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, gain possession of the entire city
of Jerusalem (Old and New) from Jordan, and wrest control of the Golan Heights from
Syria. Israel also captured the West Bank cities of Bethlehem, Hebron, Jericho, Nablus,
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Ramallah, and Jenin. In all, the Jewish state was in possession of an area four times
greater than the area of Israel before the war broke out (Keesing’s 1967).
The conclusion of the Six-Day War did not bring any peace agreements in the
Middle East. Instead, for the three years following the war, Egypt engaged in a war of
attrition with Israel. Moreover, in late August 1967 an Arab League Summit took place
in Khartoum, Sudan. By the end of the Summit, eight Arab heads of state declared that
there would be no peace with Israel.

Figure 4.2 Maps of Territory Held by Israel before and after the Six-Day War

Source: BBC News

United States policy toward the Middle East during the 1967 crisis was
considerably different than the crisis that occurred during the Eisenhower
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administration. Lyndon Johnson elevated America’s relationship with Israel long before
the onset of the Six-Day War (Christison 1998). During the Suez Crisis under
Eisenhower’s watch, Johnson persuaded the Democratic Policy Committee to voice its
unanimous opposition to the threat of sanctions against Israel (Sachar 2009). As
president, he accepted Israel’s program of diverting water from the Jordan River. He
agreed to sell tanks and fighter aircraft to Israel and adamantly supported the Israeli
position in the 1967 conflict. His support for Israel seemed so virtually unconditional
that, according to Kathleen Christison (1998), Johnson did not appear overly concerned
even after Israel attacked an American communications intercept ship, killing thirtyfour American naval personnel. So amiable was the president’s attitude toward Israel
that during Johnson’s administration, a number of Israelis and Israel supporters had
easy access to the White House, including during the 1967 crisis (Christison 1998).
Howard Sachar (2009, 630) argues, however, that although Johnson’s stance was
pro-Israel, his support was not unconditional. After Egypt implemented a blockade of
the Straits of Tiran, for example, the president warned Foreign Minister Abba Eban that
Israel must not take preemptive military action or it would have to “go it alone.”
Johnson remained publicly silent on his support for Israel during the war, and instead
tried to present a united front along with the Soviets on calling for an immediate
ceasefire. In reality, the war was brief enough and the Israeli military so successful that
the president did not find it necessary to openly voice his support for Israel. Despite
Johnson’s warning to the foreign minister against preemption, there were few political
repercussions for Israel when she fired the first shot of the war, at least not from the
U.S. (Christison 1993; Sachar 2009; Spiegel 1985).
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Johnson’s Middle East policy at the conclusion of the war appeared to be more
balanced than prior to the conflict. For example, the Johnson administration prohibited
all arms shipments to the region in an attempt to “encourage Moscow to reciprocate”
(Spiegel 1985, 158). When Moscow did not return the gesture, the administration
publicly announced that the U.S. would deliver military equipment, which was ordered
before the war began, to five pro-Western Arab states.
It was the role in the negotiations regarding Resolution 242, however, that was
the Johnson administration’s most significant achievement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy
(Spiegel 1985). The resolution not only provided the framework for future negotiations,
but it was an indication of the increasing involvement of the United States in the ArabIsraeli conflict.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War
The Yom Kippur War, also known as the October War or the Ramadan War,
began on the holiest day of the year in the Jewish calendar, which is traditionally
observed with intensive prayer and about twenty-five hours of fasting beginning at
sundown the night before. Because it was the holiest day of the year, many military
personnel had been granted leave to spend the holiday with their families. This left the
IDF forces significantly depleted at the Egyptian and Syrian borders.
Israeli decision-makers recognized several days before the war broke out that
Egypt and Syria were positioned for a potential attack.12 However, previous experience
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and certain underlying assumptions precluded the Israeli Cabinet from taking steps to
stave off military confrontation. The general assumption was that Israel was militarily
superior to both Egypt and Syria, and neither would independently attack the Jewish
state. A second assumption was that Egypt had threatened war earlier that year, yet
nothing had transpired. Certain elements in the Israeli government believed that Sadat
was “all talk” and would not start a war that he could not win (Bar-Joseph 2006; Bartov
1981; Dayan 1976; Derfler 2014; Meir 1975; Rabinovich 2004; Sachar 2010). Most
intelligence and military analysts did not believe that Egypt or Syria would engage in a
military confrontation with Israel. In essence, although policymakers recognized the
potential problem on their borders, they did not perceive the threat to be imminent.
The war would last for nearly three weeks and bring the United States and
Soviet Union to the brink of a nuclear confrontation. Egypt and Syria had mobilized
forces at the border weeks in advance, but Israeli intelligence analysts reported that it
was most likely a military exercise. Even the expulsion of Soviet military advisors in
Egypt, along with the evacuation of their families on 5 October, though worrisome, did
not change the perception of some of those in the Cabinet that Israel would get
“adequate warning of any real trouble” (Meir 1975). Most in the government still did
not believe that Egypt or Syria would actually go to war with Israel.
The Prime Minister was reassured the day before the attack began that
“sufficient reinforcements were being sent to the fronts to carry out any holding
operation” that might be necessary.13 Chief of Staff David Elazar and Defense Minister
Moshe Dayan had already decided early on October 5 to place the regular IDF forces on
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the highest state of alert and the Air Force on full alert. Based on intelligence
evaluations and reassurances from military advisers, Meir decided not to call up the
reserves.
New intelligence received on the morning of October 6 claimed that Egyptian
and Syrian forces were planning to begin an assault on Israel at 6:00 p.m. that evening.
The hostilities actually began four hours earlier at 2:00 p.m. That Egypt or Syria would
even consider war with Israel came as a surprise to the Israeli government. Just hours
before the attack, when the Israeli government became convinced of the impending
hostilities, Prime Minister Golda Meir and her advisers decided against the option of a
preemptive strike. Israel possessed superior air power over Egypt and Syria, and a
preemptive strike, as occurred in 1967, could have substantially reduced the damage
incurred by the ground assault. That initial decision to forego preemptive action would
be both politically and militarily significant. By letting the Egyptian and Syrian armies
make the first move, Israel’s military would come closer than ever before to a
devastating defeat. Additionally, the Israeli government would raise questions about its
own ability to maintain its security in the region. However, because Israel did not
initiate the war, Meir and members of her cabinet were able to remind the United States
and the international community again and again of Israel’s role as the victim or target
in the conflict, and thus help solidify much needed U.S. military and political support.
In the early days of the war, Egypt and Syria inflicted severe damage to the
deficient and unprepared Israeli army and made significant territorial gains. Syria was
able to move into the Golan area, and Egypt managed to cross the Suez Canal and enter
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the Sinai. Following three days of intense fighting, Israel was able to launch a counteroffensive, pushing Syria back across the pre-war lines and stopping Egypt’s advance.
Within a week of the outbreak of the war, Israeli artillery was reaching the outskirts of
the Syrian capital of Damascus. On the Egyptian front, the Israeli army slowly advanced
and was eventually able to cross the Canal and enter Egypt. Although it became possible
for the IDF to march on both Cairo and Damascus, the Israeli government elected not to
do so.
On October 22 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 338,
calling for an immediate ceasefire-in-place and the implementation of SC Resolution
242.14 The UN would go on to pass two more resolutions before the fighting ceased.
Despite the UN call for a ceasefire, the fighting continued, with both sides claiming the
other had violated the agreement. It was during this time that Israel was able to
surround the Egyptian Third Army and effectively prohibit their ability to withdraw or
receive supplies, including food and water. Angered by Israel’s actions and asserting
that it was Israel that had violated the ceasefire, Moscow insisted that both the United
States and Soviet Union send troops to the region immediately to impose the UN
resolution. And, if the United States was unwilling to do so, the Soviet Union would act
unilaterally, sending its own troops. The U.S. government was adamantly opposed to
any American or Soviet military involvement in the current conflict and believed it
could only escalate to a direct confrontation between the two superpowers. Despite the
concern over such a confrontation, the U.S. response to the Soviet proposal was to put
its military worldwide on a heightened state of alert. Secretary of State Kissinger had
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just returned from Moscow following what seemed to have been successful negotiations
regarding the crisis. Fortunately, the elevated alert status lasted less than a day.
Tensions between the Americans and the Soviets de-escalated and the ceasefire
took hold only after persistent communications between the two governments and an
increase of U.S. pressure on Israel to comply with the second and third UN resolutions.
The U.S. also convinced Israel to allow nonmilitary aid to reach the surrounded
Egyptian army. On October 26, Israel accepted UN calls for a ceasefire. The war itself
was over, but negotiations for a military disengagement were just beginning. It is
important to note that near the end of the war and throughout the negotiation process,
Syria and Egypt acted independently of one another. What began as a collaborative
effort to regain lost territory ended with divided interests and different strategies for
obtaining long-term objectives.
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East under the Nixon administration was heavily
influenced by the policy of détente with the Soviet Union (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger
1982; Maghroori 1981; Quandt 1977; Siniver 2008; Spiegel 1985). Before the October
war broke out, President Richard Nixon did not consider Arab-Israeli relations to be a
top priority on his agenda (Dowty 1984; Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Maghroori
1981; Perlmutter 1975; Quandt 1977; Sachar 2009; Siniver 2008; Spiegel 1985). While
he fundamentally supported Israel and defensible borders, he was less involved with
the region in general, instead focusing on Cambodia, China, and Vietnam (Kissinger
1982; Quandt 1977; Spiegel 1985). When Nixon did become involved in the Middle
East, his policy choices were often inconsistent or at odds with one another. Steven
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Spiegel (1985) explains Nixon’s conflicting and confusing approach to his Mideast
policy:
The administration that more than any of its predecessors cooperated
with the Soviets in the Mideast through the Big Two and Big Four talks, by
the end of its first term threatened the U.S.S.R. in Egypt, the country of
most significant influence in the area…An administration that openly
withheld arms to Israel in spring 1970, even after increased Russian
involvement in Egypt, was by early 1972 concluding the first long-term
arms arrangement with Jerusalem. An administration that openly issued
a comprehensive plan for reaching an Arab-Israeli settlement (the Rogers
Plan) found itself by the end of the term secretly discussing negotiations
to initiate a mere interim settlement on the Suez Canal (217).
According to Spiegel, it was Nixon’s ambivalence toward the Middle East, coupled with
domestic problems that allowed various members of his cabinet to heavily influence
foreign policy in the region. For example, by the time hostilities began in October 1973,
Nixon was already beleaguered by the Watergate Scandal, which presented a more
immediate threat to the administration.
It would take nearly two years, several rounds of negotiations, and significant
commitments from the U.S. before the Sinai II Agreement was signed. During the
negotiation phase (crisis transition period), several domestic and international events
occurred that affected the decision process in both the U.S. and Israel.
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Conclusion
The events surrounding the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 created a
fundamental consensus on the nature of the threats facing its society. The Arab League
had immediately rejected the UN partition plan, and, just one day after declaring
independence, several of Israel’s neighbors attacked the new nation. The attack
signaled to the Jewish people that the creation of a new and enduring state in the
region, particularly a Jewish one, would not be easy. Moreover, America’s official
recognition of Israel suggested to Jewish leaders that they could count the United States
a political ally. At the same time the announcement marginalized the Palestinian issue,
which further heightened concerns of Arab leaders. Israel’s victory in the 1948 conflict
did little to persuade Arab leaders’ acceptance of the new country.
The successes of the Six Day War demonstrated the considerable capabilities of
the Israeli military over those of her Arab neighbors and fostered the notion of an
Israeli unchallenged superiority. In addition, the strategic advantage of capturing the
Sinai was the acquisition of the Giddi and Mitla Passes and the oil fields at Abu Rudeis.
The mountain passes formed a bottleneck, which could allow a small contingent of
Israeli troops to defend a large force. Indeed, the passes are considered the best places
from which to defend Israel (Rabinovich 2004; Sacher 2010; Safran 1978; Siniver
2013). These same passes would play a key role in the negotiations of the
disengagement agreements following the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
The military superiority displayed during the 1967 war also created in the
minds of the Israelis, along with many in the international community, an assumption
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that no Arab nation would again engage Israel militarily until they had the capacity to
match or defeat her air power. In the Israeli government this assumption, coupled with
the idea that Syria would never act alone, became known as the “concept” (Brecher
1980; Rabinovich 2004; Safran 1978; Siniver 2013; Zeira 1993). The Agranat
Commission, established following the failures that occurred during the Yom Kippur
War, determined that the “concept” was a crucial factor in interpreting and evaluating
the intelligence that was gathered leading up to the conflict. The “conception,”
according to the Commission Report, was deemed outdated, and evidence and
intelligence to the contrary were not enough to displace the significant influence of the
conception (Bar-Joseph 2006). However, some scholars argue that there were multiple
contributing factors responsible for the intelligence failure, including groupthink on the
part of the Israeli decision-makers (Stein 1982). Despite the crushing defeat in the 1967
Six Day War, Arab leaders professed that there would be “no peace…no recognition…no
negotiations with Israel.”15
A further assumption within the government was that Israel would have at least
forty-eight hours’ notice of an impending attack. And, if such an attack were to occur,
there was no doubt that Israel maintained military superiority and could quickly
dispatch with the enemy. The view that Israel could easily defeat her Arab neighbors
was present in the U.S. as well and had a significant influence on decisions taken during
the crisis. In addition to the assumptions resulting from the 1967 war, other effects
included the emergence of a regional environment of superpower competition by
proxy. Essentially, the United States supported the pro-Western countries of Israel and
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some Arab countries such as Jordan, and the Soviet Union backed the Egyptian and
Syrian regimes (Siniver 2013).
United States policy concerning Israel from the War of Independence in 1948 up
to the 1973 Yom Kippur War was in general one of cautious support. Truman and
Johnson were often swayed by the Jewish voting bloc in the U.S. when it came to
decisions regarding Israel, whereas Eisenhower tried to implement a more balanced
approach to U.S.-Israeli relations (Christison 1998; Hahn 2006; Sachar 2009; Spiegel
1985). The containment of Soviet expansion in the Middle East was a primary driver of
U.S. foreign policy from Truman to Johnson (Hahn 2006; Sachar; 2009; Spiegel 1985).
Nixon sought a different approach in regards to its relationship with the Soviet Union:
détente. Nixon’s concerns, however, focused on events and conditions in Southeast Asia
rather than the Middle East (Haney 1994; Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Kohl 1975;
Quandt 1977; Sachar 2009; Siniver 2008; Spiegel 1985). Nevertheless, a competitive
international environment continued to exist during the Nixon and Ford
administrations, which helped to shape decision processes throughout both the 1973
crisis and crisis transition period.
Chapter Five is intended to provide some contextual information and brief
descriptions of each of the key decisions undertaken during the crisis, which covers the
period from October 5 to October 26, 1973. Included in each description are
assessments and classifications of the types of decision units and occasions for decision.
The decisions taken by both the U.S. and Israel are presented chronologically. This
chapter also provides a brief analysis of the decisions taken during this time. As some of
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the hypotheses in this study seek to test the effects of environmental shocks, I include
these events within the chronology of decisions. These events are noted in italicized
text. Chapters Five and Six do not provide detailed, minute-by-minute accounts of all
decisions considered, but are intended to inform the reader of the basis for the
classifications used in this study. Chapter Seven provides comparisons of the findings
and an assessment of the DU framework.
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Chapter Five
Crisis Decisions
Introduction
In the early hours of October 6, 1973, an Israeli intelligence source confirmed
what the Israeli government did not want to acknowledge: that a war would be
launched against the Jewish state that day.1 For several days leading up to the war,
military intelligence reported a build-up of Syrian and Egyptian forces along the border.
Though disconcerting, analysts concluded that the Egyptian activity was most likely a
military exercise and, in the case of Syria, the deployment was probably defensive
maneuvering in response to an unexpected air battle with Israel that had occurred on
September 13. Despite evidence to the contrary, the intelligence assessments went
largely unquestioned (Bar-Joseph 2006; Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976;
Dunstan 2007; Eban 1977; Erikkson 2013; Meir 1975; O’Ballance 1978; Rabinovich
2003; Sachar 2010). The day before the war began, the Egyptian army made a move
toward the Suez Canal. The Syrian military transitioned from a defensive to an offensive
posture. Israel reacted by putting its military on high alert. For many in the Israeli
government, war appeared to be inevitable, but not all were convinced (Bartov 1981;
Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Eban 1977; Meir 1975).
At the time the crisis began, Henry Kissinger was in New York and President
Nixon was in Key Biscayne, Florida. According to telephone transcripts, they spoke only
once the first day of the war. The conversation included a brief description on the status
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of the fighting, the possibility that the Soviets knew about the impending attack, and the
likelihood of a UN Security Council (UNSC) meeting being called that day. Nixon
suggested that Kissinger “take the initiative” and call for a UNSC meeting himself, or
perhaps get the Russians to do it. Kissinger relayed his strategy to the President about
getting the Soviets involved and the possibility of a comprehensive settlement. Bringing
the Soviets in, Kissinger explained, entailed asking them to take a neutral position with
the United States. Kissinger also told the President that the long-term strategy should
be to actively seek a diplomatic settlement to the bigger problem, the Palestinians. The
President reminded Kissinger not to take sides and asked to be kept informed of the
developments. Though not explicit, Nixon’s responses in the telephone conversation
suggested that Kissinger had the authority to decide how to handle the immediate
situation.2 In that regard, Kissinger did not call for a UNSC meeting.
The international shock of an impending conflict initiated a series of sixty-two
discernible key decisions by both Israel and the United States during the crisis and
crisis transition periods, including two decisions made the day before the war broke
out. During the crisis period, a total of thirty-two decisions were made, fifteen by the
United States and seventeen by Israel.

Sequence of Decisions
Note: The dates of each decision correspond to the local date and time of each of
the official documents issued by the respective government. Discrepancies in the
sequence of decisions are the result of time zone differences. Additionally, assessments
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of the Israeli decisions taken between October 5 and 9 are supported by official
documentation from the Israeli State Archives. Analysis of the decisions made after
October 9 was derived from secondary sources. Most of the assessments of U.S.
decisions were based on primary sources, augmented with secondary source
information.
October 5, 1973
On October 5, 1973, Israeli military intelligence reported that Egyptian and
Syrian militaries were mobilized along the Israeli border. Defense Minister Moshe
Dayan authorized Chief of General Staff (COGS) David Elazar to place the IDF and air
force on high alert. In an emergency meeting, the Cabinet, acting as a single group
decision unit, approved the alert status and the decision was made to give authority to
the prime minister and Dayan to mobilize all reserves if necessary (Bartov 1981; BenMeir 1986; Brecher 1980; Dayan; 1976; Meir 1975). The authorization for mobilization
is denoted as Israel Decision #1 (hereafter, IS1) in the decision table. The occasion for
decision in IS1, Egyptian and Syrian military activity, is classified as an external shock.
In consultation with Elazar, Meir and Dayan voiced their concern about the
Egyptian and Syrian military postures, but agreed that mobilization of Israeli forces
may not be necessary (IS2). Elazar maintained that Israel would have an advanced
warning before an attack, but still believed war was unlikely. Meir accepted this
assessment and decided not to mobilize reserves at that time. The timing of the crisis
(Yom Kippur) played no small role in Meir’s decision not to mobilize reserve forces
(Meir 1975). Most were at home with their families preparing for the holiday.
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According to the official transcript of the meeting,3 Meir was the ultimate authority and
made the decision regarding mobilization (IS2). The decision unit for IS2 is classified as
predominant leader, and the occasion for decision is the same as in IS1: external shock.
October 6-7, 1973
By the morning of October 6, Meir and her Cabinet learned that a coordinated
Egyptian and Syrian attack was imminent and reportedly would commence at 6:00 p.m.
(The outbreak of the war would actually begin at 2:00 p.m.) Archival transcripts dated
October 6, which were declassified and released in 2010, revealed that the discussions
regarding the mobilization of the reserves and the option of a preemptive strike
occurred during the same meeting. Regarding the mobilization, Elazar recommended a
full-scale mobilization of reserves, while Dayan supported only limited mobilization.
Meir, acting on the chance that war was imminent, decided to adopt Elazar’s
recommendation and ordered full mobilization (IS3).
On the subject of a preemptive strike, Elazar strongly argued in favor of such
action, but Dayan was adamantly opposed. Elazar later explained his support for
preemption was based on the assumption that war was a certainty and it was the only
way to “neutralize…the initial advantage enjoyed by the battle-ready Syrians and
Egyptians” (Bartov 1981). Conversely, Dayan was not convinced of the certainty of an
attack and was concerned about the consequences of initiating hostilities
(ISA/RG130/143 2013; Bartov 1981; Ben-Meir 1986; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir
1975; Safran 1978). The transcripts suggest that the prime minister was the individual
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responsible for deciding against a preemptive strike (IS4). Meir (1975) explained to
Elazar:
“Dado, I know all the arguments in favor of a preemptive strike, but I am
against it. We don’t know now…what the future will hold, but there is
always the possibility that we will need help, and if we strike first, we get
nothing from anyone…with a heavy heart I am going to say no” (p. 357).4

Although Meir was concerned with the political implications of preemptions, she was
also reassured by the military leadership that, with Israel’s superior capabilities, they
would be able to overcome an initial assault and eventually take the advantage. The
transcripts indicate that Meir acted as predominant leader in both decisions (IS3 and
IS4). The occasions for decision were twofold: external shock and new information. The
external shock was the immediate threat of an attack, and Israeli intelligence provided
new information that confirmed an attack was to begin at a specific time.
The United States was well aware of the situation growing in the Middle East. A
series of telephone transcripts indicate that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
communicated regularly with the Israeli Ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, and the
ambassador kept Kissinger informed of developments in the days leading up to the war.
Additionally, Meir informed Washington through Embassy channels that Israel had no
aggressive intentions, but would respond forcefully if attacked. Kissinger urged Israel
not to initiate hostilities.5
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During an Israeli Cabinet meeting on the afternoon of October 6, reports came in
that war had broken out on both fronts (Brecher 1981).
Throughout the first day of fighting, reports coming in from the military
commands on both fronts indicated that the situation was under control. In actuality,
Israeli forces were taking heavy losses and, by the second day (October 7), battle
updates were no longer optimistic. The information raised concerns about Israel’s
ability to defend her borders in a protracted conflict (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980;
Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; O’Ballance 1978; Rabinovich 2004; Sachar 2010; Safran
1978).6 Prime Minister Meir and her Cabinet made two key decisions on the second day
of fighting: [1] to request emergency assistance and military supplies from the United
States (IS5); and [2] a decision regarding a counter-attack (IS6).
The decision to request aid from the U.S. had been discussed at several Cabinet
meetings since before the start of hostilities (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975). All
of the participants in these meetings, who included the prime minister, defense
minister, the chief of staff, and several military advisers, agreed that Israel should make
the request for supplies (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975).7
Although the military leaders recommended the request and there was consensus on
the decision (Brecher 1980), the transcripts of the meeting suggest that Meir
maintained the ultimate authority to order the request (Ben-Meir 1986; Bartov 1981;
Dayan 1976; Meir 1975). 8
According to Henry Kissinger’s telephone transcripts, U.S. decision-making
during the first day of the war centered on getting the fighting stopped. However,
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varying accounts indicate that Sadat was not interested in a cease-fire, and Israel was
concerned about the timing – Israel did not want to lose any territory if a cease-fire-inplace was imposed too early (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Nixon 1978; Quandt 1977).
In regards to steps toward a cease-fire, the administration’s policy of détente with the
Soviet Union weighed heavily on the decision to ask the Soviets to take a neutral stand
alongside the U.S. – US Decision #1, hereafter US1 (Dallek 2007; Horne 2009; Isaacson
1992; Kissinger 1982; Nixon 1978; Perlmutter 1975; Siniver 2008). Kissinger suggested
the idea of bringing the Soviets in and Nixon agreed. This seems to indicate that the
decision unit consisted of a single group. The clear impetus, or occasion for decision, was
the commencement of the war, which can be classified as an external shock.
In a telephone conversation with Kissinger later that day, the Minister of the
Israeli Embassy, Mordechai Shalev, assured Kissinger that Israel did not initiate
hostilities and that reports coming out of Cairo of an Israeli naval engagement were
false.9 Shalev also informed Kissinger that Israel’s military commander had submitted a
list of “urgent items” for U.S. consideration. Kissinger told Shalev that they could meet
later to discuss the items.
Kissinger and Nixon agreed to provide the missiles and ammunition (US2), but
delayed approving the request for planes. According to telephone transcripts, the issue
delaying the supply of planes was based on the assumption that Israeli forces would be
able to reverse Arab advances and take the advantage within a few days. In addition,
Kissinger warned that the delivery of the supplies from the U.S. should be kept low-key
so as to “preserve the American position in the Arab world” (Kissinger 2003, 159).
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Nixon was not opposed to this strategy; indeed early on he voiced his concerns to
Kissinger that he did not want the U.S. to appear too pro-Israel. Therefore, in order to
maintain a low profile, it was decided that Israel would pick up the supplies in
unmarked planes (US2).
Although it is not clear from official transcripts, Kissinger alone likely decided to
have the Israelis pick up the aid. Kissinger and Nixon did not discuss logistics during
their telephone conversation. Also, there are no indications of a face-to-face meeting
between Kissinger and Nixon during this time, where such a decision might have been
addressed. The assessment of the decision unit is also based on telephone transcripts
between Kissinger and General Brent Scowcroft, as well as secondary sources (Isaacson
1992; Kissinger 2003; Quandt 2001; Siniver 2008). While the decision to provide
military supplies to Israel was key, and one that had to be approved by the president, I
argue that the primary significance of the decision lay in the U.S. insistence that Israel
was required to come and get them.10 The decision unit is therefore classified as
predominant leader. The occasion for decision is assessed to be other (strategic).
Unfortunately for the Israeli government, there was an issue with Israeli planes
not being allowed to land at any of the airbases for supply transfer (Bartov 1981; Dayan
1975; Eban 1977). During a telephone conversation on October 7 between the
Secretary of State and the Israeli Ambassador, Dinitz told Kissinger that he would work
on securing charter planes to pick up the supplies. At this time Kissinger left the Israeli
Ambassador to work out the delivery logistics of the resupply effort. Later, it would
become known that personnel in the Defense Department deliberately delayed
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assembling and loading the equipment requested (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 2003;
Nixon 1978; Quandt 1977).11
Also on October 7, the Israeli government authorized COGS Elazar to make the
decision on a counter attack (IS6). This is considered to be a key political decision
because the significant territorial encroachments into Syria and Egypt would affect the
political negotiations upon the conclusion of hostilities. The decision for granting the
authorization was based partly on the fact that Elazar was an experienced military
officer and understood the battlefield better than members of the Cabinet (Dayan 1976;
Meir 1975; Rabinovich 2004) and partly on the previous practices that granted military
leadership considerable leeway in decision-making regarding national security (BarJoseph 2000; Ben-Meir 1986; Brownstein 1977; Eban 1977; Elizur and Salpeter 1973;
Maoz 1990; Rabinovich 2004; Safran 1978). Chief of Staff Elazar recommended an
immediate counter attack on Syria, but recommended they hold off in the Sinai until the
situation improved (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976; Rabinovich 2004). Elazar was confident
that additional tanks in the north along with the superior capabilities of the air force
could prove successful against Syria. Additionally, if Israeli forces could hold the
Egyptians at the Suez Canal, the air force could complete its mission in the north and
return to assist in the south (Bartov 1981). The decision unit for the authorization of
the counter-attack option is assessed to be a single group. The occasion for decision is
classified as other, deferring to expertise in military matters.
In addition to the decisions noted above, it has been reported that on or around
the second day of the war the prime minister was presented with the option of
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preparing Israel’s arsenal for a “nuclear demonstration” (Cohen 2008).12 According to
an interview with Arnan Azaryahu, a trusted aide and confidante to key adviser and
Minister Without Portfolio Yisrael Galili, a meeting took place involving the Prime
Minister Meir, Defense Minister Dayan, COGS Elazar, Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Alon,
and Galili. At the end of the meeting, after Elazar left, Dayan proposed to the prime
minister that Israel should prepare a nuclear demonstration. Those remaining in Meir’s
office immediately warned against such an action, that the situation was not yet that
desperate. According to Azaryahu, the prime minister unequivocally denied Dayan’s
suggestion. In no uncertain terms, Meir told Dayan, “Forget it” (Cohen 2008, 3).
Azaryahu maintains that Dayan’s failure to adequately assess the strength of the enemy,
combined with the bleak situation on both fronts, had transformed him into a “Prophet
of Doom” with few options for Israel.
Although some have suggested that Israel seriously considered implementing a
nuclear “demonstration” (Aronson 1992; Evron 1994; Hersch 1991; Kumaraswamy
2000), primary documentation cannot confirm such an exchange took place. Moreover,
Azaryahu admits that he did not personally attend the meeting, but only reports what
was relayed to him by Galili. Neither Meir (1975) nor Dayan (1976) make any mention
of such a meeting in their autobiographies, and Dayan called the suggestion “absurd”
(Raz 2014, 104). While the decision to reject a nuclear option would have certainly
been a key decision to include in this study, the absence of first-hand accounts or
primary sources would render an analysis of such a decision conjecture.
October 9, 1973
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The next set of key decisions made by the Israeli government came two days
later on October 9. The first involved the authorization of air strikes on military targets
in the heart of the Syrian capital of Damascus (IS7). On the previous day, October 8, the
IDF experienced serious setbacks and failures on both the northern and southern
fronts. In light of these developments, Dayan and Elazar agreed that the Israeli Air Force
should begin conducting strikes in Damascus.13 Meir was reluctant to authorize such a
campaign on the capital (Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975).14 She eventually
relented, but instructed Elazar to target only military installations. The occasion for
decision can be classified as new information, but also other and strategic in nature.
Based on the transcript of the meeting on this issue, I assess the decision unit to be
predominant leader.
The second decision was in response to the delay in military supplies Kissinger
had promised Israel. Prime Minister Meir was growing concerned and frustrated with
the delay in receiving much needed military supplies from the U.S (Bartov 1981;
Brecher 1980; Dayan 1975; Meir 1976).15 In consultation with Dayan, Meir suggested
that perhaps she should make a trip to Washington (IS8) to convince President Nixon of
the critical nature of the situation (Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1976). Dayan was
in agreement. The trip became unnecessary, however, because, when Nixon and
Kissinger learned of the plan, Kissinger informed the prime minister that no such
journey was warranted. According to Kissinger, all requests coming through
Ambassador Dinitz or Minister Shalev were considered requests by the prime minister
and would be treated as such.16 In other words, the U.S. had already decided they were
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going to send supplies and a visit from Meir would not have any effect on that decision,
one way or the other.
According to Kissinger (2003), the primary issue was one of logistics rather than
intent. The U.S. diplomatic strategy included trying not to anger the Arabs with an overt
airlift for Israel. Arranging the delivery of supplies was, therefore, hindered by the
secrecy of the mission. Meir’s proposed trip, though not terribly significant in the
overall sequence of events, nonetheless can be considered a key decision based on
several factors. First, it indicated to the U.S. that the Israeli military was faring far worse
than previously believed, which Kissinger later confirmed caused the U.S. to reconsider
certain assumptions about Israel’s capabilities (Kissinger 2003). It was becoming more
apparent that Israel really did need the equipment for which they were asking.
Additionally, the United States had been prepared to delay long enough and veto any
resolution calling for a cease-fire in place, as the American government expected Israel
to eventually reverse the course of the war. However, given the setback experienced
thus far, Kissinger realized that the U.S. position would not be sustainable indefinitely
(Kissinger 2003).
According to the characteristics in the DU framework, Meir’s (aborted) decision
(IS8) to fly to Washington was made by a predominant leader. The occasion for decision
is classified as new information, in light of the military setbacks on both fronts and the
continued delay of supplies from the United States.
October 10, 1973
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On October 10, the Israeli Cabinet approved a plan to launch a general attack on
Syria (IS10). The Israeli army had been able to push Syrian forces back beyond the
October 5 lines, and a push toward Damascus would put pressure on Syria to agree to a
cease-fire. Although the plan indicated the attack would move in the direction of
Damascus, Meir insisted she did not wish to occupy Syria’s capital (Bartov 1981;
Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975). The attack eventually allowed Israel to
recapture the Golan Heights and gave Israel bargaining leverage with Syria. The
recommendation was probably made by Elazar and/or Dayan (Bartov 1981; Dayan
1976; Rabinovich 2004), who then requested the endorsement of the Prime Minister
and the Cabinet. It is not clear whether the Cabinet approved the plan on a strict
majority vote, or whether it was actually Meir’s decision and the Cabinet went along. It
is unclear, therefore, whether the decision unit was predominant leader or single group.
Based on similar types of decisions made earlier in the conflict, I assess that the
decision unit was likely a single group. The type of occasion for decision is classified as
new information, based on battle reports, and also other because it was strategic in
nature.
As to the strategy for the southern front, the Cabinet decided that the southern
command would hold the Egyptian army for now, but should prepare its forces for an
attack (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Rabinovich 2004). Dayan reported
that there was “now powerful pressure…for an unconditional cease-fire…This would
mean victory for the Arabs…I felt we should do whatever we could to prevent an
immediate cease-fire decision” until Israel could push the Egyptian army back across
the Canal (Dayan 1976, 426; see also Brecher 1980, 212, and Quandt 1977, 177).
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The U.S. decisions on October 10 were in relation to military supplies and the
delivery of those supplies. According to Walter Isaacson (1992), Nixon received
information regarding a Soviet airlift to Syria and was worried about how the war was
developing for the Israelis. Nixon reportedly agreed to replace all aircraft lost by Israel
(US4) as well as to send new F-4 Phantom fighters (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982;
Quandt 1977, 2001). In this scenario, the decision unit is predominant leader. However,
in a telephone conversation, Kissinger asks James Schlesinger that, if he [Kissinger]
wanted to “sweeten the pot” with the Israelis, what planes could they [Defense
Department] “scrape together.” Schlesinger responded with “only Phantoms.” This
interaction implies that it was Kissinger who acted as predominant leader in the
decision to supply Israel with additional aircraft. Although I am unable to identify the
specific decision-maker in this instance, it is apparent that the decision unit was one of
predominant leader. Because of the news of the Soviet airlift and the state of the Israeli
military, the occasion for decision is classified as new information.
Despite the U.S. decision to provide aid to Israel, problems continued to persist
regarding its delivery. According to Quandt (1977), the intensity of the fighting was
such that the supplies could not be delivered solely by El Al flights. Kissinger decided
that the U.S. would try and hire civilian charter planes to deliver the supplies (US3).
This would help expedite the delivery while maintaining the illusion of official
American involvement (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977). The decision
unit is classified as predominant leader. The occasion for decision is negative feedback.
Meanwhile, Kissinger continued to press Israel for an immediate cease-fire.
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Throughout 1973, the Nixon administration had been experiencing political
difficulties on the domestic front. In addition to the Watergate burglary plaguing Nixon,
his vice-president, Spiro Agnew, became entangled in a bribery scandal in April 1973.
Allegations against Agnew grew more serious over the summer, with threats of
impeachment and indictment. Finally, on October 10 the vice-president resigned from
office.
October 12-13, 1973
By October 12, none of the planes promised by the White House had yet to arrive
(Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Quandt 1977). On that same day,
Elazar presented his assessment of the IDF’s ability to cross the Canal and hold the
Egyptian line. He was confident that ground forces could successfully capture a portion
of the west bank of the Canal, but could not hold that position for an extended period of
time (Bartov 1981, 438). In other words, if a cease-fire was likely to occur in the next
few days, he would recommend the attempted crossing. Later in the day, news arrived
that the Egyptians were planning to implement “Phase Two” of their war plan,
suggesting that Sadat was not considering a cease-fire in the immediate future (Bartov
1981). Indeed, reports from the southern front indicated that Egyptian forces on the
west bank had begun crossing the Canal (Brecher 1980).
The Cabinet decided to postpone a decision on attempting to cross the Suez
Canal (IS10) until Israeli forces could break the Egyptian armor (Bartov 1981; Brecher
1980; Dayan 1976). This was a key decision in several respects. A crossing of the Canal
could potentially send a signal to Egypt that Israel might try to advance on Cairo, a clear
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move with threatening political overtones (Brecher 1980). Additionally, the decision
turned out to be key because the two Israeli divisions determined to cross would be
doing so just as two full-strength Egyptian divisions were approaching the Canal to
cross to the east (Bartov 1981). The decision was similar in nature to IS9 – the decision
to launch a general attack on Syria - therefore, the Cabinet probably acted as a single
group. According to Elazar, it became clear that “only the Cabinet [would] decide on the
crossing” (Bartov 1981, 438]. The occasion for decision is tactical in nature and thus
classified as other.
Before October 12 came to an end, the Israelis received a report that the
Russians were preparing to send three divisions to the Middle East (Bartov 1981). In a
midnight meeting, the Cabinet discussed the probability of a cease-fire proposal in the
Security Council (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976). Meir and the Cabinet
decided to accept a U.S. suggestion for a cease-fire in place (IS11) if such a proposal was
raised. The much-needed supplies promised by the U.S. had yet to be delivered, and
Elazar reported that Egyptian activity suggested a possible full-scale armor attack
(Bartov 1981, 444). Based on biographical accounts, the decision unit is classified as a
single group. Although Brecher (1980) suggests that Meir made the decision in
consultation with Dayan and Elazar, other reports indicate that Meir and her War
Cabinet (consisting of Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon and adviser and Minister
Without Portfolio Yisrael Galili) decided to accept a cease-fire, if one should be
proposed. The occasion for decision is considered strategic in nature and classified as
other.
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In regards to the crossing of the Canal, Elazar laid out his plan to members of the
Cabinet.17 The ensuing meeting went on until after midnight. The differences of opinion
within the Cabinet generally centered on “how and when” to implement the plan, rather
than whether or not it should be undertaken (Bartov 1981, 471; Brecher 1980; Dayan
1976; Meir 1975). Even Dayan threw his support behind the plan (Bartov 1981; Dayan
1976; Meir 1975). Finally, the Cabinet approved the proposal to cross the Canal (IS12).
This is classified as a tactical decision (other) based on new information. Based on
personal accounts of the meeting, the vote was unanimous, indicating that the decision
unit was a single group (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975).
In the United States, President Nixon learned that Israel had yet to receive the
military aid promised. He then directed Kissinger and Haig to have American military
planes deliver supplies to Israel (US5), something Kissinger was trying to avoid
(Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 2003; Quandt 1977, 2001). In fact, in a telephone
conversation early on October 13, Kissinger explicitly told James Schlesinger that he did
not want American planes flying into Israel. Although Nixon was concerned early about
America looking pro-Israel, no one in the administration wanted to see Israel lose the
war (Dallek 2007; Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Nixon 1978; Quandt 2001; Siniver
2008). The precipitous occasion for this decision is classified as negative feedback, the
direct result of Kissinger’s insistence on a covert military equipment delivery. New
information also qualifies as the occasion for decision. The new information was not
only that Israel could lose the war, but also that supplies previously promised had not
been delivered. The decision unit, Nixon, is classified as predominant leader.
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October 19, 1973
Several developments occurred between October 14 and 19. Israel was able to
cross to the west side of Canal, surprising the Egyptian army (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976;
O’Ballance 1978; Rabinovich 2003; Tzabag 2001). Meanwhile, the Israeli government
received word that Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin was travelling to Cairo. The Israeli
government was somewhat buoyed by this development (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976;
Meir 1975; Safran 1978). Based on the recent Israeli military successes, including
pushing back and fracturing a massive Egyptian assault as well as the crossing of the
Canal, they were hopeful that the Soviets could convince Sadat to accept a cease-fire
(Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Safran 1978).
Despite daily communications between the United States and the Soviet Union,
they remained deadlocked on the specifics of the joint proposal for a cease-fire. In an
attempt to break the deadlock, Premier Brezhnev invited Kissinger to Moscow for faceto-face meetings. Nixon instructed Kissinger to make the trip and granted him full
authority to negotiate a cease-fire (US6). The decision unit is predominant leader. The
occasion for decision is strategic in nature and therefore classified as other. Possibly
because of Kissinger’s previous successes in foreign policy – i.e. winning the Nobel
Peace Prize – the occasion for decision could also be classified as positive feedback.
In response to the public acknowledgement of American supplies to Israel, coupled
with Nixon’s formal request of $2.2 billion in aid for Israel, the Arab states announced on
October 19 an oil embargo. Although some argue that the embargo did not affect the
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outcome of the war (Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977), it would influence negotiations
following the cessation of hostilities.
October 20, 1973
Nixon became increasingly preoccupied with his domestic troubles, namely the
Watergate affair (Isaacson 1992). The situation was exacerbated when Nixon ordered
the firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox. Conversations between Nixon
and Kissinger at this time reflected this growing concern and included some references
to negative press reporting. According to Kissinger, Nixon needed a significant political
achievement that portrayed the administration in a favorable light (Isaacson 1992;
Kissinger 2003). On the eve of Kissinger’s trip to Moscow, Nixon instructed him to reach
a joint comprehensive peace plan, propose it to the U.N. and impose it on both the
Israelis and the Arabs (US7). As early as October 14, Nixon advocated a peace
conference to negotiate a comprehensive agreement between Israel and her Arab
neighbors.18 However, Kissinger preferred a step-by-step approach to a settlement and
demonstrated this approach often in communications with both the Israelis and the
Soviets. The decision unit is classified as predominant leader. The occasion for decision
is strategic in nature and classified as other.
While Kissinger was en route to Moscow, he learned that Nixon had sent a cable
to Brezhnev indicating that the Secretary of State was granted the authorization to
make decisions on behalf of the United States in any negotiations with the Soviets
(US8). Kissinger was furious because he preferred to have the option of deferring all
decisions to the White House if he wished to delay (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982;
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Quandt 1977). Nixon’s decision to send the letter to Moscow was most likely
precipitated by his desire to achieve some kind of political accomplishment in the way
of peace in the Middle East. The decision unit is predominant leader. The occasion for
decision is classified as other (tactical).
October 21-22, 1973
Kissinger’s trip to Moscow and subsequent negotiations proved fruitful;
however, acting as predominant leader, Kissinger essentially ignored Nixon’s orders on
trying to reach a comprehensive peace agreement (US9). Both parties agreed to a
simple cease-fire-in-place, a call for the implementation of Security Council Resolution
242, and to negotiations between the Arab and Israelis under “appropriate auspices” –
i.e. a peace conference co-chaired by the United States and the Soviet Union (Quandt
1977). The occasion for decision in this case is classified as other (tactical).
On October 21 the Israeli government learned that Kissinger had reached a
tentative cease-fire agreement with the Soviet Union (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980;
Dayan 1976; Isaacson; Kissinger; Sachar 2010; Safran 1978).19 Although Israel was
aware of Kissinger’s trip, the prime minister was under the impression that Kissinger’s
trip was a delay tactic so Israel could complete military operations (Quandt 1977). At
the very least, she would be informed of any developments prior to an actual
agreement. Brecher (1980) maintains that Israel was not informed of Kissinger’s
“secret” trip to Moscow; however, telephone transcripts indicate that the Israeli
ambassador in Washington was fully aware of Kissinger’s travel plans.
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The irritation felt by the prime minister was not simply that Kissinger would
draft a joint cease-fire resolution – indeed, the Israelis anticipated that such a proposal
was imminent based on conversations between Washington and Tel Aviv (Bartov 1981;
Dayan 1976; Kissinger 2003; Meir 1975). The primary issue was that the U.S. was now
insisting that Israel accept the proposal without consulting her government in advance
(Meir 1975). Meir requested Kissinger to come to Israel before returning to the United
States. He complied with the request, although telephone transcripts reveal that
Kissinger told Ambassador Dinitz that he might go on to Israel following the talks with
the Soviets. Kissinger did not arrive in Israel until after the Cabinet decided to accept
the cease-fire resolution October 22 (IS14).
In his meeting with Meir and Dayan, Kissinger reiterated that hostilities should
cease at 5:00 p.m. on October 22. However, he also indicated to the Israeli prime
minister that there could be some “slippage” in the deadline (US10). Kissinger would
later admit that it was mistake, stating that he had thoughts of “hours” rather than
“days” when he issued the statement (Bartov 1981; Kissinger 2003). The decision unit
for the US10 is predominant leader. The occasion for decision is other.
Given the time frame before the cease-fire would take effect (approximately
nineteen hours) and Kissinger’s indication of some flexibility in the timetable,
discussions within the Israeli Cabinet focused on better positioning themselves for
negotiations, as well as the possibility that Egypt would not abide by the cease-fire
(Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Quandt 1977). Elazar and Dayan
believed that the IDF could accomplish several missions already begun. Success of these
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objectives could put Israel in a better position when negotiations began. Although the
Cabinet voted to accept the impending cease-fire agreement, several members of the
prime minister’s inner circle were concerned that Egypt would not acquiesce.
Subsequently, the Cabinet decided the IDF would continue operations if Egypt or Syria
did not obey the cease-fire (IS14). This was basically a pre-approval for the prime
minister to authorize a continuation of the fighting based on the actions of either the
Egyptian or Syrian armies. The decision unit was a single group. Because the decision
was strategic in nature and based on the potential actions of Egypt or Syria, the type of
occasion for decision is classified as other. The occasion for decision is also classified as
new information, derived from Kissinger, with the unexpected imposition of the ceasefire.
According to accounts of some of those on the battlefield, there was a temporary
cessation of hostilities around the time dictated by the resolution, although random
attacks continued to occur (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977; Rabinovich
2003). Syria, however, did not accept the resolution, and so the battle continued on the
northern front.
October 23-24, 1973
On the morning of October 23, Elazar phoned Defense Minister Dayan and
informed him that the Egyptians were violating the cease-fire agreement in the Third
Army’s sector (Bartov 1981). He requested permission to reengage the Third Army.
Dayan granted Elazar permission to do so, although Meir subsequently gave her
“approval” (IS15), and the advances of the IDF on the west bank of the canal continued.
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The decision unit for this decision is predominant leader because Meir had preauthorization from the Cabinet. The occasion for decision is more difficult to classify. It
could be considered a tactical decision (other), but also new information, as reports
flowed in that Egypt continued firing on Israeli positions (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980;
Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Rabinovich 2004).
In contrast, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat received reports of IDF assaults in
the Third Army sector (Brecher 1980; Kissinger 2003; Quandt 1977; Sadat 1978). In
light of ongoing hostilities along the Egyptian front, Sadat filed a formal complaint to
U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim citing Israel’s violation of the cease-fire
agreement. Although Meir insisted that Israel did not initiate actions on the Egyptian
front, Kissinger was not convinced (Kissinger 2003). This could have been in part to
Kissinger’s earlier reference to some “slippage” in the timetable. By the afternoon of the
24th, Sadat had requested the introduction of American and Soviet troops, or observers
at the very least, into the region in order to enforce the cease-fire (Kissinger 2003;
Quandt 1977, 2001; Sadat 1978). Kissinger dismissed the idea of sending troops and
insisted that Sadat withdraw his request (US11 and US12). Alarmingly, the Soviet Union
informed Washington that it would support Sadat’s appeal for troops. Kissinger then
issued a reply to Moscow, adamantly rejecting the introduction of either country’s
troops in the region (US13). The reply was in the form of a letter from President Nixon
to Brezhnev. It is difficult to determine the decision-maker on the issue of the letter;
however, based on Kissinger telephone transcripts, Kissinger most likely structured the
president’s letter to the Soviet leader. In each of the three decisions, Kissinger acted as
predominant leader. The occasions for decision were a result of the same event, Sadat’s
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request for troops in the region. The occasions for decision, therefore, can be classified
as new information.
October 25-26, 1973
The Soviet response to Nixon’s letter indicated that, although they preferred a
joint approach, they were willing to take unilateral military action in the Middle East in
order to stop the fighting. American forces and troops worldwide were put on a
heightened state of alert, Defense Condition Three – DefCon III (US14), which is in
practice the highest state of alert during peace time (Kissinger 2003).20 The increased
readiness of the American military not only created a crisis within a crisis for the United
States, but it also represented an exogenous shock for Israeli decision-makers. Official
U.S. documents indicate that Nixon was not involved in the decision to raise the alert
status. In telephone conversations between Kissinger and Nixon and Kissinger and Haig
on the afternoon of October 25, the secretary received an apology and congratulations
from the president. Nixon said he was “sorry” that he “didn’t get to hear it”, and Haig
told Kissinger he was superb. “And you and I were the only ones for it,” was Kissinger’s
reply.21 Although some argue that Nixon participated in the decision process regarding
the alert status (Isaacson 1992; Quandt 1977), the conversation with Haig suggests
otherwise.
That Kissinger and Haig were the only ones who advocated the move to DefCon
III is an indication that Kissinger acted as predominant leader in this instance. The
occasion for decision, which was the alarming letter from Brezhnev, is classified as an
external shock.22 A review of previous U.S. decisions suggests that Kissinger’s indication
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of a flexible timeline on the cease-fire (US10) may have been perceived as permission
for Israel to complete its military objectives on the west bank of the Canal (IS15). The
Brezhnev letter and subsequent U.S. decision to put its military worldwide on alert
could have been an indirect result of Kissinger’s ambiguous timeline as indicated to the
Israelis. In this instance, the occasion for decision is also classified as negative feedback.
Kissinger, acting as predominant leader in response to an external shock (the
Brezhnev letter threatening unilateral military action), pressured Israel to release the
Third Army or, at the very least, to allow nonmilitary supplies through to the
surrounded Egyptian forces (US15). He gave the prime minister until October 27, 8:00
a.m. Washington time, to reply. Instead of agreeing to Kissinger’s ultimatum, Meir
suggested the two parties (Egypt and Israel) meet face-to-face. Kissinger passed the
message on to Egypt’s foreign minister. Meir’s suggestion eventually prompted direct
talks at Kilometer 101.
After a five hour meeting, the Cabinet decided to accept the call for a cease-fire
(IS16). Meir later reported that the decision was based on pressure from the U.S.,
threatening to end delivery of supplies (Brecher 1980; Eban 1977; Meir 1975). The
decision unit was a single group. The occasion for decision was primarily an external
shock (superpower confrontation and the possibility of an end to supplies). Secondary
to external shock, the occasion for decision is also classified as other. Israel had gained
sufficient territory – even more than they possessed at the beginning of the war – to be
willing to accept an end to hostilities (Rabinovich 2003).
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The Cabinet also authorized supplies to be allowed to reach Egypt’s encircled
Third Army (IS17). Considerable U.S. pressure and the potential of Soviet troops being
introduced into the conflict persuaded Israel to comply with the request. The decision
unit was most likely a single group. The type of occasion for decision was two-fold. The
first was the exogenous shock of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The second reason can be
classified as other, which was the opportunity for Israel to achieve a primary goal:
ending the war.

Summary and Discussion of Crisis Decisions
The findings of the study revealed thirty-one key decisions during the crisis
period, fourteen of which belonged to the United States and seventeen belonging to
Israel. For the U.S. the type of decision unit that emerged in thirteen of the fourteen
cases was predominant leader. In Israel, the type of decision unit was divided between
predominant leader (seven) and single group (ten). The results of the Israeli case do not
seem to support Hypothesis #1, which suggests that the decision unit will likely remain
constant throughout the crisis period. However, in the case of the United States the
decision unit did indeed remain constant after the first single group decision and
throughout the period. If one considers all of the decisions taken during the time period,
it appears that the type of decision unit is just as likely to change throughout the course
of a crisis event as it is to stay constant. In other words, a summary of the decision units
does not indicate whether the same type of decision structure (unit) will make all
decisions regarding the same foreign policy problem.
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The classification of some of the decision units may be confusing or
contradictory and thus warrants some clarification, specifically the decisions that
pertain to granting governmental authority to another actor. The Israeli Cabinet twice
gave authorization on decision-making: one to the prime minister and defense minister
regarding the mobilization of the IDF, and the other to the chief of staff regarding a
counter-attack. The decisions eventually taken by the prime minister regarding
mobilization (IS2 and IS3) were included in my analysis, whereas Elazar’s decision
involving a counter-offensive was not. While all three decisions were of consequence to
the prosecution of the war, evidence suggests that Elazar did not actually make a
decision on his own, but rather continued to consult with the prime minister and brief
the Cabinet for approval on every major military strategy (Bartov 1981; Dayan 1976).
The decisions of the Cabinet to launch offensives against both Egypt and Syria are
included (IS9, IS10, and IS12), with the decision units classified as a single group as
Elazar did not exercise his authority to make decisions on a counter-attack.
In a U.S. decision of a similar nature, President Nixon explicitly granted
authorization to Kissinger to negotiate a cease-fire with the Soviets (US8). Like Meir,
Kissinger did not hesitate to exercise this authority and acted as predominant leader on
at least one occasion – i.e. Kissinger refused to discuss a comprehensive peace plan at
this stage of negotiations (US10).

United States
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TABLE 5.1. U.S. Crisis Decisions

Dec.
No.

Date

1

6 October 1973

Decision to ask Soviets to
take a neutral stand with
the US to get fighting
stopped

Single group

2

7 October 1973

Decision to provide
missiles and ammunition
to Israel; must be in
unmarked Israeli planes

Predominant
New
leader information;
External
Kissinger
shock;
Other strategic

3

10 October
1973

Decision to have American
civilian planes chartered
by the DoD deliver
supplies

Predominant
leader Kissinger

Negative
feedback

4

10 October
1973

Approval to replace all
aircraft lost by Israel and
sending 5 new F-4
Phantom fighters

Predominant
leader Nixon

New
information

5

13 October
1973

Decision to have American
military planes expedite
delivery of supplies

Predominant
leader Nixon

Negative
feedback;
New
information

6

19 October
1973

Decision to grant Kissinger Predominant
full authority to negotiate
leader cease-fire
Nixon

Decision
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7

20 October
1973

Decision for Kissinger to
propose a WashingtonMoscow joint
comprehensive peace plan
& impose it on Israel & the
Arabs

Predominant
leader Nixon

Other

8

20 October
1973

Decision to send
presidential letter to
Brezhnev informing him
that Kissinger acts on
behalf of the US

Predominant
leader Nixon

Other tactical

9

21 October
1973

Decision to discuss with
Soviets a simple cease-fire
rather than
comprehensive agreement

Predominant
leader Kissinger

Other tactical

10

21 October
1973

Kissinger indicates to
Israel that there could be
some "slippage" in the
cease-fire deadline

Predominant
leader Kissinger

Other tactical

11

24 October
1973

Refusal of Sadat's
invitation for US & Soviet
troops to enforce ceasefire

Predominant
leader Kissinger

New
information

12

24 October
1973

Decision to ask Sadat to
withdraw request for
Soviet & US troops

Predominant
leader Kissinger

New
information

13

24 October
1973

Decision to reject the
introduction of Soviet or
US troops in region

Predominant
leader Kissinger

New
information

14

25 October
1973

American forces and
troops worldwide are put
on higher state of alert DefCon III

Predominant
leader Kissinger

External
shock
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A total of fourteen decisions were made by the United States during the crisis
period, thirteen consisting of a predominant leader decision unit, with one decision
(US1) made by a single group.
During the crisis period, Nixon and Kissinger were the dominant actors in U.S.
decision-making, with Nixon having considerable institutional authority over U.S.
foreign policy. The evidence suggests, however, that Kissinger imposed his preferences
in the decision-making process as much as, if not more often than, the president
(Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 2003; Quandt 1977; Safran 1978). In this regard, Kissinger
emerges as the predominant leader more often than does Nixon.
Nixon occasionally made decisions as the predominant leader that was contrary
to Kissinger’s strategy. For example, Kissinger was scheduled to fly to Moscow (October
20) to negotiate a cease-fire agreement. While Kissinger was en route, Nixon sent a
letter to Brezhnev (US8) indicating that Kissinger was acting on the president’s full
authority. The president would support any decisions Kissinger made while in Moscow.
Kissinger was furious about the letter. If certain aspects of the negotiations were not
satisfactory, Kissinger wanted to be able to tell the Soviets that he would have to get
“presidential approval” before he could agree to anything. Nixon effectively constrained
Kissinger’s maneuverability. In addition, Nixon’s directive to Kissinger to propose a
Washington-Moscow joint comprehensive peace plan and impose it on Israel (US7) was
essentially ignored. Although it was well within Nixon’s authority to make such
decisions, Kissinger actively sought to mitigate or even reverse decisions.
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The normal constraints of Congressional approval did not appear to be of
significant concern for President Nixon or Kissinger. This is exemplified in a telephone
conversation with White House Press Secretary Ron Ziegler, where Ziegler iterated that
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield had issued a statement regarding the position of
Congress. “[A]s far as the Congress is concerned, we support completely the course of
action being undertaken by President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger.”23 This
was significant for the Nixon administration since the Democrats held a majority in
both houses.
There was little evidence that on October 6 or 7 Kissinger and Nixon discussed
at length what equipment the US would provide to Israel. Discussions between
Kissinger and Nixon focused heavily on the knowledge and reaction of the Soviet Union
and whether or not the Soviets would request a meeting of the Security Council
alongside the United States. Kissinger’s conversations regarding military aid to Israel
were primarily with Alexander Haig and Arthur Schlesinger. The general consensus in
Washington was that, based on prior conflicts between Israel and other Arab states,
Israel should have no problem turning the tide of the war. There was overall no great
concern about Israel’s military capabilities.

Israel
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TABLE 5.2. Israel Crisis Decisions
Dec.
No.

Date

1

5 October 1973

Prime Minister & Defense
Minister receive
authorization to mobilize
reserves

Single group

External
shock

2

5 October 1973

Decision not to mobilize
reserves

Predominant
leader - Meir

External
shock

3

6 October 1973

Decision for large-scale
mobilization

Predominant
leader - Meir

External
shock; New
information

4

6 October 1973

Decision not to conduct a
pre-emptive strike

Predominant
leader - Meir

External
shock; New
information

5

7 October 1973

Decision to request
emergency assistance and
military supplies from US

Predominant
leader - Meir

External
shock;
Negative
feedback
(IS4)

6

7 October 1973

Cabinet authorized Chief of
General Staff to decide
about a counter-attack

Single group

Other strategic

7

9 October 1973

Decision to conduct air
strikes on military targets
in the Syrian capital

Predominant
leader - Meir

New
information;
Other strategic

8

9 October 1973

Decision for Meir to fly to
Washington to plead
Israel's case for supplies

Predominant
leader - Meir

Negative
feedback
(IS4)

9

10 October
1973

Approval of plan to launch
general attack on Syria

Single group

New
information;
Other strategic
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10

12 October
1973

Vote to postpone a decision
to cross the Canal

Single group

Other uncertainty

11

12 October
1973

Decision to accept a US
suggestion for a cease-firein-place

Single group

Other strategic

12

14 October
1973

Approval of the proposal to
cross the Canal

Single group

New
information;
Other strategic

13

21-22 October
1973

Decision to accept USSoviet call for a cease-fire

Single group

Other strategic

14

22 October
1973

Decision to continue IDF
operations if Egypt does
not obey cease-fire

Single group

New
information;
Other strategic

15

23 October
1973

Approval for continued IDF
advances on the west bank
of Canal

Predominant
leader - Meir

New
information;
Other strategic

16

26 October
1973

Decision to accept a 2nd &
3rd call for cease-fire

Single group

External
shock; Other
- strategic

17

26 October
1973

Decision to allow supplies
to reach Egypt's encircled
3rd Army

Single group

External
shock; Other

There were a total of seventeen key decisions during the crisis period, the first
five resulting from external shocks. In seven decisions, the decision unit was identified
as a predominant leader, while the single group was identified as the decision unit the
other ten decisions.
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The occasion for decision for IS1 and IS2 was the recognition that Egyptian and
Syrian forces appeared to be mobilizing on the northern and southern Israeli fronts.
This occasion could be classified as both new information and external shock. However,
based on the decision-makers’ perceptions of an unlikely war, the occasion is coded as
new information (although it did raise grave concerns with some leaders, particularly
Prime Minister Golda Meir). The decision units that emerged as a result of the possible
mobilization of forces were single group and predominant leader, respectively. Decision
#1 was coded as single group due to the fact that Cabinet acted to authorize the prime
minister to make the decision.
Defense Minister Dayan and Chief of Staff Elazar differed in opinion on more
than one issue during the crisis period. As there was not always consensus within the
Cabinet, Meir was often faced with having to decide herself among the options. As one
Cabinet member described, “Golda had great authority. Once she decided and gave her
reasons, the others would accept her decision” (Brecher 1980, 201; see also Ben-Meir
1986 and Brownstein 1977).
The following chapter provides the sequence of events for the crisis transition
period (October 27, 1973 to September 1, 1975).
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Notes: Chapter Five

According to Ahron Bregman (2013), the source of the intelligence was Gamal Abdel Nasser’s son-inlaw, Ashraf Marwan.
2 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts
(Telcons), Chronological File, Box 22. October 6, 1973.
3 See also Israel State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Yom Kippur War, Saturday, 6 October 1973.”
http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/66FC5A72-27F7-41A6-99697ED71A097F57/0/yk6_10_0805.pdf. Accessed January 14, 2014.
4 The quote was taken from Golda Meir’s autobiography. However, transcripts of the Cabinet meeting at
8:00 on the morning of October 6 reflect the same sentiment.
5 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts
(Telcons), Chronological File, Box 22, October 6, 1973.
6 See also Israel State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Yom Kippur War, Sunday, 7 October 1973.”
http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/13ABA8CA-542F-4912-A5879B8A33BE54ED/0/yk7_10_0910.pdf. Accessed January 14, 2014.
7 See also Israel State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Yom Kippur War.”
http://www.archives.gov.il/archivegov_eng/publications/electronicpirsum/yomkippurwar/. Accessed
January 14, 2014.
8 See also Israel State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Yom Kippur War, Saturday, 6 October 1973.”
http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/66FC5A72-27F7-41A6-99697ED71A097F57/0/yk6_10_0805.pdf. Accessed January 14, 2014.
9 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts
(Telcons), Chronological File, Box 22, October 6, 1973.
10 According to Kissinger, the agreement was for the U.S. to fly the supplies into Germany and have Israeli
planes pick them up.
11 See also National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations,
Transcripts (Telcons), October 7, 1973.
12 Avner Cohen’s interview with Arnan Azaryahu occurred in 2008 shortly before Azaryahu’s death at the
age of 91. Cohen admits an “epistemic gap between the testimony’s core and periphery.” For example,
while Cohen states that the core was in focus (the context of what transpired was clear), some of the
details of Azaryahu’s account could not have occurred on the date that he claims. However, Cohen
maintains that the testimony provides not simply the essence of what was discussed at the meeting, but
how Moshe Dayan’s frame of mind at the time explains why he would have made the proposal in the first
place. No reference to a nuclear option appears in any of the sources used for this study. Moreover, there
are no records, minutes, or official testimonies that corroborate Azaryahu’s account.
13 Israel State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Yom Kippur War, Tuesday, 9 October 1973.”
http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/5244271D-8308-421D-8ABB197FE454D43B/0/yk9_10_0730.pdf. Accessed January 14, 2014.
14 Ibid.
15 See National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 ARAB-IS; also, Transcript of telephone
conversation between Kissinger and Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts (Telcons), Chronological File, Box
22, October 9, 1973.
16 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts
(Telcons), Chronological File, Box 22, October 6, 1973.
17 For a detailed account of Elazar’s plan, see Hanoch Bartov’s (1981) Dado, 48 Years and 20 Twenty Days,
pp. 470-471.
18 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts
(Telcons), Chronological File, Box 23, October 14, 1973.
19 The joint U.S.-Soviet cease-fire agreement would become known as Resolution 338.
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According to Kissinger (2003, 350), most of U.S. forces were at DefCon IV or V at that time, except for
those in the Pacific, where forces were at a permanent DefCon III – a legacy of the Vietnam War. During
the Cuban Missile Crisis, forces worldwide were elevated to DefCon III, while strategic forces were placed
on a higher alert status, DefCon II (Allison and Zelikow 1999). DefCon II indicates the highest alert level
short of war.
21 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts
(Telcons), Chronological File, Box 23, October 25, 1973.
22 Victor Israelyan (1995) maintains that the U.S. overreacted to the letter. He reports that Brezhnev was
surprised that the U.S. government would interpret the letter as anything but a Soviet plea to resolve the
immediate issue of a cease-fire.
23 National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Transcripts
(Telcons), Chronological File, Box 22, October 10, 1973.
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Crisis Transition Decisions
Introduction
Near the conclusion of the Yom Kippur War the Syrian army had been pushed
back beyond the 1967 borders and the IDF was positioned on the west bank of the
Canal. The negotiations that culminated in the signing of the Sinai II Agreement were a
slow and often frustrating process. While the Israeli prime minister and Cabinet
remained the authoritative decision-makers during the negotiation phase, there was
also the addition of a negotiating team as a decision-making group (Ben-Meir 1986;
Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976). The negotiating team consisted of Meir, Dayan, Foreign
Minister Eban, and Deputy Prime Minister Allon. The team, therefore, was essentially an
ad hoc committee composed of a limited number of Cabinet members. According to the
stipulations of the DU framework, whether a decision is attributed to the Cabinet or the
negotiating team, the decision unit would still be classified as a single group.
In addition to the changes mentioned above, both the Israeli and U.S.
governments experienced regime change during the crisis transition period. In Israel
Yitzhak Rabin succeeded Prime Minister Meir following her resignation in April 1974.
Rabin had played no part in the decision-making during the war (Derfler 2014; Fischer
2014). In the U.S., President Nixon resigned in August 1974 as a result of the Watergate
scandal, with Gerald Ford ascending to the presidency. Neither Rabin nor Ford initially
altered the foreign policy strategy of their respective predecessor, although Ford’s
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approach was significantly different than that of Nixon (Quandt 1977). However, the
internal shocks that occurred in each country would affect decision-making processes
in both governments.
In his first address to the Knesset as prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin issued his
agenda regarding Israel’s relationships with her Arab neighbors. Rabin reiterated that
Israel would continue to strive for true peace, but realized that an eventual peace
agreement could only be obtained in stages “through partial arrangements, which will
ensure pacification on the battlefield by means of a cease-fire and thinning-out of
forces, reducing the dangers of a flare-up or surprise attack.”1 He cautioned that
continued negotiations and a “dialogue toward peace” could only be accomplished if
Egypt and Syria fulfill the requirements set out in the disengagement agreement signed
during Meir’s government. Rabin stated that although his government endorsed peace
negotiations with Egypt (as well as Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon), he was adamantly
opposed to returning to 1967 borders, “even within the context of a peace treaty.”2
Gerald Ford entered the White House on August 9, 1974, having served eight
months as vice-president. He was a fiscal conservative, promoted a balanced budget,
and was knowledgeable on the intricacies of governmental policies and programs. He
spent two decades on the House defense appropriations committee and was, therefore,
familiar with Nixon’s foreign policy agenda. However, Ford’s foreign policy approach
was decidedly different from Nixon’s. Indeed, Yanek Mieczkowski (2005) observes that
Ford was hardly the foreign policy mogul that Nixon had been. His strength lay in
domestic politics. A strong proponent of containment, Ford was “openly hostile” and
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“highly negative” toward the Soviet Union while a congressman, but seemed to favor
détente once he became president (Mieczkowski 2005, 282).

Sequence of Decisions
The cease-fire agreement reached on October 26 was highly precarious and woefully
inadequate. The cease-fire was simply the first step in an arduous journey to a more
stable settlement (Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977). Major issues in the negotiations
included Israeli insistence on an exchange of prisoners and concerns over force
dispositions in the Sinai and Golan Heights.
October 30, 1973
Prime Minister Meir had expressed the need to go to the United States and
personally clarify Israel’s position on negotiations and explain the country’s immediate
needs (Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977). Meir also sought to garner Nixon’s direct support
during the negotiation phase. The Cabinet authorized Meir to do so (IS18), and she left
for the U.S. on October 31. As William Quandt (1977, 215) describes it, the meetings
between Meir and Nixon and Kissinger were “chilly, if not hostile.” Rather than
expressing her gratitude for U.S. aid, the prime minister voiced her disappointment at
being deprived of victory by “friends.” Meir’s animosity seemed to be directed primarily
toward Kissinger (Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977; Siniver 2008). In spite of the uneasy
environment, it was during these meetings that Kissinger and Meir hammered out a
draft of the six-point agreement between Egypt and Israel (Brecher 1980).3 The
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Cabinet’s decision to authorize Meir’s visit was made by a single group. The occasion
for decision was strategic initiative and, therefore, classified as other.
November 8, 1973
On November 6 and 7 Kissinger met with Sadat in Cairo with the draft of the sixpoint agreement. Kissinger was able to persuade Sadat to accept the agreement as it
was written, even convincing him to drop the issue of the October 22 lines (Quandt
1977). Following the secretary’s meeting with Sadat, two of Kissinger’s aides went to
Israel to hammer out the details. With little modification, the Cabinet approved the sixpoint agreement – IS19 (Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977). The accord was signed on
November 11 by Israeli and Egyptian military representatives at Kilometer 101, a point
along the Cairo to Suez road (Bartov 1981; Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975;
Quandt 1977; Rabinovich 2004). The decision unit for IS19 is classified as single group,
while the occasion for decision is other (strategic).
November 25-28, 1973
On November 25, the Israeli Cabinet decided to participate in the opening
session of the Geneva Peace Conference (IS20), under specific conditions (Brecher
1980). According to Minister Abba Eban (1977), who dictated the terms to Kissinger,
Israel did not wish to enter into substantive discussions at the conference before the
general elections on December 31. In addition, Israel would not discuss the Palestinian
issue nor approve the presence of a separate Palestinian delegation at the conference
(see also, Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Quandt 1977).
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Based on a survey of several secondary sources (Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976;
Eban 1977; Quandt 1977), the Israeli decision to participate, at least conditionally, in
the Geneva Conference was likely taken by the Cabinet, acting as a single group. Since
the assessment is that Kissinger pressured Israel to suspend the military talks and
continue negotiations under U.S. auspices, the occasion for decision can be classified as
other. The decision to participate in the conference was strategic in nature, as Kissinger
asserted that arriving at a broader peace plan would have a better chance of success if
the U.S. were involved in the negotiations (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt
2001; Stein 2013).
Kilometer 101 had been the site for negotiations between Israel and Egypt prior
to the signing of the six-point agreement. The talks, headed by Israeli General Aharon
Yariv and Egyptian General Mohammed el-Gamasy, began on October 28 and ended on
November 29. As far as the negotiations and decision-making were concerned, General
Yariv had only the authority to propose or concede points which had been previously
approved by the Cabinet – reference Israeli Decision #19 (Ben-Meir 1986; Dayan 1976;
Meir 1975). The primary task was to establish the basis of a military disengagement
agreement and then to hammer out the logistics of implementing that agreement
(Brecher 1980; Eban 1977; Quandt 1977). The details were regularly presented to the
Israeli and Egyptian governments for approval (Stein 2013).
The negotiations between Yariv and el-Gamasy on finalizing the disengagement
seemed to be progressing (Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977; Stein 2013). Some scholars
argue that Kissinger strove to convince Israel of the importance of Geneva in the

Drake

146

Who Decides?
process of negotiations and to make sure the U.S. was a central figure in any progress
(Brecher 1980; Quandt 1977, 2001; Siniver 2008; Stein 2013). In a conversation with
Ambassador Dinitz earlier in November, Kissinger voiced his displeasure with the type
of forum in which the negotiations were taking place. Dayan did not support these talks
because he too believed that the U.S. should be involved in such negotiations (Dayan
1976). At the behest of Kissinger, General Yariv was ordered to suspend talks with
Egypt at Kilometer 101 (Fischer 2014; Isaacson 1992; Parker 2001; Quandt 2001;
Sachar 2010; Stein 2013). Although Sadat publicly claimed that he was suspending the
military talks because they were “not to his liking” (Stein 2013, 226; see also Brecher
1980), most accounts maintain that it was Israel who officially ended the negotiations
(Dayan 1976; Eban 1977; Fischer 2014; Parker 2001; Sachar 2010; Stein 2013).
According to General Yariv, the talks at Kilometer 101 ended because Israel wanted to
put a “political stamp on what were talks between officers on a military agreement”
(Brecher 1980, 307). Yariv also claims that it was Kissinger’s interest in making the
Kilometer 101 talks part of the overall negotiations on disengagement that prompted
Israel to withdraw from the direct talks with Egypt (Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Eban
1977; Quandt 1977). The decision to recall Yariv from Kilometer 101 and suspend the
military talks (IS21) was most likely made by the Israeli Cabinet, acting as a single
group. The occasion for decision, Kissinger’s insistence on moving the talks to Geneva, is
the same as for IS20 and classified as other.
There were also elements of negative feedback in prompting the decision to
recall Yariv. Kissinger’s instance on conducting negotiations in Geneva could be
considered negative feedback to the direct talks at Kilometer 101. In addition, Dayan’s
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initial disapproval of the forum under which the negotiations were conducted
intensified as the talks progressed. He felt Israel was on the verge of making “vital
concessions…without a suitable settlement” (Dayan 1976, 451; see also Brecher 1980,
307). While the decision to send military officers to negotiate a disengagement of forces
was not unprecedented (a decision which was not included as a key decision in this
study), the progression of the talks at Kilometer 101 raised concerns among some
decision-makers in the United States and Israel, which could be considered negative
feedback from a previous Israeli decision.
December 16-17, 1973
Once the six-point agreement was reached on November 11, Kissinger felt there
was sufficient momentum to begin planning for a Geneva Peace Conference (Isaacson
1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977). On December 6 and 7, Dayan met with Kissinger
in Washington. The purpose of the trip was to discuss problems regarding some
equipment Israel had previously requested, but also to present his personal view, for
which he had the approval of the prime minister, of a disengagement agreement
(Brecher 1980). Kissinger had received tentative consent of Israel’s participation (IS20)
in late November, but the conditions set out in that approval had still not been met. The
Cabinet decided to accept the U.S.-Soviet request to start negotiations at Geneva before
Knesset elections. The approval of its participation in the Geneva Conference stipulated
that Israel would not sit in the same room with Syria’s delegation unless Syria released
the list of POWs (Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Quandt 1977). His talks with
Syrian President Hafez Assad, however, were not as productive.
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On December 6, Kissinger announced that a conference on Arab-Israeli
negotiations would likely convene in Geneva on December 18. Although Kissinger was
successful in convening the Geneva conference, the effort resulted only in formal
remarks that laid out Kissinger’s step-by-step strategy, beginning with the
implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 as an essential first step (Quandt
1977). To complicate the ensuing negotiations, Syrian forces were placed on a high
alert status in late December, the oil embargo continued, and OPEC doubled oil prices.
Elections for the Knesset were held on December 31. The opposition gained some
seats, but not to where it would necessitate selecting a new prime minister or cabinet. The
elections did not seem to fundamentally affect the Meir government’s stance on
negotiations or the configuration of foreign policy decision-makers.
January 2, 1974
The Geneva Conference lasted just one day, consisting of primarily formal
remarks from the foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. Kissinger then
presented his step-by-step strategy, after which the conference was adjourned (Quandt
1977 and 2001). While the meeting at Geneva did not result in any substantive progress
regarding negotiations, it presaged the first disengagement agreement (Sinai I)
between Israel and Egypt in January 1974. The Cabinet authorized Dayan to place
before Kissinger Israel’s conditions for disengagement agreement with Egypt (IS24).
The Defense Minister flew to Washington and met with Kissinger on January 4 and 5.
The positive tone of the meetings prompted the suggestion that Kissinger visit Egypt
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and Israel to continue the negotiations. The decision unit is classified as single group.
The occasion for decision is other.
January 9, 1974
Following his meetings with Dayan, Kissinger decided to go to Egypt with a
revised Israeli plan for disengagement agreement (US17). The trip required the consent
of Sadat, which Kissinger received around January 9 or 10. The trip was the start of
Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy. The decision unit is predominant leader. The occasion for
decision was new information (Dayan’s visit) and positive feedback (the suspension of
talks at Kilometer 101).
January 15, 1974
The Cabinet decided, on Meir’s initiative, to abandon Israel’s demand for clearcut Egyptian declaration of non-belligerency. As any agreement would require the
approval of the Cabinet, it is most likely that the decision to drop the verbiage on nonbelligerency was probably made by a single group. Opinions within the Cabinet differed
on whether Israel should accept anything less than an Egyptian promise of
nonaggression (Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Eban 1977), but Kissinger convinced Meir
to concede and accept the less offensive phrase, “maintenance of the cease-fire”
(Brecher 1980, 319; Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982). The occasion for decision can be
classified as either other – a strategic initiative to move the talks forward – or negative
feedback – Egypt’s refusal to acquiesce to the original demand.
January 17, 1974
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The Cabinet decided to accept the Disengagement Agreement (Sinai I
Agreement) with Egypt. The Cabinet acted as a single group, and the occasion for
decision was strategic in nature and classified as other.
Israel and the United States signed a detailed 10-point memorandum of
understanding. In letters exchanged between Nixon and both Sadat and Meir, force
limitations were agreed upon. The role of the United States would be to perform
reconnaissance flights at regular intervals in order to monitor the agreement. The
results were to be made available to both sides (Quandt 2001). The decision unit is a
single group. The occasion for decision is classified as other as the commitment of
resources reflect the overall strategy of establishing influence in the Middle East.
On February 6, the House of Representatives authorized an investigation to
determine whether grounds existed for an impeachment of President Nixon. The
announcement of the investigation did not seem to have a significant impact on
negotiations. On February 9, Syria agreed to the exchange of POWs with Israel (Quandt
2001).
Although the exchange of POWs was a positive step in the Israel-Syria negotiations,
Arab leaders felt more progress could be made and decided to delay lifting the oil
embargo until such time.
While President Nixon continued to deal with political difficulties at home, the
Israeli government would face troubles of their own in the spring of 1974. On April 1, the
Agranat Commission published the interim report on the failures of the Yom Kippur War.
The report blamed COGS Elazar, Intelligence Chief Eli Zeira, and Gonen for failing to
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prepare the army for war and for the operations intelligence failures. The report
essentially exonerated the prime minister and the defense minister. Meir, disturbed by the
findings, resigned from office on April 11. On the day Meir resigned, a terror attack
occurred in Kiryat Shmona, when the PFLP-GC entered an apartment building and killed
all eighteen residents, half of them children. Many viewed the attack as an attempt to
disrupt the Kissinger shuttle negotiations (Sachar 2010).
May 15, 1974
After more than thirty days of shuttle diplomacy between Damascus and Syria,
Kissinger was able to settle most of their differences. The only major issue remaining
was a narrow strip of land around the town of Kuneitra, the most important urban
center in the Golan (Rabinovich 2003; Sachar 2010). When neither Israel nor Syria was
willing to move on this issue, Nixon ordered Brent Scowcroft to cut off all aid to Israel
unless they immediately complied on the Syria disengagement agreement – US20
(Kissinger 1982, 1078).4 In a memo to the president, Kissinger strongly urged Nixon not
to cut off aid. He argued that it would be a “grotesque error” to put all the blame on
Israel, and to cut off aid would be “disastrous.” It seems Nixon clearly acted as the
predominant leader in this decision. Some argue that the threat of the impending
impeachment was largely responsible for Nixon’s response (Rabil 2006). The occasion
for decision is thus classified as other.
Israel experienced another terror attack on May 15 when Palestinian militants
crossed the border from Lebanon and killed two Israeli-Arab women, a couple and four-
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year-old son. The militants held 105 students and ten teachers hostage. Twenty-five
hostages were killed, twenty-two of them children.
May 29, 1974
On May 29, the Israeli Cabinet decided to accept the Israel-Syria disengagement
agreement (IS29). Unlike the outcome of the war for the Egyptians, Syria suffered an
“unqualified defeat” (Brecher 1980, 321-22; see also Rabinovich 2003; Sachar 2010)
The primary issues in the negotiations were Israel’s insistence on a list of prisoners of
war (POWs) – which was resolved in February earlier that year, the size of a United
Nations Buffer zone, and Syria’s demand for the immediate return of part of the Golan
(Brecher 1980; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975; Quandt 1977; Rabinovich 2003; Sachar 2010).
Israel eventually conceded and agreed to divide Kuneitra. On May 18, Syria accepted the
conditions.5 The Cabinet approved the agreement (IS29), and it was signed in Geneva
on June 5, 1975. The decision unit is classified as single group. The occasion for decision
is classified as positive feedback – the Israeli concessions produced a positive response –
and other (strategic).
On June 3, Rabin informed the Knesset that future negotiations with Egypt would
not include a return to the 1967 borders. Additionally, he reiterated that any agreement
must require Egypt to forgo “maintenance of the state of belligerence.”6
June 14-17, 1974
During a trip to the Middle East in June 1974, Nixon made two key promises
(decisions) that alarmed some in his administration (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982;
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Quandt 1977). The first decision was Nixon’s promise of American technology for Egypt
and implied that the U.S. would help Egypt build a nuclear power plant as a reward to
accepting the agreement. Then two days later on June 17, Nixon promised Israel
assistance with nuclear energy (US21). The promises seemed to stem from his own
strategic initiative, which would classify the occasion for decision as other. Therefore, in
both instances, Nixon acted as predominant leader.
Yigal Allon, who became Foreign Minister under the Rabin government, publicly
downplayed the risk of Nixon’s proposed sale of an American nuclear reactor to Egypt. In
protest to Allon’s statements, on June 19, the Knesset took a vote of “no confidence” on a
motion by the Likud and National Religious Party. The vote was defeated 60-50.
On August 8, 1974, President Nixon announced his resignation. The entire
Watergate affair took a personal toll on Nixon and was politically devastating. The
impeachment proceedings and Nixon’s subsequent resignation created a constitutional
crisis for the United States. For the first several months and with the guidance of his
cabinet, Ford concentrated on regaining some political respect for the office of the
presidency (minutes of cabinet meeting – 10 August 1974; 10:07 a.m.). His time was
consumed with finding a new Vice President, setting up his organizational structure (i.e.,
communications between the White House and the Cabinet and other aspects of
intergovernmental relations). Ford wanted to be able to focus on domestic problems,
which had been put on the back burner since the Watergate scandal (Quandt 2001). Ford
was kept informed of developments regarding Middle East negotiations, but did not
personally involve himself in the process. It was not simply that the new president was
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occupied with other, more pressing obligations. According to William Quandt, foreign
policy was not Ford’s area of expertise.
Domestic troubles continued for Israel during the summer months of 1974. On June
24 Palestinian militants again launched an attack. They infiltrated Nahariya by sea from
Lebanon and killed three civilians and one soldier. A little more than two months later,
September 8, a TWA jet from Tel Aviv to Athens crashed, killing all eighty-eight passengers
aboard. The cause of the crash was a bomb detonated by PFLP militants.
Between the decisions of June 17 and October 17, the international community
witnessed a Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the U.S. president being charged with
obstruction of justice.
Throughout this period communications continued between the United States and
both Egypt and Israel.
October 17, 1974
Ford and Kissinger discussed on several occasions the aid packages that the U.S.
might offer Egypt as incentive to accept the second disengagement agreement. Despite
potential constraints from Congress, President Ford promised in a letter to Sadat that
he would push for $250 million in assistance for Egypt (US22).7 The decision unit is
classified as single group, based on several memoranda of conversation between Ford
and Kissinger. The occasion for decision is classified other (tactical).
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On November 19 Palestinian militants attacked the city of Beit She’an, killing four
civilians. The following March, the Savot Hotel was attacked by Fatah, where eight of
thirteen hostages and three Israeli soldiers were killed.
March 3, 1975
Based on what Ford and Kissinger believed to be movement toward Israeli
territorial concessions, Ford authorized Kissinger to go to the Middle East and negotiate
on behalf of the United States (US23) (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977).
The decision unit is predominant leader. The occasion for decision is classified as other.
March 19, 1975
A statement issued by the Israeli government on March 20 explained the recent
impasse in the Israel-Egypt negotiations. After another round of shuttle diplomacy
failed to produce any movement toward an interim agreement. In a terse letter from the
U.S. president, Ford urged Israel to accept Egypt’s latest offer or the United States may
have to reassess its policy. Despite the deadlock on the second interim agreement, and
perhaps in light of Ford’s letter, the Israeli Cabinet decided to authorize its negotiating
team to continue negotiations (IS28). The decision unit is single group, and the occasion
for decision is classified as other, as Israel hoped to stave off a U.S. decision of
reassessment (Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014).
March 24, 1975
Following Kissinger’s return to the United States, President Ford, on Kissinger’s
recommendation, publicly ordered a reassessment of America’s Middle East policy and
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relationship with Israel (US25). The decision unit is classified as single group, and the
occasion for decision is both negative feedback – not as a result of one specific decision
but rather the failure of shuttle diplomacy and the general inability to move
negotiations forward – and other – a strategic decision intended to influence the
negotiating process. This development is also considered as an exogenous shock for
Israel, given the historic relationship between the two countries.
The Cabinet responded to Ford’s announcement of the reassessment and
decided to suspend talks on the second disengagement agreement (IS29). The decision
came less than a month after Rabin was authorized to continue negotiations. The
decision unit for IS29 is predominant leader. The occasion for decision is classified as
external shock, as well as negative feedback.
During a one-month period of time in 1975, the United States experienced two
external shocks that proved to be both morally and politically distressing. On April 30,
Saigon finally fell to the Communist North Vietnam. South Vietnam surrendered
unconditionally (Kissinger 2003). Then less than two weeks later on May 12, Khmer
Rouge forces in Cambodia seized the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez. The ship and its
occupants were rescued by U.S. Navy and Marines on May 15, but forty-one Americans lost
their lives in the incident. Following a trail of failed foreign policies – i.e. setbacks in the
Middle East negotiations and the fall of South Vietnam to the Communists – the rescue of
the Mayaguez, as costly and sloppy as it was, had a decidedly positive affect on Ford’s
public opinion. The rescue showed that the United States was still willing and able to apply
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the use of force. Ford recalled later that the incident was a much-needed “shot in the
arm…when we really needed it” (Isaacson 1992, 651).
On March 30, less than a week after Ford ordered a reassessment of Middle East
policy, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat announced that he would authorize the reopening
of the Suez Canal, which had been closed since the 1967 Six-Day War (Associated Press
1975). An article that appeared the following day clarified that Israeli ships would be
barred from passing through the Canal. While the announcement of the opening was a
positive step on the part of Sadat, the U.S. and Israeli governments were skeptical about
Sadat’s motives or whether Israeli ships would have access to the Canal (Associated Press
1975; Kissinger; Rabin 1996;
A review of Memoranda of Conversation revealed that, between Ford’s
announcement of a reassessment on Middle East policy and the decision to resume the
Sinai II negotiations, Kissinger, Scowcroft, and the president regularly discussed
developments in the region and America’s strategic options. By the end of April, these
discussions centered on the increasing possibility of another war between the Arabs and
Israelis. On 21 May, Ford received a letter signed by 76 senators, which urged him to be
“responsive to Israel’s economic and military needs” (Quandt 1977, 270).
Preventing another war seemed to be the greater priority, and, despite the recent
strain on the U.S.-Israel relationship, both Ford and Kissinger agreed that the U.S. would
need to reestablish negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Ford decided he would also
participate in talks with Rabin and Sadat.
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On June 4, the Suez Canal reopened. That same day in a statement to the Knesset,
Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Yigal Allon announced the reduction of Israeli
troops near the Canal.
June 1975
By early June 1975, Ford and Kissinger decided to resume formal negotiations
with Israel and Egypt – US26 (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 2001). Kissinger
was concerned about the increasing tensions in the region and the possibility of
renewed hostilities, concerns which were compounded by the letter signed by 76
senators urging the U.S. to be “responsive to Israel’s economic and military needs”
(Quandt 1977, 270). Additionally, domestic pressure seemed to help propel Ford and
Kissinger’s decision to resume negotiations. Kissinger’s confidence in being able to
conclude an agreement, though, had been eroded by the stagnation of talks earlier that
year. During his last visit with the Israeli government, prior to the decision to reassess
Middle East policy, Kissinger told Rabin that the U.S. was losing control over events and
that, in essence, the effort to reach any agreement had failed (Isaacson 1992).
However, according to several conversations that took place between May 24
and June 5, 1975, Kissinger and Ford regularly discussed various contingencies and
ways in which an agreement might be reached. In none of the conversations was the
possibility of not being able to bring both parties to the negotiating table discussed. The
timing of the decision coincided with, or perhaps was prompted by, Rabin’s trip to
Washington scheduled for the second week in June. As Ford and Kissinger both agreed
that an agreement was necessary, the decision unit in this case (US25) is classified as

Chapter Six

159

Crisis Transition Decisions
single group. The occasion for decision is new information – indications from Israel that
it would be willing to make some concessions – as well as other.
June 8, 1975
On June 8, the Cabinet adopted a resolution dealing with possible avenues to
peace, and authorized Rabin to negotiate on Israel’s behalf (IS30). The resolution
attempted to constrain Rabin’s ability to deviate from the government’s strategy in
negotiations (Brownstein 1977; Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014). Rabin had intimated on
several occasions that Israel may be willing to concede additional territory, including
the passes and the oil fields, in return for Egypt’s declaration of non-belligerency
(Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014). The decision unit is classified as single group. The
occasion for decision is strategic in nature and therefore classified as other. The
occasion for decision can also be classified as new information, as Sadat had reopened
the Suez Canal just days before the decision.
On June 11, Rabin, the Israeli Ambassador, the Minister of the Israeli Embassy,
and the Director General of the Prime Minister’s Office met with Kissinger and Ford to
discuss the different avenues toward an agreement. The consensus of all parties was
that an interim agreement was preferable, and more likely to be reached, than an
overall comprehensive agreement (Geneva Conference) at that time.
On June 15, Palestinian militants entered a Jewish settlement and held a family
hostage. Two civilians and one soldier were killed in the incident. A few weeks later, a
terrorist detonated a booby-trapped refrigerator laden with explosives at Zion Square in
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downtown Jerusalem, killing fifteen people and wounding sixty-two others (Israel Security
Agency 2010). The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) claimed responsibility.
August 16, 1975
During June and July, Ford and Kissinger discussed on multiple occasions the
progress of negotiations and the cost that U.S. might have to incur in order to reach an
agreement. While the specifics of military force withdrawal were a primary issue in the
negotiations, Israel was also asking for a significant aid package from the United States.
The original request amounted to a little more than $2.5 billion in military and
economic assistance. After several months of stagnation, Kissinger and Ford agreed to
push for a $2.1 billion aid package for Israel (US27). The occasion for decision is
classified as other, and the decision unit is single group.
The negotiating team agreed to withdraw from the Mitla and Gidi passes in
exchange for Egypt’s renouncing the use of force and an unprecedented amount of U.S.
aid. In addition, the United States agreed to man three warning stations in the Sinai. On
August 31, the Cabinet approved Sinai II Agreement (IS31).8 The decision to accept the
agreement was in part a result of positive feedback from the decision to give up some of
its territory. Louise Fischer (2014) argues, however, that the territory Israel was willing
to concede in August 1975 was little more than it had agreed to in October 1974. The
primary incentives for Israel was the $2 billion aid package from the United States, a
guaranteed oil supply, and the positive steps taken by Sadat (Fischer 2014).
On September 1, 1975, Henry Kissinger signed a Memorandum of Agreement and
Memorandum of Understanding with Israel for future military and financial aid and
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monitoring of the early warning system in the Sinai. The memoranda demonstrated to
Israel America’s long-term commitment to its security. The points laid out in the Sinai II
Agreement provided the foundation for the negotiations at Camp David. In addition, the
signing of the agreement signaled to both Israel and Egypt that each side was willing to
give up the use of force in order to resolve disputes (Fischer 2014).

Summary and Discussion of Crisis Transition Decisions
United States
The United States made fourteen decisions during the crisis transition period, six
taken by a predominant leader and eight by a single group decision unit. While Kissinger
acted as predominant leader in the first two of six such decisions during the crisis
transition period, Presidents Nixon and Ford were responsible for the other four. Ford
made only one decision as predominant leader when he authorized Kissinger to go to
the Middle East and negotiate on behalf of the United States (US23). The three decisions
Nixon took during the transition phase were extreme attempts to reach a settlement
and, like his decisions in the crisis period, were contrary to Kissinger’s
recommendations. Nixon and Kissinger made one decision as a single group: agreeing to
and signing a Memorandum of Understanding promising a U.S. commitment in the
Middle East (US16).
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TABLE 6.1. U.S. Crisis Transition Decisions

Dec.
No.

Date

Decision

Decision
Unit

15

28 November
1974

Kissinger convinces Israel Predominant
and Egypt to suspend talks
leader at KM 101 in favor of a
Kissinger
Geneva Conference

16

9 January 1974

Decision for Kissinger to
go to Egypt with a revised
Israeli plan for
disengagement agreement

17

17 January 1974 U.S. signs a Memorandum
of Understanding
promising US commitment
in Middle East

19

15 May 1974

20

Type of
Occasion
for
Decision
Other strategic
initiative

Predominant
New
leader information;
Positive
Kissinger
feedback
Single group
- Nixon &
Kissinger

Other strategic

Decision to cut off all aid
to Israel unless they
immediately comply on
the Syria disengagement

Predominant
leader Nixon

Other tactical

14 June 1974

US promises Egypt
American Technology &
implied a nuclear power
plant as reward to
agreement

Predominant
leader Nixon

Other tactical

21

17 June 1974

US promises Israel
assistance with nuclear
energy

Predominant
leader Nixon

Other tactical

22

17 October
1974

Promise to Sadat that US
will push for $250m in
assistance for Egypt

Single group

Other tactical
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23

3 March 1975

Authorization for
Kissinger to go to Middle
East and negotiate on
behalf of the US

Predominant
leader

Other strategic

24

24 March 1975

Decision to reassessment
Amerca's Middle East
policy & relationship with
Israel

Single group

Negative
feedback;
Other tactical

25

June 1975

Decision to resume formal
negotiations

Single group

New
information;
Other strategic

26

August 1975

Decision to push for $2.1b
aid package for Israel

Single group

Other tactical

27

August 1975

Decision to resume shuttle
diplomacy

Single group

Positive
feedback;
New
information;
Other strategic

28

1 September
1975

Kissinger signs a MoA &
MoU with Israel for future
military & financial aid &
monitoring early warning
system

Single group

Other tactical

Half of the U.S. decisions during the crisis transition period were made under the
Ford administration and, as noted previously, all but one decision unit was classified as
single group.
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Israel
All but two of the decision units associated with Israeli decisions during the
transition period can be classified as single group. Twelve of the eighteen decisions
were made when Meir served as prime minister; the others were taken under the Rabin
government. The types of occasion for decision included three instances of negative
feedback and one instance of new information. Fourteen decisions were based on the
classification other, which were generally of a strategic or tactical nature. Two decisions
were based on multiple types of occasions.

TABLE 6.2. Israel Crisis Transition Decisions
Dec.
No.

Date

Decision

Decision
Unit

Type of
Occasion for
Decision

18

30 October
1973

Decision to authorize
Meir's visit to US to enlist
Nixon's direct support

Single group

Other strategic
initiative

19

8 November
1973

Approval of amended
version of the Six-Point
Agreement

Single group

Positive
feedback;
Other strategic

20

25 November
1973

Decision to participate in
opening session of Geneva
Peace Conference

Single group

Other strategic

21

28 November
1973

Decision to end talks with
Egypt at Kilometer 101
regarding the separation of
forces

Single group

Other strategic
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22

16-17
December 1973

Decision to accept USSoviet request to start
negotiations at Geneva
before Knesset elections

Single group

Other strategic

23

17 December
1973

Decision to participate in
Geneva Conf but not to sit
in same room with Syria's
delegation unless Syria
releases list of POWs

Single group

Other tactical

24

2 January 1974

Decision to authorize
Dayan to present to
Kissinger Israel's
conditions for
disengagement agreement
with Egypt

Single group

Other strategic

25

15 January
1974

Decision to abandon
Israel's demand for clearcut Egyptian declaration of
nonbelligerency

Single group

Negative
feedback;
Other strategic
initiative

26

17 January
1974

Decision to accept the
Disengagement Agreement
with Egypt

Single group

Positive
feedback;
Other strategic

27

~29 May 1974

Approval of Israel-Syria
disengagement agreement

Single group

Positive
feedback;
Other strategic

28

19 March 1975

Decision to support
continued negotiations
despite deadlock on second
agreement

Single group

Other strategic

29

24 March 1975

Decision to suspend talks

Single group

External
shock;
Negative
feedback
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30

8 June 1975

Adoption of resolution
dealing with possible
avenues to peace, Rabin
authorized to negotiate on
Israel's behalf

Single group

New
information;
Other strategic

31

August 1975

Approval of Sinai II
Agreement

Single group

Positive
feedback;
Other strategic

In the crisis transition period challenges facing Israel were primarily of the
domestic nature. Numerous terror incidents fueled the concerns for national security
and occupied much of the government’s attention. Only two primary exogenous shocks
occurred during the transition period that affected Israeli foreign policy: the reopening
of the Suez Canal in June 1975 and the U.S. decision to reassess its foreign policy toward
Israel. Both events likely influenced the decision to resume negotiations between Israel
and Egypt.
In March 1975, the sticking points to an interim agreement were: (1) how far
Israel would have to withdraw and the extent of the Egyptian advance; (2) the Israeli
early warning system at Um Hashiva; and (3) the duration of the agreement. Gerald
Ford sent a letter to Rabin stating that “failure of the negotiations will have a farreaching impact on the region and on our relations. I have given instructions for a
reassessment of United States’ policy in the region, including our relations with Israel,
with the aim of ensuring that overall American interests…are protected. You will be
notified of our decision” (Rabin 1979, 200). Whatever the effect Ford intended, the
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letter made even the “most hesitant members of the Cabinet” resolve that the
negotiating team remain adamant on its policy.
According to several accounts, the U.S. decision to reassess policy in the region
did not induce Rabin to reconsider his position on restarting negotiations (Derfler
2014; Fischer 2104; Rabin 1996). Even a suspension of military contracts between the
U.S. and Israel did not resolve the impasse. Rabin stated that his “desire to achieve an
interim agreement with Egypt rested upon my perception of Israel’s needs, rather than
on any wish to placate the United States” (Rabin 1996, 261). It was Sadat’s expressed
interest in restarting negotiations that prompted Rabin to accept an invitation to go to
Washington in June 1975 (Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014; Rabin 1996).
The reopening of the canal in June 1975, while a seemingly positive
development, also did not appear to influence Israeli decision-makers (Derfler 2014;
Rabin 1996). In a speech addressed to the Knesset on June 4, Deputy Premier and
Foreign Minister Yigal Allon noted that the opening of the canal was an important and
constructive act that could aid in the easing of tension in the region, of which Israel had
a great interest. However, Allon also recognized that the opening of the canal would
have the greatest benefit to Egypt.9
Chapter Seven discusses the results of the hypotheses and compares the decision
unit dynamics between the United States and Israel. The next chapter also explores the
differences in decision unit dynamics between the crisis and crisis transition periods.
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Notes: Chapter Six

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Address in the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin on the Presentation
of his government – 3 June 1974, Volume 3: 1974-1977.
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook2/Pages/1%20Address%20in%20the
%20Knesset%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Rabin%20o.aspx. Accessed March 10, 2014.
2 Ibid.
3 According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the six-point agreement stipulated that (1) Egypt and
Israel observe the cease-fire called for by the UN Security Council; (2) discussions between them would
begin immediately regarding the return to the October 22 positions; (3) the town of Suez would receive
daily supplies of food, water, and medicines; (4) there would be no impediment to the movement of nonmilitary supplies to the east bank of the Canal; (5) Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road would be
replaced by UN checkpoints; and (6) there would be an exchange of all prisoners of war following the
establishment of the UN checkpoints.
4 Kissinger’s claim that Nixon ordered aid to Israel to be cut off is substantiated in a May 15, 1974,
Memorandum from Brent Scowcroft to President Nixon. Scowcroft relays Kissinger’s assessment that
doing so would be “disastrous in terms of the immediate negotiation, the long-term evolution and the U.S.
position in the Middle East.” National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office
Files, Box 45, HAK Trip Files, Middle East Memos and Security, April 28-May 31, 1974.
5 The Israeli demand for a cessation of terror activity in the Golan was refused by President Assad. It was
only after the U.S. agreed to a memorandum of understanding that the United States would not consider
any actions taken by Israel in defense against “raids by armed groups or individuals across the
demarcation line” as violations of the cease-fire agreement, and that the United States would support
Israel politically (Brecher 1980, 323-24).
6 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Address in the Knesset by Prime Minister Rabin on the Presentation
of his government – 3 June 1974, Volume 3: 1974-1977.
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook2/Pages/1%20Address%20in%20the
%20Knesset%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Rabin%20o.aspx. Accessed March 10, 2014.
7 National Security Adviser’s Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection, Gerald Ford
Presidential Library, Box 1, Folder “Egypt – President Sadat (1).”
8 At the time the agreement was signed, Israeli law did not require treaties and agreements to be
approved by the Knesset, only that the Knesset needed to be notified of such agreements within thirty
days.
9 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement in the Knesset by Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Yigal
Allon on the opening of the Suez Canal – 4 June 1975.”
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook2/Pages/89%20Statement%20in%20t
he%20Knesset%20by%20Deputy%20Premier%20and.aspx. Accessed March 10, 2014.
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Results and Comparisons
Summary of Decisions, Units, and Occasions for Decision
Table 7.1 illustrates the number and type of decision units associated with the
decisions. The predominant leader decision unit emerged in twenty-six decisions
(twenty during the crisis and six in the transition period), while the single group type
occurred in thirty-three of the decisions. The coalition decision unit did not appear as
the authoritative body in any of the sixty-two decisions.

TABLE 7.1. Decision Unit by Type and Period
United States

Israel Total

Crisis decisions

14

17

31

Predominant leader

13

7

20

Single group

1

10

11

Coalition

0

0

0

14

14

28

Predominant leader

6

0

6

Single group

8

14

22

Coalition

0

0

0

Transition decisions
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Results of Hypotheses
Decision Units
The first two hypotheses relate to the types of decision unit that emerged during
the decision process.
H1: During sequential crisis decision-making, the nature and type of
decision unit will remain constant throughout the duration of the crisis.

H2: During sequential crisis decision-making, the decision unit will likely
take the form of predominant leader or single group.

The results of the study regarding the consistency of the decision unit is mixed.
During the crisis period, the decision units for the U.S. fell overwhelmingly into the
predominant leader category (13 of 14), but they were evenly split, seven predominant
leader and seven single group, during the crisis transition period. Conversely, Israeli
decision units were divided during the crisis period (seven predominant leaders and ten
single group decisions); and all of the decision units in the transition period were single
group. Overall, the trend in the type of decision unit from crisis to crisis transition was a
dramatic decrease in predominant leader decisions (20 during the crisis, six during the
transition).
There could be several reasons for this discrepancy. One reason could be the
institutional structures involved in foreign policy decision-making, as well as the often
times ambiguous nature of leadership roles. In Israel’s parliamentary system, foreign
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policy decisions and matters of national security are the responsibilities of the prime
minister and his or her Cabinet.1 And, according to Yehuda Ben-Meir (1986, 99), the
final governmental authority – in the absence of an explicit Cabinet decision to the
contrary – is the prime minister (see also Brownstein 1977). Foreign policy decisions,
therefore, seem to depend on the leadership style of the prime minister, as well as the
coalition of the Cabinet (Ben-Meir 1986; Brownstein 1977; Dayan 1976; Meir 1975).
Meir, prime minister during the crisis period, enjoyed a significant majority in her
coalition government, holding 72 of 120 seats in the Knesset, as opposed to Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin (transition period), who had only a one-vote margin in the
Knesset when he won his party’s leadership election in 1974. Meir generally had the
support of her Cabinet, whereas Rabin had to contend with two adversarial Cabinet
members with whom he disagreed on many issues (Brownstein 1977; Derfler 2014). In
other words, Meir may have had some flexibility in exercising her authority, while
Rabin did not.
As for the United States, foreign policy decision-making is generally conducted
within the Executive Branch, which consists of the President and his subordinates (i.e.,
members of his Cabinet and various advisers). The Constitution signifies the President
as the primary actor in matters of foreign policy, if he so chooses. However, because of
the political problems that plagued the Nixon administration – i.e., Vice-President
Agnew’s resignation and the Watergate scandal – Secretary of State Kissinger was the
primary actor involved in managing the October crisis (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982;
Quandt 1977, 2001). Where Nixon was distracted with domestic issues, his successor,
Gerald Ford, seemed to be engaged in the foreign policy decision-making process
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(Quandt 1977). During the crisis period under the Nixon administration, Kissinger was
able to take some liberties with decisions. This did not seem to be the case under Ford.
A second reason why the decision units may not be consistent across
governments could be the position of the players in the course of events. Israel was
directly involved in the conflict, whereas the United States was primarily involved in
conflict resolution. The environment in which Israel had to make decisions was
decidedly more stressful than that in the United States. The literature suggests that
decision-makers under stress may seek support from a group of trusted associates who
have a first-hand understanding of the immediate crisis (Bar-Joseph and McDermott
2008; ‘t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius 1997). In addition, Brecher’s (1980) study on crisis
decision-making in Israel finds that as stress increases, so does the number of persons
consulted. That is not to say that an increase in consultations implies group decisionmaking. Indeed, the evidence shows, and both Meir (1975) and Dayan (1976) admit,
that it was the prime minister who was responsible for, and ultimately made, many of
the decisions during the October crisis.
Brecher (1980) concludes that when stress is reduced in the environment,
Israeli decision-makers return to routine procedures for choice – i.e., institutional
versus ad hoc decision-making. Whether Meir merely consulted with the Cabinet or
requested approval on a decision, Israeli leadership was confronted with an immediate
physical threat to its security during the crisis period. With the possible exception of the
nuclear alert, I would argue that the United States and Israel were operating under
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different fundamental threats and stress levels, which may have had an effect on the
type of decision unit that emerged during the crisis.
As for the crisis transition period, the evidence seems to support Brecher’s
(1980) assertion of a return to institutional decision-making. In fact, while a
comparison of the U.S. and Israeli decision units suggests that there may be slightly
different processes for policymaking, both governments moved toward an increase in
group decision-making during the crisis transition period.
As to Hypothesis #2, the findings seem to support the proposition that the
decision unit will likely take the form of predominant leader or single group during the
crisis and crisis transition periods. All of the decision units across both time periods and
both governments were either predominant leader (26 of 59 cases) or single group (33
of 59 cases). This is perhaps consistent with the literature that suggests that the
number of actors involved in crisis decision-making tends to contract (George 1980;
Hermann and Hermann 1989; Hermann 2001; ‘t Hart 1990; Trumbore and Boyer
2000). However, because the DU framework indicates that a single group need only
consist of two members, it tells us nothing about the dynamic nature of the decision
unit – only that no one member alone can commit or withhold the resources of the
government.
In the Israeli instances where the predominant leader emerged (all during the
crisis period), it was Golda Meir who was identified as such. In the United States, the
predominant leader was not always the same individual. During the crisis period,
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Kissinger emerged as the predominant leader in seven decisions, while Nixon was
identified as such in six decisions.
During numerous telephone conversations, Nixon repeatedly told Kissinger that
whatever he thought would be fine with him. He issued this remark regarding strategy
and the oil embargo, military aid to Israel, and handling of détente with the Soviets. The
instances where Nixon intervened on any of Kissinger’s decisions seemed to be when
there was negative feedback from the press, when new information reached the
President, or when decisions were not being implemented. William Quandt (1977, 130)
asserts that, because of Nixon’s preoccupation with his “crumbling domestic base of
support,” Kissinger was given considerable latitude in American diplomacy, particularly
in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Quandt claims that Kissinger occasionally
called on Nixon to invoke his presidential authority and kept Nixon informed at each
stage. Kissinger also ignored presidential directives on occasion.
Gerald Ford also gave Kissinger some negotiating room with Israel and Egypt,
but, unlike Nixon, Ford took a genuine interest in Middle East policy (Isaacson 1992;
Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977). And, although Kissinger heavily influenced foreign
policy in the new administration, Ford chose to participate in the decision-making
process. But because Kissinger did hold sway with Ford, the majority of decisions were
made as a single group.
Since Meir resigned in April 1974 but stayed on in a caretaker capacity until the
new government was formed in June, she was involved in ten of the fourteen decisions
during the transition period. A comparison of the decision units alone from the Meir
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regime to Rabin’s government does not say anything about the nature of the decisionmaking process.
Occasions for Decision
The occasions for decisions are classified into six types: (1) external shock, (2)
internal (domestic) shock, (3) positive feedback, (4) negative feedback, (5) new
information, and (6) other. All of the types except for other are designed to address
Hypotheses #3 through #7. The classification other incorporates all types of occasions
for decision not otherwise specified. Where possible, I elaborate on the other category
by providing some context as to the nature of the occasion for decision. For the
purposes of the study, there is no differentiation between the various contexts, and the
effects of the other category are not considered.
As might be expected, one decision is often the result of more than one type of
occasion for decision. Indeed, the findings indicate that out of the sixty-two decisions
taken, twenty were initiated by two or more types of occasions. Likewise, one occasion
for decision can spawn multiple decisions and thus multiple decision units. Table 7.2
provides a data summary of the different types of occasions for decision associated with
the conditions of the decision environment (i.e., crisis versus crisis transition).
The type of occasion for decision most often found in this study is other (fortyone out of ninety-one), forty-five percent of the total. New information category
accounts for the second highest number of occasions with seventeen; external shocks
was observed in twelve cases; negative feedback was identified in eleven instances; and
positive feedback makes up only four of the ninety-one different occasions for decision.
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The category internal shocks did not appear as the occasion in any of the identified
decisions.

TABLE 7.2. Occasions for Decision by Type and Period
United States
Type of Occasion for
Decision

Crisis

Crisis
Transition

External shock

2

Internal shock

Israel
Crisis

Crisis
Transition

Total

0

7

1

10

0

0

0

0

0

Positive Feedback

0

2

0

4

6

Negative Feedback

2

1

2

2

7

New information

6

3

7

2

18

Other

6

13

11

14

44

Total

16

19

27

23

85

It should not be surprising that the classification of new information appears
overwhelmingly as the occasion for decision during the crisis period. In times of crises,
particularly conflicts, events tend to develop quickly and new intelligence or new
information is passed along to policymakers. Sometimes that information can be
erroneous, and decision-makers must reevaluate or reconsider a previous decision. For
example, on several occasions during the war, Israeli military advisers described a more
optimistic picture of events on the front than what was actually taking place. Misleading
or wrong information, although considered new by my typology, might also lead to
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decisions that produce negative feedback. Therefore, some occasions for decision
identified as negative feedback could have been the result of incorrect information
involved in an earlier decision.
This seemed to be the case in two instances for Israel. The Israeli decision not to
preempt (IS4) was based in part on the assumption that the IDF could quickly recover
and take the advantage. When Meir learned that military intelligence analysts
significantly underestimated the enemy’s capabilities and intent, the prime minister
expressed an increased sense of urgency in obtaining additional planes and tanks (IS5).
Several days later, after there had been no movement on the supplies, Meir felt she
needed to go Washington personally to plead Israel’s case (IS8).
Several of the hypotheses presented in this study seek to test whether certain
factors affect change in the structure or nature of the decision unit, given a series of
decisions regarding one problem or issue. These factors, while incorporated into the
classification system representing different types of occasions for decision, can occur
outside the purview of the occasion for decision variable. Put simply, the study does not
rely solely on the type of occasion for decision to determine the effects of shocks or
feedback on the decision unit. Classifying the occasion for decision attempts to facilitate
the understanding of the relationship between an occasion for decision and the decision
unit.
Feedback
Hypotheses #3, #4, and #5 pertain to the effects of feedback on the decision unit.
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H3: Positive feedback regarding a foreign policy decision or policy action
will not likely alter the nature or type of decision unit of a given
government.

H4: Negative feedback regarding a foreign policy decision or policy action
will not likely affect the nature or type of decision unit of a government
under crisis conditions.

H5: Negative feedback from a foreign policy decision or policy action will
likely affect the nature or type of decision unit of a government during the
transition period from a crisis to non-crisis.

Feedback prompted a decision to be taken or was instrumental in initiating a decision
in thirteen instances. Seven decisions were the result of negative feedback, while six
were classified as positive. Occasions for decision that are categorized as feedback
(positive and negative) occurred about equally in the crisis and transition periods. As to
the effects of feedback on the decision unit, in four instances negative feedback was the
result of a previous key decision (two related to U.S. decisions; two related to Israel),
none of which produced a structural change in the decision unit. Positive feedback
occurred as the occasion for decision in two U.S. cases and four Israeli decisions, none of
which resulted in a change in the type of decision unit.
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Positive feedback by itself did not seem to affect the type of decision unit in this
study. Four of the six occasions of positive feedback pertain to the Israeli acceptance of
various agreements throughout the crisis transition position (IS19, IS26, IS27, and
IS31), and represent the culmination of demands and concessions from several rounds
of negotiations. In none of the cases was positive feedback the result of a previous key
decision used in this study.
The two instances of positive feedback in U.S. decisions also occurred in the crisis
transition period, one of which can be linked to a previous key decision. The decision
for Kissinger to resume his shuttle diplomacy in August 1975 (US27) seemed to be a
result, at least in part, of the responsiveness to an earlier decision in June to resume
formal negotiations (US25). Ford and Kissinger had separate talks with both Prime
Minister Rabin and President Sadat in June 1975, and felt that the parties were
receptive to the idea of moving forward (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Quandt 1977).
According to conversations between Kissinger and Ford, however, positive feedback
was not the predominant reason to resume shuttle diplomacy. Both were concerned
about the possibility of renewed hostilities if an agreement could not be reached. While
this concern most likely played a large part in the decision to resume the shuttle,
Kissinger would not have agreed to this decision had there not been progress in the
June talks with Israel and Egypt.
Despite the absence of positive feedback as an occasion for decision, there
obviously were positive developments throughout the crisis and transition periods. The
talks at Kilometer 101 represented the first direct negotiations between Israel and
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Egypt. Although the talks initially were a little tense, the two military leaders eventually
relaxed and the negotiations progressed for a time (Brecher 1980; Meir 1975; Quandt
1977). The reopening of the Suez Canal was also a positive development. Sadat
announced it in March 1975 and opened the Canal to ship traffic on June 4. The primary
developments, and I would argue most significant, were the signing of Sinai I and II
Disengagement Agreements.
While negative feedback generally did not cause a change in the types of decision
units, there was one change in the configuration of the decision unit, which involved
specific individual identified as the predominant leader. In U.S. Decision #5, Nixon
emerged as the predominant leader as a result of the failed execution of Kissinger’s
decisions (US2 and US3) to have aid delivered to Israel. Kissinger’s condition that
equipment was to be picked up in unmarked Israeli planes (US2) and the subsequent
decision to charter civilian planes (US3) were both problematic. It should be noted,
however, that Kissinger did not anticipate the problems associated with the conditions.
With each point of failure, Israel increased its pressure on the United States, specifically
on the president. According to Quandt (1977), it was the Soviet airlift to Egypt and
Sadat’s refusal to accept a cease-fire that prompted the decision to use American
military aircraft to transport the equipment. In this regard, the occasion for decision
could be classified as new information. However, if not for the failures in implementing
Kissinger’s conditional decisions, Nixon’s ruling would not have been necessary.
By not conducting a pre-emptive strike, Israel was forced to take the full brunt of
the Egyptian and Syrian attacks. The decision resulted in a greater loss than anticipated
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of military equipment (not to mention soldiers). It was the rapid depletion of
equipment that caused Israel considerable concern of a protracted war, and thus placed
greater emphasis and reliance on U.S. supplies. The decision not to pre-empt, therefore,
resulted in negative feedback, which prompted two subsequent decisions: (1) the
decision to request emergency assistance (IS5); and (2) Meir’s decision to fly to
Washington (IS9). The decision unit classification (predominant leader) remained the
same for each of the decisions, which would support Hypothesis #4.

Environmental Shocks
A total of twenty-six shocks occurred from the onset of the war until the signing
of the Sinai II Agreement. According to the results displayed in Table 7.3, the United
States witnessed seven external shocks (four during the crisis and three during the
transition period), as well as six internal shocks (two in the crisis period and three in
the transition phase). Israel faced the same number of exogenous shocks during the
crisis, as did the United States and only one during the crisis transition period. Israel
experienced no internal shocks during the crisis phase. All eleven endogenous events in
Israel occurred during the transition period.
Hypotheses #6 and #7 propose that both internal and external shocks will affect
change in the decision unit.
H6: Internal (domestic) shocks likely will alter the nature or type of decision
unit under both crisis conditions and during the transition period from
crisis to non-crisis.
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H7: External shocks likely will alter the nature or type of decision unit under
crisis conditions and during the transition period from crisis to non-crisis.

Of the five internal shocks that occurred in the United States throughout both
periods, four were related to the Watergate affair and Nixon’s subsequent resignation.
While none of the shocks appeared as occasions for decision in the study, all influenced
the decision-making process and the decision units that appeared as a result. As stated
previously, Nixon’s domestic problems allowed for Kissinger’s emergence as the
predominant leader in many of the decisions. And his resignation during the transition
period initiated a regime change where a new actor (Ford) emerged as one member, if
not the member, of the authoritative decision unit.
Israel experienced eleven endogenous shocks during the time period studied, all
occurring during the crisis transition period. Of the eleven shocks, nine incidents were
militant attacks and two were related directly to the October war. Terror attacks were
not uncommon events in Israel; however, there had not been a fatality on Israeli soil
since June 1972 (Johnstonarchives.com). And, although more than forty Israeli citizens
were killed as a result of the nine attacks during that time and the incidents were
addressed in prime minister speeches to the Knesset, the events themselves did not
appear to affect fundamental or dynamic changes in the decision units.
Conversely, the two internal shocks related to the crisis had a significant effect
on the decision unit dynamic. The first was the release of the interim report, published
by the Agranat Commission to determine the failures of the intelligence and military
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establishments. The report exonerated Meir and Dayan of the responsibilities of the
failures; however, Chief of General Staff David Elazar, head of military intelligence
Major-General Eliz Zeira, and the Chief of Southern Command Major-General Shmuel
Gonen were identified as the primary parties responsible for the operational
intelligence failures and failing to prepare the army for war (Bar-Joseph 2006;
Rabinovich 2003; Sachar 2010). Although the interim report absolved Meir and Dayan
of direct, both submitted their resignations.
The publication of the interim report and the resignation of the prime minister
are treated as two distinct internal shocks. The report prompted the resignation, and
the resignation brought about the election of a new government. As in the case of the
United States, the internal shocks themselves did not appear in the study as occasions
for decision. Instead, they created a fundamental change in the decision-making body.
Although it did not appear as an occasion for decision in this study, internal
shocks nonetheless had an effect on the dynamic of the decision unit. Indeed, there was
a change in the actor vested with the authority to commit the state’s resources. New
leadership in both countries brought with it new cabinet configurations, new ideas and
new approaches to the problem. Rabin faced opposition within his Cabinet, while Meir
less so, which created a more hostile decision-making environment. Ford was far more
interested in the foreign affairs of the Middle East than was Nixon, and actively (and
constructively) participated in the decision-making process. The results, therefore,
seem to support Hypotheses #6. However, the type of decision unit did not change in
response to regime change, only key members of the group.
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A total of ten external shocks appeared as the occasion for decision during the
crisis and crisis transition periods, three of which affected both the United States and
Israel. The mobilization of the Egyptian and Syrian forces along the Israeli border, the
initiation of hostilities, and the Soviet warning of unilateral military action threatened
to destabilize security in the Middle East and disrupt the balance of power in the region.
The three shocks shared by both governments initiated a series of ten decisions. The
United States took three, and Israel took seven.
The mobilization of the Egyptian and Syrian forces prompted the decision of the
Cabinet to authorize the prime minister to mobilize reserves (IS1), which Meir did not
do (IS2). After receiving new intelligence that war was imminent, Meir made the
decision for large-scale mobilization (IS3), but decided against pre-emption (IS4). In
light of reports emanating from the front and in anticipation of a possible prolonged
engagement, Meir decided to request military supplies from the U.S. (IS5). Of these first
five decisions, Meir acted as predominant leader in four, with the authorization
stemming from the first decision taken by the Cabinet (single group). Although the
decision unit changed from single group to predominant leader after the first decision,
the change was not a result of a new shock, but a consequent of the first decision itself.
This suggests that, under normal conditions the Cabinet, acting as a single group, is the
authoritative decision unit. When the external shock was recognized, the single group
decision unit granted authority to a predominant leader. In this particular case, the
evidence supports Hypothesis #7.
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For the United States, the mobilization of forces did not initiate a decision, but
the commencement of hostilities did (US1) when the Nixon administration asked the
Soviet Union to take a neutral stand alongside the U.S. The decision unit for the first
decision was a single group. The second decision, to provide supplies to Israel in
unmarked planes (US2), resulted in a change from a single group to predominant leader
decision unit. Unlike the process in Israel, there was no decision-making body that
officially granted Kissinger this authority. Although Nixon agreed to provide the
supplies, he was not part of the unit that decided to stipulate the conditions of the
delivery. As Kissinger took it upon himself to create the condition, the change in the
type of decision unit for the United States was not a result of the external shock. As to
whether the external shocks affected a change in the decision unit for the U.S., the
results indicate that with the recognition of a crisis event, the size of the decision unit
did contract, but only after an overall strategy was established.
It could be argued that all of the decisions made during the crisis period should
be considered because all stemmed from the initial shock of the war. Indeed, none
would have been necessary if not for the outbreak of hostilities. I argue, however, that
there are additional variables and conditions that arise during the decision-making
process that influence decision unit dynamics. Thus, while the entire crisis period, and
the decisions which occurred therein, is a result of one external shock, it is important to
determine which intervening variables might influence that dynamic. That said, a
cursory review of the decision units that emerged during the crisis period in the United
States reveal that, after the first decision (taken by a single group), all subsequent
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decisions were made by a predominant leader. In this case, the findings support
Hypothesis #7.
The third external shock shared by Israel and the United States involved the
Soviet threat of unilateral military action. The United States made one key decision in
response: Kissinger authorized the alert status to be raised to Defense Condition III.
Although Kissinger consulted with multiple advisers and Cabinet members, there was
no change in the type of decision unit for this decision. For the Israelis, the two
decisions associated with the alert, acceptance of the cease-fire and allowing supplies to
reach the Third Army, effectively ended the war. The decisions were taken by the
Cabinet and thus constitute single group decision units. While there was a change from
the type of decision unit found in the decision immediately preceding it, this was not
likely the introduction of a new external shock, as the Cabinet made more than half of
the decisions during the crisis period. As to the effects of external shocks on the
decision unit, the findings of the Israeli case are inconclusive.
The only other external shock that seemed to be relevant to the decision-making
process in this study occurred during the crisis transition period, when Ford announced
the reassessment of U.S. policy toward the Middle East and its relationship with Israel.
This event did not seem to change the decision unit type or alter the dynamics of the
decision-making process – the Israeli Cabinet took all of the decisions during the crisis
transition period – but it did cause the Cabinet to announce the suspension of
negotiations (IS29). (See Appendix for Environmental Shocks Tables 7.3 and 7.4)
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As to whether the evidence from this case study supports Hypothesis #7, the
findings are mixed. In the crisis period, the shock of the war prompted an initial change
in the authoritative decision unit, but it did not persist throughout the crisis. In the
United States, once the decision unit changed to predominant leader, it did not change
again until the crisis transition period. This suggests that perhaps the decision-making
processes in each country are fundamentally different or that decisions are more
heavily influenced by the personalities of the leadership. These considerations are
addressed more fully in concluding remarks.

Process Outcomes and Key Contingencies
With the fundamental structural changes of the decision-making body that occur
as a result of regime change, one might expect to see more fluctuations in the structure
of the decision units as a result. That there was little change in the type of decision units
over the course of the period studied suggests that an examination of the decision unit
alone is not sufficient to determine dynamic changes. Such changes are a little more
evident, however, in a review of the process outcomes and key contingencies as
described in the DU framework.
The framework suggests that process outcomes tend to fall into one of six
categories dependent upon preferences within the decision unit (see Table 3.1). The
specified outcomes include one party’s position prevails, concurrence, mutual
compromise/consensus, lopsided compromise, deadlock, and fragmented symbolic action.
The categories are further divided between symmetrical and asymmetrical payoff
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distributions. Concurrence, mutual compromise, and deadlock are symmetrical payoffs,
while one party’s position prevails, lopsided compromise, and fragmented symbolic
action are asymmetrical payoffs. In short, the process outcomes reflect whose positions
counted in the final decision and how reconsideration of the decision might develop
(Hermann 2001).
One additional aspect of the decision unit framework that should be addressed
relates to the key contingencies described in Table 1.1. Hermann (2001) maintains that
certain information about the nature of the key contingencies can provide some insight
into the operation of the decision units. The contingencies indicate which theories and
models of decision-making are relevant and suggest the nature of the decision process.
For example, when acting as predominant leader, Kissinger’s goals were well defined
(détente with the Soviets and an increased U.S. influence in the Middle East); the means
of achieving those goals were flexible (employed joint cooperation with the Soviets and
engaged in shuttle diplomacy); and political timing was important (convincing Israel
and Egypt to suspend talks at Kilometer 101). This assessment of Kissinger indicates
that he displayed moderate sensitivity to the political context, where theories based on
the actor/situation interaction are most relevant and the decision process tends to be
strategic.
The alternating positions of Kissinger and Nixon as the predominant leader
reflect the process outcomes described in the framework. U.S. decisions #7, #8, and #9
reflect the lopsided compromise that became the struggle for both Nixon and Kissinger
to exercise what each perceived to be their designated authority. Arguably, the outcome
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for Decisions #7 through #10 could be considered as one party’s position prevailing
over all others. However, a primary characteristic of this outcome is that other parties
will push for reconsideration if there is negative feedback. Kissinger did not wait for
negative feedback. Instead, he deliberately ignored or defied Nixon’s instructions. He
clearly acted as the predominant leader in these instances, effectively assuming the
authority to do so. Moreover, his decisions were not reversed, reinforcing his
perception that he acted with full authority.
The findings of this study indicate that many of the process outcomes during the
Nixon-Kissinger dyad resulted in lopsided compromise, fragmented symbolic action, or
one party’s position prevailing. The payoff distribution for decision preferences was
often asymmetrical. The results demonstrate the asymmetrical payoffs in decisions #5,
#6, #7, #8, #18, #19, #20, and #21. Nixon, more so than Kissinger, made decisions that
complicated, impeded, or otherwise undermined the strategy of negotiations. That is
not to suggest that Nixon and Kissinger never agreed on a decision, just that the key
decisions chosen for this study tend to reflect conflicting goals and the means of
addressing those goals.
The process outcomes under the Ford-Kissinger partnership, on the other hand,
tended toward concurrence or mutual compromise – symmetrical distribution of
payoffs. According to the characteristics and implications of process outcomes in the DU
framework, the findings indicate that Kissinger and Ford worked to minimize conflict
within the group and accepted ownership of most of the decisions. Unlike Nixon, Ford
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did not issue any ultimatums or make any concessions without the consultation and
concurrence of Kissinger.
As described in the case of the U.S., a clearer picture of any differences can be
found in examining the process outcomes of the Israel decisions. The outcomes of the
Israeli decisions are relatively consistent throughout the crisis and transition periods.
The findings reveal that most decisions resulted in outcomes of concurrence, consensus,
or mutual compromise, with possibly only one outcome resulting in a lopsided
compromise. The decision where it is unclear whether there was a mutual compromise
or a lopsided compromise was the agreement to abandon the demand for language on
non-belligerence (IS25). The argument that could support a lopsided compromise is
based on reports that Israel was insistent upon the inclusion of such verbiage in the
first disengagement agreement (Brecher 1980; Safran 1978), indicating strong feelings
on the subject in at least some of the members of the Cabinet. In addition, Safran (1978,
544) contends that Kissinger was surprised during negotiations in March 1975 on Sinai
II when Israel “firmly insisted on a non-belligerency declaration” in return for Israeli
withdrawal from the Mitla and Giddi passes and the oil fields, since Israel had dropped
the language in the first disengagement agreement. That the issue of non-belligerence
was again raised in the second phase of negotiations (Sinai II) indicates one of two
possibilities.
First, there was a mutual compromise whereby the members of the first decision
unit understood that this specific concession was necessary, and they had obtained all
they could at that time. In this instance, members seek to return to the decision if they
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think the outcome will be in their favor (Hermann 2001). The second possibility is that
some members took ownership of the previous decision and others did not. The
members that did not would then monitor the action or the political context and agitate
for a reconsideration of the decision. The second scenario would have been a lopsided
compromise, or an asymmetrical distribution of payoffs. It is difficult to determine
which scenario actually applies to the decision. However, Brecher (1980) and Safran
(1978) maintain that the decision in January 1974 to drop the demand for nonbelligerency was a considerable concession on the part of the Cabinet, and it was only
agreed to at the behest of Meir. It is likely, though not certain, that the decision was a
mutual compromise with the intent to revisit the issue in the second phase of
negotiations.
Nixon’s actions as predominant leader seem to move from moderately sensitive
to the political context to highly sensitive. The first two decisions taken by Nixon – to
replace all aircraft lost by Israel (US4) and instructing American military planes to
expedite delivery (US5) – demonstrate his strategy to maintain balance in the Middle
East and yet willingness to employ tactics not otherwise preferred, tactics that could
challenge detente. His decisions also reflected consideration for his political base, many
of whom held strong support for Israel (Isaacson 1992; Kissinger 1982; Nixon 1978;
Quandt 1977; Siniver 2008). All of the other decisions that Nixon made as predominant
leader illustrate a high sensitivity to the political context. The continued investigation
into the Watergate affair, along with a persistent decrease in public opinion, prompted
Nixon to put domestic politics above the immediate crisis and make spontaneous,
sometimes erratic, decisions. The decisions instructing Kissinger to negotiate and
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impose a comprehensive2 peace plan on Israel and Egypt (US7) and the letter to
Brezhnev authorizing Kissinger to act on behalf of the U.S. (US8) demonstrate this, as
well as the promises of nuclear energy to Israel and American technology to Egypt.
Nixon took initiative in most of these decisions without consulting his key adviser,
Kissinger. These observations support Hermann’s proposal from the key contingency
table, indicating that Nixon’s decision process straddled the strategic/pragmatic line,
exemplified by theories that focus primarily on the situation.
Although only one individual was identified as predominant leader for the Israeli
decisions, an application of the key contingencies for Prime Minister Golda Meir reveal
that she was moderately sensitive to the political context, particularly in regards to
Israel’s relationship with the United States. While she was concerned about U.S. support
and mindful of the consequences of her decisions, she was not willing to sacrifice
Israel’s security in order to appease the United States. On the domestic side, Meir
enjoyed a significant majority in her coalition government, holding 72 of 120 seats in
the Knesset, and so did not feel the political pressure that Nixon experienced. However,
given that Israel was at war when she made most of her decisions as a predominant
leader, her first concern was always with Israel’s security not domestic or international
politics.

Conclusion
A summary of the results indicates that the decision units stayed relatively
stable during the crisis and crisis transition periods. For the United States, decisions
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during the crisis period were made primarily by a predominant leader, although not
always the same individual actor. While decisions in Israel during the crisis period were
divided between predominant leader and single group, Meir was the only individual
identified as the predominant leader. The decision unit dynamics, however, illustrated
key differences between Israel and the United States during the crisis period. The
decision-making process in Israel focused on consensus, despite any differences within
the Cabinet. In the U.S., the process tended more toward asymmetric payoff
distributions in the form of a lopsided compromise or one party’s position prevailing, at
least until Nixon resigned from office when the decision-making process became more
stable.
The effects of regime change on decision unit dynamics are clearer in the U.S.
case than they are for Israel. As noted above, the Ford-Kissinger decision-making
process focused more on consensus building than did the Nixon-Kissinger partnership.
In the early part of Ford’s tenure, he gave Kissinger a considerable amount of leeway in
conducting foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East. He asked a lot of questions
but tended to demure to Kissinger’s position and supported him in all aspects. As Ford
became more informed on the details of ongoing negotiations and met or corresponded
with various political figures and heads of state, he developed his own opinions and
ideas about what could move negotiations forward. Ford gained more and more
confidence in his abilities the longer he was in office.
Ford’s leadership style also differed significantly from that of Nixon. Where
Nixon challenged institutional constraints, Ford respected them. Unlike Nixon, Ford was

Drake

194

Who Decides?
open to information and worked toward building consensus in his Cabinet. If any
similarities in leadership style existed between the two presidents, it lay in their
confidence of Kissinger’s abilities.
In Israel, there were only four key decisions taken after Rabin became prime
minister, and all of the process outcomes resulted in consensus or concurrence, despite
opposition within Rabin’s government. The outcomes of the key decisions, however, do
not suggest that there were no disagreements within the Cabinet regarding other
related decisions made during this time. Indeed, Defense Minister Shimon Peres at one
time threatened to resign rather than to withdraw any further than previously agreed.3
In general, Kissinger recognized that the negotiating team headed by Rabin was
undoubtedly different from that led by Meir. In a memorandum to President Ford dated
August 23, 1975, Kissinger relates how conflicts within the Cabinet and the mood of
negotiations reflected domestic political considerations, which was not the case under
Meir. An agreement was reached shortly after the memorandum was written; however,
it came at a considerable cost to the United States.4
The findings of the Agranat Commission highlighted the problems with foreign
policy decision-making in the Israeli government and prompted Meir to resign her post.
Several members in the new government expected Rabin to advocate for change in the
decision-making process, particularly involving negotiations with the United States
(Ben-Meir 1986; Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014). Yariv attests to the fact that Rabin felt
that the process was not as it should be. Rabin admitted that the “procedure by which
the prime minister would convene the Cabinet or the MDC on Fridays to deliberate and
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take decisions that had to be presented to Kissinger the following day was a faulty one”
(Ben-Meir 1986, 109). Despite this, Rabin was neither able nor willing to change it
(Ben-Meir 1986; Brownstein 1977; Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014). As Gazit maintains,
Rabin “openly opposed a national security council system, claiming that it was
inappropriate to the realities of Israeli government” (Ben-Meir 1986, 109).
There is little doubt that the process was affected by the failure of Israeli
intelligence to foresee the attack by the Egyptian or Syrian army (Brownstein 1977). As
Lewis Brownstein (260) notes, “The authority of the prime minister has been
challenged in [a] way that is unprecedented.” Golda Meir enjoyed wide flexibility in
exercising her authority, maintaining the support and confidence of her Cabinet and
receiving little in the way of challenges from the Knesset (at least during the crisis
period).
For Rabin, in addition to the opposition within his Cabinet, he faced considerable
criticism and challenges from opposition groups in the Knesset, primarily from
Menachem Begin and the newly formed, right wing Likud party. Despite openly hostile
opposition, Rabin continued in the tradition of previous prime ministers and asserted
his unspecified authority. On the matter of negotiating a second disengagement
agreement and dealing the Arabs, Rabin had his own approach to foreign policy and
acted accordingly (Ben-Meir 1986; Brownstein 1977; Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014).
Hermann (2001) maintains that the DU framework can accommodate varying
theories and models on decision-making. By designating the decision unit as the level of
analysis, the framework provides the analyst with a way to compare foreign policy
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decisions across different types of governments and decision-makers. An examination
of the decision units by themselves, however, is not sufficient for comparison. Only
when one delves into the dynamics of those units do comparisons become useful. The
key contingencies and process outcomes are, therefore, a necessary component of the
framework. Leadership style and conflict management within a group can help explain
many of the decisions taken during the time period in this study. However, as the case
of Nixon demonstrates, domestic environmental conditions can have a significant
impact on decision unit dynamics and foreign policy decisions.
The concluding chapter provides an assessment of the DU framework for
sequential decision analysis, as well as the utility in the classification systems proposed
in this study. Chapter Eight also explores the prospects for future research.
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Notes: Chapter Seven

According to Lewis Brownstein (1977), the role of the Knesset (Israel’s legislative body) in foreign
policy matters is decidedly weak (see also Mahler 1981). Knesset control or supervision over public
administration, security affairs, and the conduct of foreign policy is virtually non-existent.
2 A comprehensive agreement, rather than step-by-step interim agreements, would have required
negotiations on the Palestinian issue. Before the Arab summit in 1974, Jordan was the de facto authority
to speak for the Palestinians. However, an Arab reassessment of the conditions in the region resulted in a
vote to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the ultimate Palestinian authority.
3 This was based on a memorandum of conversation on June 20, 1975, where Kissinger attempted to
demonstrate to Ford the attitude of the Israeli Cabinet and the improbability of imposing an interim
agreement. Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 13, June 20, 1975.
4 Despite the promise of more than $2 billion in aid, not all of materialized (Fischer 2014).
1

Drake

198

Who Decides?

Chapter Eight

Conclusion
Assessment of the Decision Unit Framework
In this study, I have applied the DU framework to the decisions made by Israel
and the United States from the day before the Yom Kippur War began (October 5, 1973)
to the conclusion of the Sinai II Agreement (September 1, 1975). The DU framework
stipulates the occasion for decision as the level of analysis by which foreign policy
decisions can be compared. I have attempted to classify the occasions with the intent of
expanding upon the framework. The hypotheses considered in this study were
developed in order to test the effects of the occasions for decisions on the decision unit
and to provide a way to potentially identify when or why decision unit dynamics might
be altered during the decision-making process.
By applying the DU framework to sequential decisions I have been able to
identify the key actors in the decision process within a government and establish
patterns of behavior or choice indicative of that government. These patterns can help
identify decision units where the evidence is not quite clear. While I applied behavior
patterns to several decisions in this study, there is a danger in making assumptions
about a decision unit if one is trying to determine what factors might precipitate a
change in that unit. This could present a limitation in the confidence level of the
analysis, particularly where primary sources are scarce. However, limitations can be
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minimized by examining how the decision in question reflects or contradicts the
decision-makers’ goals and preferences.
An overall view of the study shows that, as the environment moved from a crisis
to a transition period, single group decision-making became more prevalent. Indeed,
the single group decision unit was present in eleven of thirty-one decisions during the
crisis and twenty-three of twenty-nine in the transition period. This may suggest that as
the level of stress decreases or as the immediate threat associated with the crisis begins
to subside, the decision unit may return to more routine decision-making.
In general, applying the DU framework to one key decision was not especially
difficult. However, attempting to identify specific key decisions in a sequential decision
process may at times seem arbitrary. For example, decisions that did not result in
actionable consequences – i.e., Meir’s decision to fly to Washington during the crisis,
and Nixon’s promises of American technologies to Israel and Egypt – might seem
irrelevant in the overall study. However, these decisions offer indications into the
personalities and confidence of the individuals’ abilities to affect events. Meir believed a
personal visit from her could convince the U.S. of the seriousness of the situation and
the urgent need for supplies. Nixon’s bold promises of American technologies
demonstrated his desire to interject himself into the successes in the Middle East,
where previously he had been inattentive.
In addition, the fluid nature of war presents some challenges in discriminating
between political and military decisions. For the United States, the determination was
more apparent. America was not engaged militarily; therefore, all of its decisions were
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decidedly political. Even the decision to provide military equipment to Israel was
political. There was no immediate threat to U.S. security or territorial integrity. There
were no American military forces deployed. America’s primary concern focused on U.S.
interests in the region – i.e., maintaining a balance of power in the Middle East and
addressing the concerns of the Jewish voting community at home. That the U.S. sought
to marginalize Soviet influence in the region, while establishing a closer relationship to
Egypt, was political opportunism. Simply put, the Israel strategy was to end or prevent
hostilities with consideration for political and territorial consequences. The U.S.
strategy was to protect its foreign interests and expand its influence in the Middle East.
With respect to classifying the occasion for decision, several problems quickly
became apparent. First, in some instances it was difficult to discern all of the factors
that led decision-makers to consider one specific decision – let alone a sequence of
decisions – especially in cases where official documentation is not available. In such
cases, I used biographical accounts of those individuals involved in the decision-making
process. Although not a perfect solution, the use of personal accounts enabled me to
piece together the events leading up to a particular decision.
Another issue pertaining to the classification of the occasions for decision was
that some decisions were a result of multiple occasions, confounding possible effects.
Determining if one occasion had a greater influence than the other or if there was an
interaction effect became potentially problematic. And, of course, there is always the
possibility that a key variable was omitted.

Chapter Eight

201

Conclusion
The most difficult occasion to assess was new information. Decisions are
generally not reached arbitrarily, and most can be associated with the presentation of
new or additional information. For example, when the Israeli government learned that
Egyptian and Syrian forces had mobilized along the border, the information signified a
threat to the country, easily identifiable as an external shock. However, the intelligence
is obviously new information. Indeed, external shock may be viewed simply as a
subcategory of new information. It could be recommended, therefore, that new
information be further clarified, defined, and classified into subcategories that identify
what type of new information is being introduced to decision-makers.
Although it would not affect the hypotheses in this study, the category other
could also be further defined. For example, additional conditions that might precipitate
or influence decision-making include domestic factors such as economic cycles, interest
group or lobbying activities, or considerations of an upcoming election. For example,
the Jewish lobby in the United States put considerable pressure on Presidents Nixon
and Ford to ensure Israel’s security, as evidenced in meeting minutes. Jewish leaders
routinely met with or telephoned Kissinger in efforts to influence or increase U.S.
support for Israel. How much of an effect this activity had on the decision units in this
study is difficult to determine. Perhaps an alternative approach would be to ask:
without the pressure applied by the pro-Israel lobby, not only to the administration but
also to Congress, would the United States have agreed to the substantial aid packages to
Israel? Domestic pressures may have affected the outcome of certain decisions, but it is
uncertain whether they influenced the dynamics of the decision units involved.
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This research cannot say whether shocks or feedback affected a persistent
change in decision unit dynamics or decision processes, as the study did not consider
Israeli or U.S. decision-making after the signing of the second interim agreement.
Overall, though, Israeli decision-making seemed to have been more affected than the
U.S. For Israel, the initiation of the war, the external shock that precipitated the crisis,
revealed serious vulnerabilities regarding information processing and intelligence
analysis, as highlighted in the Agranat Commission report.
As to the overall effects of feedback, consider Wiener (1954) and de Rosnay’s
(1997) assessment that negative feedback induces stability while positive feedback will
eventually destroy a system as it applies to one particular decision. Through established
Israeli information channels, decision-makers learned of a possible, perhaps imminent,
attack by the Egyptian and Syrian armies. Prior experience and preconceived beliefs led
many of these analysts to conclude that, although evidence and intelligence suggested
such a possibility, war with either Egypt or Syria was highly unlikely; thus, Meir made
the decision not to call up reserves or put the military on full alert. The consequences of
this decision were decidedly negative. The Israeli army sustained heavy losses,
including the loss of soldiers and, at least initially, territorial ground. Israeli military
experts and analysts were exposed as naïve or short-minded at best and incompetent at
worst. Political and military careers were compromised. The question then becomes:
did the negative consequences (or feedback) of this policy action reinforce stability in
the existing system, as Wiener would propose, or rather did it proceed along the path
Pierson might suggest and create systemic changes or challenges to the processing of
information as well as to the decision-making process?
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In the short term, specifically during the crisis period, this particular negative
consequence appeared to have little or no impact on the dynamics of the decision unit.
In fact, Prime Minister Meir acted as predominant leader in several subsequent
decisions. However, the negative consequences of multiple Israeli decisions publicly
called into question the informal nature of the decision-making process (Brownstein
1977; Derfler 2014; Fischer 2014). As for long-term effects, the results in this study are
inconclusive. The dynamics of Rabin’s government may have differed from that of Meir;
however, the four decisions taken under Rabin indicate no significant differences in
process outcomes.
In the conduct of the study, I found some deficiencies in the framework. The
primary focus of this study was to determine the decision unit for each key decision.
Although I attempt to identify other elements, such as the type of occasion for decision,
simply recognizing the DU says nothing about the process leading up to the occasion for
decision. For instance, the DU framework does not consider the flow of information or
how intelligence reaches the upper levels of government, a significant factor in what
options are available and how they are presented to decision-makers.
The identification of the decision unit as single group also highlights some
deficiencies in terms of decision analysis. While Hermann (2001) maintains that the key
contingencies – the techniques used to manage conflict within the group – help
determine the decision process and outcomes, the size and configuration of the group
can potentially influence sequential decisions. For instance, in the Israeli case during
the crisis period, sometimes the group consisted of select members of the Cabinet –
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Meir’s Kitchen Cabinet – and sometimes it consisted of the entire Cabinet. If Meir chose
to include or exclude particular members, as Brecher (1980) and others maintain, then
she consciously affected group dynamics, potentially limiting dissention or
disagreements within the Cabinet. This raises some question of whether Meir acted
more as a predominant leader by influencing group structure rather than a strong
group leader.
Finally, Hermann (2001, 55) suggests that researchers should focus on those
occasions for decision that lead to authoritative actions rather than those occasions that
seek information, implement a previous decision, or ratify a decision. In examining
sequential decision-making, I deliberately deviated from the framework’s intent.
Decisions such as Cabinet approval of the disengagement agreements and Cabinet
authorizations demonstrate an underlying premise of the Israeli decision process: while
the prime minister might wield considerable influence with his or her government, it is
the Cabinet that is presumed to possess the authority to commit the resources of the
state.
In her memoirs, Golda Meir (1976, 369) posed the following: “In the final
analysis…the fate of small countries always rests with the superpowers, and they
always have their own interest to guard.” Many of the decisions in the study seem to
reflect this assessment. The involvement of the United States, as well as the Soviet
Union, no doubt played a key role in the decision-making process for Israel. Great
consideration was given to the possible consequences of U.S. support prior to several
key Israeli decisions. The escalation toward a superpower confrontation forced Israel
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(and Egypt) to accept an immediate cease-fire and make certain concessions. On the
part of the United States, the government took decisions that obviously reflected their
own interests, including taking the negotiations to Geneva, the reassessment of U.S.
Middle East policy, and, in particular, providing military aid with the stipulation that it
be transported via unmarked Israeli airplanes. One could argue that Meir’s assessment
supports a systemic approach to foreign policy-making, perhaps rendering assessments
at the individual level unnecessary. However, this study demonstrates that individual
leadership and group dynamics can influence not only the outcomes of decisions but
also the decision process itself.
This raises an important point regarding the potential relevance of the DU
framework. Those intent on influencing foreign policy must be aware of the individuals
or groups of individuals with the authority to make policy decisions. Understanding the
decision-making process in a particular government can help individuals, organizations,
and other governments focus efforts toward the appropriate policymakers.

Future Research
Despite some limitations of the framework, several possible avenues for future
research emerge. An examination of Israeli and U.S. decisional units during the Camp
David Accords might reveal any differences in the decision-making process when
compared to the results of my study. Additionally, a comparison of the decision units of
the other governments involved in the 1973 crisis, such as Egypt, Syria, and the Soviet
Union, could provide more depth and richness to this study, particularly when
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compared to the decisions made during the crisis period. A study of sequential decisionmaking after the fall of Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union could test
the possible systemic effects on U.S. and Israeli decisions and decision units. The
framework might also be used to examine U.S. or Israeli decisions made under routine
conditions – e.g., treaties or trade agreements.
As suggested previously, the classification system for the occasions for decision
could be further clarified and refined. This would present the opportunity to not only
test the effects of other types of occasions but it would also allow for the isolation of
“like” occasions for decision. Researchers could then provide more quantitative analysis
using multiple foreign policy decisions across multiple types of governments.
Beasley et al. (2001) suggests that the nature of the decision unit is important in
determining how a series of actions is going to play out. My research helps to confirm
this assertion. It illustrates how dominant individual leadership, whether in the form of
a predominant leader or a powerful leader in a single group, can influence the foreign
policy decision-making process as well as the ultimate decision. Henry Kissinger
demonstrated this, as did Golda Meir. Kissinger achieved his overall strategic goal of
marginalizing Soviet influence. Meir was able to convince her Cabinet to make certain
concessions, which were previously unacceptable, in order to secure long-term
commitments from the United States. Moreover, the process outcomes generally
reflected the dynamics of the decision unit. Going beyond explaining historical
decisions, however, researchers applying the DU framework to sequential decisionmaking in other cases might be able to identify broader, more general patterns of choice
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and behavior that could perhaps help move the framework into a more predictive
realm.
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Appendix

TABLE 7.3. Environmental Shocks - Crisis Period
UNITED STATES

Date

Endogenous Shock

ISRAEL

Exogenous Shock

Endogenous Shock

Exogenous Shock

5 October
1973

Mobilization of
Egyptian and Syrian
forces along the Israeli
border

Mobilization of
Egyptian and Syrian
forces along the Israeli
border

6 October
1973

Egypt and Syria attack
Israel

Egypt and Syria attack
Israel

10
October
1973
19
October
1973

VP Spiro Agnew resigns

Arab oil embargo
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20
October
1973
24
October
1973

Nixon orders firing of
Special Prosecutor
Archibald Cox
Soviets threaten
unilateral military
action in the Middle
East

25
October
1973

Soviets threaten
unilateral military
action in the Middle
East
US increases military
readiness to DefCon III
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TABLE 7.4. Environmental Shocks - Crisis Transition Period
UNITED STATES

Date

Endogenous Shock

ISRAEL

Exogenous Shock

11 April
1974

Endogenous Shock

Exogenous Shock

Prime Minister Meir
resigns
Kiryat Shmona
massacre

15 May
1974

Ma'a lot massacre

19 June
1974

Knesset narrowly fails
to pass a vote of noconfidence against
Rabin government

24-25 June
1974

Nahariya attack

27 July
1974

House Judiciary
Committee adopts
articles of
impeachment charging
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Nixon with obstruction
of justice

20 July
1974
8 August
1974

Turkey invades Cyprus
Nixon announces
resignation

8
September
1974

TWA jet from Tel Aviv
to Athens crashed terror attack

19
November
1974

Beit She'an attack

6 March
1975

Savoy Hotel attack

26 March
1975

Ford announces
reassessment of US
policy on Israel
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30 April
1975

Saigon falls to
Communist North
Vietnam
Jerusalem struck by
missiles, 500 meters
from Knesset

3 May 1975

12-15 May
1975

Mayaguez incident

4 June 1975

Suez Canal reopens

15 June
1975

Kfar Yuval hostage
crisis

4 July 1975

Zion Square
refrigerator bombing
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